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# CURRENTS

*A QUARTERLY REVIEW  
to explore the implications  
of Christianity for our times*

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MERTON	•	NIEBUHR	•	WATKIN
FLOROVSKY	•	BOURKE	•	CHENU

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# CHRISTIANITY AND MASS MOVEMENTS

THOMAS MERTON

THE TASK OF A CHRISTIAN is not only to "save his own soul" but to do so by "building the Kingdom of God" even in this world, as an image of the eschatological and mystical Kingdom of Heaven. There has always been a tendency for Christian society to pass from an almost exclusive emphasis on the spiritual character of the Christian vocation, to an equally exclusive emphasis on the social and humanistic aspects of that vocation. The fact remains that both points of view are obligatory. We are bound to seek the realization of the mystical Kingdom of God by the fact that we must love God "with our whole heart and our whole soul and all our strength" but we are bound also to build a just, humane and peaceful society on earth by the fact that we must "love our neighbor as ourselves."

Man saves his soul by living a good life in his body. And the good bodily life in this world is a spiritual life—a life in which man's work, play, thought, love, and all his strivings are spiritualized. This means that man must give glory to God by living a life that is, in the best and fullest sense, *human*. Such a life presupposes a reasonable standard of living, a certain freedom, opportunities for education, decent work, and mature participation in the political and cultural life of society. In a word, Christian living supposes a balanced and peaceful social order. And Christians are bound by their vocation to strive to realize on earth some measure of such order.

The modern world offers the temptation of spectacular technological and organizational efforts to achieve order and prosperity in society. Technology and organization are not to be spurned: they

have their place. But that place is secondary. There can be no question of a Christian's placing all his hope in power, wealth, or technology above everything else. If he does so, he runs the risk of committing the same ghastly blunders as those who have tried to build a new world without love, without Christ and without God and who, in so doing, have ended by enslaving man more cruelly and degrading him more completely than ever before.

Building the Kingdom of God is not a matter of creating an immense and powerful organization, a kind of monolithic religious society with far-flung political power, social influence, and an ever-increasing membership. When Christ sent His Apostles to preach to all nations—a task which is incumbent upon us today as it was twenty centuries ago—He did not intend merely that we should go out and sign up everybody on a list of members, and draw them into a mighty aggregation.

The fact that the Church is the Mystical Body of Christ immediately sets it apart from every form of "aggregation," or crowd. If the Church were merely a moral body, a social organization, there would be no spiritual mystery about the union of her many members in one body. They would simply be united by common interests and a common purpose. But the Church is something far greater and more mysterious than this. The unity of the members of Christ is such that together they form One Person, One Christ, and yet each one personally "is Christ."

Christ the Lord is all in all, and present in each one of His members. Christ is not Head of the Church in the same way that a Dictator is Head of a Totali-

tarian State. By his authority and power, the Dictator imposes his policies on every individual in the state, controlling them all in and through a vast political organization. Christ rules His faithful first of all from within, with the power and authority of supernatural life and of grace. It is because of the inner movement of grace that the "believers" unite themselves freely with one another in the Church, under the authority of a visible head who represents Christ on earth. The Church as a visible society has, of course, her organization, laws and discipline. But these are all secondary, and relatively unimportant compared with the principle of inner and spiritual unity which is the charity of Christ. Charity can only be exercised among free individual men. Charity is the mark of a *person*, not of an organization.

The Church therefore is not an army or a mass movement in which the individual loses himself. When the prophets preached the Messianic Kingdom of Peace, they based their preaching on justice and mercy which implied a profound respect for the rights and integrity of the human person. And when Christ, in the New Testament, preached the Kingdom of God, He opened the way only to individuals. No one can enter the Kingdom except by his own personal decision.

We are not saved *en masse*. Masses indeed may be called, but only persons are chosen because only persons can respond to a call by a free choice of their own. The Church is not, and has never been merely for the mass-man, the passive, inert man who drifts with the crowd and never decides anything for himself.

The mass-man is material for a mass movement because he is easily transformed into a fanatic. That is why the mass movement is so congenial to fanatics, and seeks to keep the fanaticism of

its members at a high pitch. Indeed, when the members of a mass-movement begin to lose their fanatical hatred of everything that is *not* the movement then that movement itself begins to die. This is a truth which Hitler openly admitted, and it explains the frantic insistence of the Russians on maintaining an iron curtain and preaching virulent hatred of the unknown world that lies beyond it.

In spite of this, there are as we know many Russians who instinctively realize that outside the Iron Curtain are millions of persons who, like themselves, love peace and do not want war. This instinct of love, and identification of oneself with the foreigner and stranger, this ability to find oneself in another, which alone can preserve world peace, is a fundamentally Christian instinct. Its continued presence in the Western World is due to the influence of our Christian past. Woe to use if this heritage is ever lost!

Nothing is so harmful to the Church as fanaticism. And it is harmful precisely because it produces an *ersatz* of Christian fervor and unity. The fanaticism of a mass movement has the semblance of a unanimous spiritual front—the dedication of members to a common purpose to resist error and stamp out evil. It is precisely this semblance of spirituality and dedication that makes fanaticism deadly. Fanaticism is never really spiritual because it is not *free*. It is not free because it is not enlightened. It cannot judge between good and evil, truth and falsity, because it is blinded by prejudice. Faith and prejudice share a common need to rely on authority and in this they can sometimes be confused by one who does not understand their true nature. But faith rests on the authority of love while prejudice rests on the pseudo-authority of hatred. Everyone who has read the Gospel real-

izes that in order to be a Christian one must give up being a fanatic, because Christianity is love. Love and fanaticism are incompatible. Fanaticism thrives on aggression. It is destructive, revengeful and sterile. Fanaticism is all the more virulent in proportion as it springs from *inability* to love, from incapacity to reciprocate human understanding.

Fanaticism refuses to look at another man as a person. It regards him only as a thing. He is either a "member" or he is not a member. He is either part of one's mob, or he is outside the mob. Woe to him, above all, if he stands outside the mob with the mute protest of his individual personality! That was what happened at the Crucifixion of Christ. Christ, the Incarnate Son of God, came as a Person, seeking the understanding, the acceptance and the love of free persons. He found Himself face to face with a compact fanatical group, that wanted nothing of His Person. They feared His disturbing uniqueness. It was necessary, as Caiaphas said, that this "one man should die for the nation"—that the individual Person, and above all *this* Person, should be sacrificed to the collectivity. From its very birth, Christianity has been categorically opposed to everything that savors of the mass-movement.

A mass movement always places the "cause" above the individual person, and sacrifices the person to the interests of the movement. Thus it empties the person of all that is his own, takes him out of himself, casts him in a mold which endows him with the ideas and aspirations of the group rather than his own. There is nothing wrong in the person's sacrificing himself for society: there can be times when this is right and necessary, and in the sacrifice the person will find himself on a higher level. But in the case of a mass movement the emptying of the individual turns

him into a husk, a mask, a puppet which is used and manipulated at will by the leaders of the movement. The individual ceases to be a person and becomes simply a "member," a "thing" which serves a cause, not by thinking and willing, but by being pushed about like a billiard ball, in accordance with the interests of the cause.

Contrast this with the teaching of Christ, for whom the soul of the individual was more important than the most sacred laws and rites, since these exist only for the sake of persons, and not vice versa. "The sabbath was made for man and not man for the sabbath" (Mark 7:27). Christ even placed the bodily health and well-being of individuals before the law of the sabbath. One of the bitterest complaints made against Him was that He cured on the sabbath.

A mass movement readily exploits the discontent and frustration of large segments of the population which for some reason or other cannot face the responsibility of being persons and standing on their own feet. But give these persons a movement to join, a cause to defend, and they will go to any extreme, stop at no crime, intoxicated as they are by the slogans that give them a pseudo-religious sense of transcending their own limitations. The member of the mass movement, afraid of his own isolation and his own weakness as an individual, cannot face the task of discovering within himself the spiritual power and integrity which can be called forth only by love. Instead of this, he seeks a movement that will protect his weakness with a wall of anonymity and justify his acts by the sanction of collective glory and power. All the better if this is done out of hatred, for hatred is always easier and less subtle than love. It does not have to respect reality, as love does. It does not have to take account of individual cases. Its solutions are simple and

easy. It makes its decisions by a simple glance at a face, a colored skin, a uniform. It identifies the enemy by an accent, an unfamiliar turn of speech, an appeal to concepts that are difficult to understand. And then fanaticism knows what to do. Here is something unfamiliar. This is not "ours." This must be brought into line—or destroyed.

Here is the great temptation of the modern age, this universal infection of fanaticism, this plague of intolerance, prejudice and hate which flows from the crippled nature of man who is afraid of love and does not dare to be a person. It is against this temptation most of all that the Christian must labor with inexhaustible patience and love, in silence, perhaps in repeated failure, seeking tirelessly to restore, wherever he can, and first of all in himself, the capacity for love and understanding which makes man the living image of God.

\* \* \*

In the Old Testament, the Chosen People followed Moses as a group toward the Promised Land. As a community they entered with Josue into the Kingdom of Promise. It was sufficient to be part of the community that kept God's law, and the rest was taken care of. But in the New Testament, the message of salvation is addressed not to a group or a totality but to individuals. "*Si quis vult . . .*" "If any man, any person, decides and wills to follow me . . ." In the New Testament salvation is a matter of a free personal decision to accept and to follow Christ, to do the will of Christ, to please Him, to be His friend. The ritual of baptism is sufficient evidence of the care the Church takes to treat her children as individual persons, and to show a supreme respect for their freedom. Only a person can say "*volo*," "I will." The Christian is not saved as a member of a mob, by join-

ing in mass acclamations and allowing himself to be lost and submerged in the vast anonymous exultation of a totality. The *Alleluia* of the victorious Church of Christ is indeed the acclamation of a "great multitude which no man can number" (Apoc. 7:9) but it is made up of the "*Volo*," the declaration of each one that he is a member of Christ, a friend of Christ. And this witness may often be sealed by the Christian's own blood in martyrdom. Religious vows are not merely the Christian person's consecration of himself to the service of a good cause, not merely a matter of immersing oneself in the anonymity of an Order—it is above all the act by which one declares that he is before all else a friend, even a spouse, of Christ. It is not a renunciation of personality, but, like martyrdom, its highest affirmation.

The members of a mass movement may perhaps choose to become units in the totalitarian community: more often they are dragged into it or they drift into it passively, without too definite a decision. In any case, membership in a mass movement is too often merely an "escape from freedom," a renunciation of personal responsibility, in order to live not by one's own mind and one's own freedom but by the thought and decisions of the group: the party line, the will of the leader. The disastrous consequences of this renunciation of moral responsibility on the part of the individual has been made clear by the unbelievable atrocities committed in police states all over the world in the last thirty years. These things have been done "with a good conscience" by people who have ceased to think and decide for themselves, carried away by the hypnotic effect of feeling themselves lost in a huge entity vastly more powerful and more effective in its actions than an individual could ever be. The mem-

ber of the mass movement loses his sense of limitation, weakness, fallibility, in the unlimited power and infallibility of the group.

When Christ called the "poor in spirit" blessed, He did not preach the abdication of our human dignity, He did not preach flight from individual responsibility and from the risks and limitations it implies. On the contrary, who is more poor in spirit than the man who takes the risk of standing on his own feet, who tries to realize his own fallibility and struggles to decide in his own conscience what is the will of God? From the moment that we break away from the reassuring passivity and confusion which surrounds us on all sides as we drift the stream of the world, we become aware of our own insecurity, our fallibility, and we "work out our salvation in fear and trembling."

Take the moral teaching of St. Paul to the Ephesians or Corinthians, as an example. The life of the pagan world, with its idolatry, its comfortable, accepted rituals and superstitions, its drunkenness, its luxury and its self-indulgence, created an atmosphere of warm, delusive irresponsibility in which the individual could drift along without worrying too much. This is not hard for us to visualize since our present day society is just about the same. We too feel the risk and insecurity that come when we nerve ourselves to break away from this passivity, to resist those who try to "deceive us with vain words" (Ephesians 5:6) to "be not partakers with them" (*ibid.* 7) and "to be no more children tossed to and fro with every wind of doctrine by the wickedness of men . . . who walk in the vanity of their mind, having their understanding darkened, being alienated from the life of God . . . who despairing have given themselves up to lasciviousness . . . and covetousness" (Ephesians 4:14-19).

It is the man who identifies himself with a powerful group, glories in its display of might and fills his mouth and his head with its jargon, who ceases to be poor in spirit because he no longer has to take the responsibility of thinking and willing as a fallible person. Personality means at once glory and lowliness, power and risk. When he is called upon to answer for his actions, the person who stands alone is weak and helpless indeed if he finds himself faced with a group that does not approve of his action. And yet he is in possession of great spiritual power if his personal decision has been made in the light of truth, with the testimony of a good conscience, as the act of a child of God. "What then shall we say to these things? If God be for us, who is against us? . . . Who shall accuse against the elect of God? God that justifieth." (Romans 8: 31-33).

\* \* \*

The individual Christian does not stand alone. He who has in his heart the testimony of Christ and of the Holy Spirit, who stands firm in the love of God and of his truth, who clings to the truth not because of a temporal power and glory that are seen, but because of the invisible glory of God in the inmost depths of his being, in faith—such a one is united with all who share the same hope, the same faith, the same love. He is one with those who are filled with the same Spirit. His unity with them is expressed by an exterior confession of faith, by fidelity to the same laws, by participation in the same liturgical worship of the All Holy One. He is a member of the visible Church, the Mystical Body of Christ. But these things alone do not constitute the essence of his unity with his brethren and with Christ, which is interior and spiritual. Of the Christian's interior union with Christ and his brethren,



his obedience and worship are only the outward sign not the whole spiritual essence.

Hence there must be something more in the Christian life and apostolate, than merely persuading Christians to adhere to the same doctrinal propositions, to obey the same laws, and frequent the same sacraments. If we are content with merely exterior practice of our religion we will tend to make Christianity another of the mass movements that cover the face of the earth. Then the Christian, rather than a free man, humbled by the consciousness of his responsibility, tends to become another fanatic who allows himself the worst excesses and excuses them easily on the ground that he is "defending the faith" or "fighting for the Church." A timely example: the readiness some Christians might have today to accept the idea of an all-out atomic surprise attack on Russia, and their approval of the most drastic and cruel methods in order to "stamp out communism." Such things are complacently "justified" by the argument that the communists are atheists, enemies of God, and hence "outside the law." The example may seem a gratuitous supposition. Let us hope there are few such Christians in the world, or none at all. Yet we cannot forget the frightful barbarities perpetrated by the Western Crusaders in Constantinople, desecrating Greek Churches, sacking monasteries and committing all sorts of other crimes, confident that these were acts proper to a holy war! Such incomprehension of the law and love of Christ seems almost unbelievable. Yet the study of history shows us these things and others like them repeated over and over again. By such actions the Kingdom of God is not built, it is destroyed; or would be if the gates of hell could prevail against it.

The union that binds the members of Christ together is not the union of

proud confidence in the power of an organization. The Church is united by the *humility* as well as by the charity of her members. Hers is the union that comes from the consciousness of individual fallibility and poverty, from the humility which recognizes its own limitations and accepts them, the meekness that cannot take upon itself to condemn, but can only forgive because it is conscious that it has itself been forgiven by Christ. The union of Christians is a union of friendship and mercy, a bearing of one another's burdens in the sharing of divine forgiveness. Christian forgiveness is not confined merely to those who are members of the Church. To be a Christian one *must* love all men, including not only one's own enemies but even those who claim to be the "enemies of God." "Whosoever is angry with his brother shall be in danger of the judgment... Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you, pray for them that persecute and calumniate you, that you may be the children of your Father who is in heaven" (Matt. 5:22, 44, 45). The solidarity of the Christian community is not based on the awareness that the Church has authority to cast out and to anathematize, but on the realization that Christ has given her the power to forgive sin in His Name and to welcome the sinner to the banquet of His love in the Holy Eucharist. More than this, the Church is aware of her divine mission to bring forgiveness and peace *to all men*. This means not only that the sacraments are there for all who will approach them, that Christians themselves must bring love, mercy and justice into the lives of their neighbors, in order to reveal to them the presence of Christ in His Church. This can only be done if all Christians strive generously to love and serve all men with whom they come into contact in their daily lives.

It has been repeatedly pointed out that the Mystical Body of Christ is not an organization but an organism. However, if this is to be an intuition that has meaning, and not just a verbal formula, we must realize that an organism is a living thing, and that it is ruled by the laws of life. Life is subject to its own laws. It does not allow itself to be governed by anything outside itself. The life which Christ came to give to the world is His own life, His love, and His freedom. He Himself is the "way, the truth and the life" both of the Christian and of the Church. Our task as Christians is to continue on earth that same life which Christ lived among us. Each individual Christian embarks upon a life in which he will govern his conduct by the pattern of the Gospels, and on the Christ-likeness of the saints. But in order to understand both the Gospels and the example of the saints, he must be not only guided exteriorly by the Church but also interiorly formed and taught by the Holy Spirit. Such a life cannot be reduced to mere external conformity to the patterns and norms of a given social group, no matter how Christian may be its intentions. Each Christian must work out his own salvation, as a member of Christ, and work it out in union with others. But the new circumstances of each age in the life of the Church confronts each new generation of Christians with problems and solutions for which the past offers no fully satisfactory example.

This means that each Christian has a truly creative mission in the society of his time. He has to begin anew, under new conditions, the great task of helping to redeem mankind by love. This does not mean simply applying formulas that were good in the 13th Century—though these are not necessarily out of place either. But we must discover new solutions for problems that

are entirely new in our age. The discovery is not the work of science only, but above all the work of love.

The history of the Church is a confusion of successes and apparent failures of Christianity. It is in fact an ever-repeated series of attempts to begin constructing the Kingdom of God on earth. This is not surprising, nor is it something Christ Himself failed to foresee. The parable of the cockle sown among the wheat shows clearly that He had this in mind, and that it accords with His Father's plan. The life of the Church in history as well as the life of the individual Christian is a constantly repeated act of starting over again, of good intentions ending in achievements and in mistakes: of errors that have to be set right, of failings that have to be utilized, of lessons that are learned poorly and have to be learned over again. There have been hesitations and false starts in Christian history. There have even been grave errors, but these are imputable to Christian secular societies rather than to the Church. The Church alone has never lost her way. But the thing that keeps her on the right way is not power, not human wisdom, not political dexterity, or diplomatic foresight. There are times in the history of the Church when these things became, for Christian leaders, stones of stumbling and sources of delusion. The thing that keeps the Church and the Christian on the right way is love. And this is necessary, because love is the highest expression of personality and of freedom. The Kingdom of God is, then, not the Kingdom of those who merely preach a doctrine or follow certain religious practices: it is the Kingdom of those who love. To build the Kingdom of God is to build a society that is based entirely on freedom and love. It is to build a society which is founded on re-

spect for the individual person, since only persons are capable of love.

One cannot help getting the impression that this is not sufficiently well understood in our day. Love is a word that has been emptied of content by our materialistic society. In our world "love" is reduced to the infatuation celebrated in popular songs. Genuine love cannot be taken for granted, and least of all today. But we Christians seem to take it for granted. We seem to feel that we "love one another" and that we know very well what love is. We tend to act as if things were so well regulated by love in our own household that we could safely forget about it and go out to preach to others. Hence we are not worried about love, so much as about doctrine. At all costs we want to get everybody to agree with us, and to accept our beliefs.

In this way we tend to become proselytizers rather than apostles. That is to say that we are looking for "members" who, by their numbers and their material support will bolster up our own faith and give us more confidence in the doctrine that we preach.

The true Apostle is not preaching a doctrine or leading a movement or recruiting for an organization: he is preaching for Christ, because he loves other men and knows that thus he can bring them happiness, and give meaning to their lives. The proselytizer is selling his doctrine because he needs proselytes. The Apostle is preaching Christ because men need the mercy of God and because only in the love of Christ can they find happiness. The proselytizer is bitter and impatient when his ambitions are thwarted: and when they are successful he only communicates his own bitterness and restlessness to those whom he has "converted" into a replica of himself. The Apostle has no ambitions for himself, and his faith is so deep that

it does not depend on being preached with great exterior success. Even if no one were to believe him, the Apostle would continue quietly and patiently to preach the love of God for man in Christ, without hackneyed slogans, without arrogance and without the salesman's insufferable insistence.

The spirit of proselytism grows out of human cupidity and ambition, and it is this which endangers the purity of the Christian faith in our age, by making Christianity sometimes too like the mass movements that are springing up everywhere. For proselytism, not being "rooted and grounded in charity" (Ephesians 3:17) but springing rather from a hidden anxiety for domination and power, is over-anxious to imitate the techniques and the policies of politicians and business men.

It is quite true that the Church must make use of the great new inventions of our age in order to preach the Gospel far and wide. But the Christian apostle must learn how to use these things in a different spirit and with different techniques from the man of the world. The radio and newspaper publicity that surrounds for example the death of a Pope, his burial, and the election and coronation of his successor, can immensely debase the dignity and significance of the Church's symbolic rituals by presenting them in the senseless clichés of journalese. Christianity loses its meaning when it is described in the language of those whose minds are a constant series of uninterpreted sensations. Filtered through this tepid medium and reduced to the same formless neutrality that emasculates every other truth as soon as it becomes "news," the realities of Christianity and the Church have nothing whatever to gain and everything to lose by mere "publicity." Unless we strive to develop a greater spirit of self-criticism and discretion in our use of

the media that have been developed by business and politics, we run a serious risk of becoming, in spite of ourselves, a "party" of parades, slogans and mass demonstrations.

There *must* of course be huge concourses of the faithful in witness of the glories of the Christian faith, but no matter how large a congregation of Christians may be, if it is fully Christian it is never merely a crowd, never merely a mass meeting. The individual is always more important than the collectivity. This is manifested in a rather striking way by the cures that take place, at times, during great demonstrations at Lourdes. The important thing is not that there is a huge crowd singing or praying, but that *one person* who was crippled gets up and goes away whole. The joy of all is simply the amplification of the joy of that one.

It is deeply significant that in any gathering of Christians, each individual person present is so important that a spiritual or temporal favor granted to him can burst into a thousandfold increase of joy in the whole multitude praising God.

A mass movement is a pyramid at whose summit a few powerful men thrive and grow stronger on the labors of the huge anonymous mass which sacrifices itself in adoration of them. The Kingdom of God is just the opposite: it is the Kingdom of One who being equal to God took the form of a servant and suffered the death of the Cross that the love and life of God might descend and reach out into the lowest depths and bring light to all who are sitting in darkness, poverty, hopelessness and the shadow of death. In the Kingdom of God those who are higher exist for those who are below them. As Christ said:

The princes of the gentiles lord it over them and they that are greater

exercise power upon them. It shall not be so among you: but whosoever will be the greatest among you, let him be your minister, and he that will be first among you shall be your servant.

(Matt. 20:25-27)

No matter how gigantic the Christian congregation may sometimes become in its zeal to bear massive witness to its faith in Christ, the type of the Christian gathering will always remain not the parade of thousands of loyal members of a "cause" but the family of the faithful reunited peacefully for the breaking of Bread in the Holy Eucharist, the Lord's Supper. The supreme manifestation of Christian unity is always the relatively small group that gathers around the altar for Mass. The Holy Sacrifice is indeed magnificently impressive when it is offered before an enormous multitude in a stadium, at a Eucharistic congress. Yet it is far more truly itself when it simply unites the members of a parish in the parish church early on a Sunday morning. By way of analogy, the daily meal which unites families and friends together in the evening, at home, is much more truly significant and human in its ordinariness and genuine warmth than the elaborate formal banquet where a hundred strangers get together in a hotel to nibble at strange cooking and listen to a series of speeches.

• • •

Karl Marx's basic charge against religion was that it engineered a systematic *alienation* of the human spirit. It took man away from himself, and from his own spirit. It emptied his life of its personal content to make him a "thing" belonging to something and someone else. It reduced him from the status of an individual person living his own life and forging his own future, to that of a "believer," an anonymous cipher in a

religious organization, a worshipper of invisible powers, who devotes his energies and his income to the service of a fiction which he himself creates: a fiction whose existence is encouraged and abetted by the economic rulers of his world. There is no doubt a certain crudity in Marx's conception. It represents an analysis of religion *from the outside*, by one whose religious instincts had remained frustrated. Marx was not a man without religion: he was a man whose religious development had been thwarted by the practical bourgeois indifference and hypocrisy in the midst of which he lived. But his hidden religious energies certainly found a devious outlet in the obvious messianism of his philosophy. In any case, his idea of man's alienation by religion, economics, politics and philosophy is his most genial contribution to the history of human thought. There is no need for Christianity to fear this sharp instrument of Marxian criticism. It becomes indeed one of our own most potent weapons if we turn it against those who claim to be the inheritors of Marx's thought.

Where has man's spirit ever reached such a pitch of alienation as in the mass movements of the twentieth century, and especially in the Soviet Union? The intellectual, spiritual, artistic and religious life of the Soviet citizen has been systematically drained at its source by communist indoctrination. The pseudo-scientific "organization" of man's life in all its departments, not for his benefit but for the benefit of the "révolution" (that is for the heads of the Communist Party) has completely emptied man's life of personal meaning and enterprise. The present disturbances and reactions among Russian youth (hooliganism and stilyagism) bear eloquent witness to the sense of futility aroused by this emptying and de-personalization of man's life. The most ironical fact about the twen-

tieth century is that Atheistic Communism has finally realized, in its ultimate perfection, the economic alienation of man which Karl Marx ascribed in part to religion.

We may be tempted, for a moment, to smile at this strange confirmation of all that our faith teaches us of the ways of God with man—that the most effective way in which man is "punished" on this earth is to let his errors take their course and work themselves out to their logical conclusion. Yet we are in no position to sit back and enjoy a complacent triumph. These same errors are all too likely to be our own.

We are living in an age of universal alienation and mass movements. Christian circles are by no means immune from the contagion of totalitarianism. It is all too easy for us to seek a kind of massive, monolithic strength in discipline, publicity, and proselytism. It is all too easy for us to lose sight of Christ and His charity, and to exchange the basic truths of the Gospel for new slogans that promise to be "more effective" in rallying thousands to our cause. Let us beware. The blaring of loudspeakers, the roaring of slogans, the tramp of marching thousands, will never produce anything but alienated fanatics. Christianity can never be allowed to savor of a mass movement. Christians can never, with a good conscience, yield to the lure of totalitarianism. Even when a political system promises a strong arm with which to defend the Church, if that arm ends in a mailed fist, and if the "protection" offered is that of a secret police and concentration camps, we cannot accept its protection. If that system offers to "defend the faith" by the atomic bombing of defenceless civilians, we cannot accept its protection. Such defence is a mockery and a desecration of God in His image. It is a renewal of



the crucifixion of Christ, in those for whom He died.

Our mission in the world is the same as it has always been, to build the Kingdom of God, which is a Kingdom of Love. Love cannot exist except between persons. For there to be love, we must first of all safeguard the liberty and integrity of the human person. We must provide an education that strengthens man against the noise, the violence, the slogans and the half-truths of our materialistic society.

Our duty to preserve the human person in his integrity, his freedom and his individuality, and to arm him spiritually against the peril of totalitarianism, is not just something it would be nice for us to discuss and perhaps to study. It is an urgent task which demands in-

sistently to be carried out wherever there is a Catholic parish, a Catholic school, and especially a Catholic university or seminary. It is the most important duty of the Catholic intellectual. It is not an easy task. It is a very delicate one, precisely because our zeal against one type of mass movement can so easily plunge us head first into another and worse kind of which we are less afraid.

The experience of the past ten years has shown, or should have shown, that it is not enough to be anti-communist to preserve freedom in America. What will the next ten years bring? There is unfortunately all too great a danger that it will see the rise of a fatal mass movement for which the moral and cultural disorders of twentieth century America have too well prepared the way.

"If ever a generation has known in the depths of its being the cry 'War on war!' it is certainly our own." (Pope PIUS XII)

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# THE COLD WAR AND THE NUCLEAR DILEMMA

REINHOLD NIEBUHR

THE LONG HISTORY of conflict between communities, whether national or imperial, has reached a climax in the cold war and the nuclear dilemma of the present day. It is a climax which certainly contradicts and refutes most of the philosophies of history in which the wise men of two previous centuries attempted to chart the course of history and to predict its future. The "cold

war" means a perpetual tension between the two blocs of nations, communist and anti-communist, of such unique intensity that one may question the adjective used to describe it. Yet it is regarded as "cold" rather than "hot" because there are no overt hostilities on a large scale. These hostilities are prevented by an historical phenomenon as unique as the cold war itself. Both sides have nuclear weapons which have raised military destructiveness to such a degree of suicidal and lethal efficacy that neither side is tempted to initiate the conflict. This is the proportion of the "nuclear dilemma." Both sides have the weapons in fairly equal proportions, so that even a surprise attack would not be certain to grant immunity to the attacker from retaliatory measures of such destructiveness that the conflict might well make any distinction between victor and vanquished irrelevant.

In the arsenals of both sides, bombs are piled on bombs and guided missiles will be piled on guided missiles in an armory of such frightfulness that man's technical progress throughout the ages has taken on a new dimension. The dimension is novel because, for the first time, the balance between the creative and destructive possibilities of the mastery over natural forces would seem to have been destroyed. The destructive possibilities are certainly more apparent and more imminent.

Furthermore, modern technical advances have set man's progress in techniques in a new light. Progress in this field is accomplished, as previously,

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*Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr, Vice-President of Union Theological Seminary in New York City, needs no introduction. This essay is taken from his soon-to-be-published work, THE STRUCTURE OF NATIONS AND EMPIRES (Charles Scribner's Sons), completed under a Rockefeller Foundation grant at the Institute for Advanced Study. The book, in Dr. Niebuhr's own words, "was prompted by the conviction that our generation, which faces the seemingly novel perplexities of the nuclear stalemate and of our encounter with the new secular religion of communism, might be tempted to forget the lessons which the past history of man offers every new generation. I thought the temptation to overestimate the novelty of the present situation was particularly great in a young nation, suddenly flung to a position of world responsibility by its great power."*

*Scribner's has also published such earlier important contributions of Dr. Niebuhr as THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY, and AN INTERPRETATION OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS (also available in paperback edition through Meridian Books). Copyright © Reinhold Niebuhr.*

through human agency, but it outruns human desires so that historical developments become more and more analogous to natural forces "which go on their fateful way unswerved, unswerving, and know not what they are."

At the beginning of the atomic age Pope Pius XII hesitantly suggested a moratorium on scientific advances, of the type engaged in by Leonardo da Vinci when he refused to continue scientific experiments (on submarines), which might prove to be detrimental to mankind. But the Pope did not enlarge upon his original suggestions, nor has anyone else. For such a moratorium is obviously beyond the competence of any agency.

In this situation of the cold war and the nuclear stalemate two questions inevitably loom large as we scan the dark future. The immediate question is whether there is any way of abolishing the dread weapons; and the second is whether there is any way of mitigating the animosities of the conflict. The first question, which is the more unanswerable, looms larger; but the second question is of equal importance. Can any light be thrown on these questions by studying the history of the behavior of communities throughout the ages?

If we seek to draw lessons from history to instruct us in our present perplexities, it is important to note the radical difference between two problems which communities in past history have faced. In the first case, communities were confronted with a crisis in which they were forced to make a choice between their survival or liberty—and some larger good, or the good of a larger community. In this situation nations chose their own existence, security, or interest rather than the more universal value, such as the peace of Europe or any other region. In such situations of crisis nations and other communities always

have responded by protecting their lives and liberties without regard to the more universal value, particularly as the latter was usually too remote or abstract.

The second situation is radically different. It occurred when communities were pressed by historical circumstances to adjust their interests, usually by gradual—and even unconscious—steps to new conditions. In the past, communities have successfully negotiated these adjustments, even when the new conditions presented some radical novelties. The great difference between the two situations is due to the necessity of either a risk or sacrifice of vital interests in the first case, while only an adjustment of interests and a reinterpretation of the peril and promise, given by the new situation, is necessary in the second case.

Thus, in the Wars of Religion which followed the Reformation, neither Catholic nor Protestant nations thought of sacrificing their securities for the sake of the peace of Europe. But when it became apparent that neither side could eliminate the power of the other side, Catholics and Protestants began those adjustments of a competitive co-existence which gradually transformed the culture of Europe into a religiously pluralistic one.

If the radical distinction between the two situations be validated by this example, and also by many other similar historical instances, it might follow that it is easier to cool off the animosities of the cold war than to agree on nuclear disarmament or the total abolition of nuclear weapons. For nuclear disarmament, even if undertaken mutually, involves some risk to the securities of both sides. There is small prospect that either side would be willing to take the risks. This remains true even if their failure to do so would involve the world in the continued peril of nuclear warfare. One may take for granted that nei-

ther side actually intends to begin the dread conflict. But it may come upon them nevertheless by miscalculation or misadventure.

#### DISARMAMENT AND ABOLITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

IN APPROACHING the first issue it is necessary to recall that, after long negotiations, the two sides have reached some tentative agreement in regard to the abolition of nuclear tests which had seemed unlikely only a year ago. We would not abolish tests without an inspection system and the Russians professed to favor the abolition of both tests and weapons without an inspection system, thus impressing the world with the alleged American preoccupation with nuclear weapons and with their moral superiority in favoring the abolition of all nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the Russians hesitantly entered scientific conferences for the examination of the feasibility of inspection systems which resulted in a considerable degree of unanimity in regard to their feasibility. Thereupon we proposed to conduct further negotiations on a trial abolition of tests with inspection for one year. Subsequent negotiations did not fulfill the early faint promise. Their failure was due to many reasons, but it is significant that the Russians insisted on a review of our whole strategic position as a basis for further negotiations.

Disarmament negotiations cannot in fact proceed without reviewing the whole power position of the contestants in the negotiations. In such negotiations with the Russians one of the hazards will be that, while there is sufficient parity between us to prevent the ultimate conflict, the Russians have considerable political advantage over us in the Middle East and Asia and strategic advantage in their reputed superiority in in-

tercontinental missiles; that they will not be inclined to any agreement which will not guard these advantages, while we will not be disposed to any agreement which will disturb or imperil our basic security, already somewhat threatened by the Russian advantages.

In order to illustrate the difficulties in coming to an agreement on disarmament Hans Morgenthau has recalled the difficulties of the disarmament conference, called in 1932, in order to implement the promise of the Treaty of Versailles that the forcible disarmament of Germany would finally lead to a general disarmament in Europe. More than a decade was required to produce even the gesture of a conference. The real difficulty according to Morgenthau<sup>1</sup> was that Germany knew herself to be potentially the strongest power on the continent while France tried to preserve, though a weaker power, the advantages she gained in the victory of the First World War. "Hence the conflict between Germany and France," declares Morgenthau, "was in essence a conflict about the distribution of their power. Behind what the delegates expressed in ideological terms of security versus equality, retrospective analysis discovers the moving force of international politics: the desire to maintain an existing distribution of power, manifesting itself in the policy of the status quo on the one hand, and the desire to overthrow the existing distribution of power . . . on the other hand."<sup>2</sup> Armaments are, in short, the fists and arms of the nations; and they cannot be discussed, or their limitation contemplated, without surveying the whole body of the contending nations.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Hans Joachim Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, second edition, New York, Knopf, 1954.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 376.

The relations between Russia and America are not exactly analogous to those of Germany and France in 1932. No historical analogies are ever exact. But what is analogous is that both nations are bound to review the disarmament problem in terms of their total power relations, which includes both military capacity and the political prestige of each in and across the continents of the world. It would be difficult to determine which of the two nations has the greater potential or present power. We have felt secure both in our power of industrial production and in our nuclear armaments. While the Soviets are presently inferior to us in industrial power their power is growing at a faster rate than ours. Moreover they have the capacity to divert more of it for war production than we have because of their lower living standards.

The Soviets have, in addition, a political advantage over us which is potentially very great. They exploit the issue of colonialism to our disadvantage; and their advantage will continue until their imperialism creates the same resentments in Asia which western imperialism once generated. They will export the same technical advantages which we exported; and those advantages will have the same effect in creating integral nations through the higher arts of communication. Their disadvantages in exercising their rule over the integral nations of Eastern Europe are already great and are bound to grow. But they have the further political advantage over us that both our system of democracy and our high standard of living seem irrelevant in Asia and Africa.

The first, representing achievements which took the technical civilization of the West centuries to accomplish, seems unattainable to nations emerging from either a pastoral or agrarian economy; and the second, our standard of living,

seems irrelevant because it is beyond the dreams of avarice of the poor nations. These living standards are, moreover, less attractive than the achievements of a nation which, while living in poverty not dissimilar to that of Asia, has managed to negotiate the path to a technical civilization with sufficient speed to outstrip us in the conquest of outer space. The Russian prestige was tremendously enhanced through the successful launching of the earth satellites because they were the symbols of a technical triumph that seemed to make the cherished freedoms of the West unnecessary.

Both strategic and political advantages seem to rest ultimately with the Communists, though they are immediately with us. If it should be true that armaments are one of the indices of the power of nations, it is not likely that a nation which seems to be potentially the stronger will yield anything at the bargaining table. We, on the other hand, cannot yield because the price of an accord seems to endanger our basic securities. There is a very rough analogy between France and us and Russia and Germany in the situations of 1932 and 1959. The prospects for an accord on nuclear weapons are, therefore, if historical analogies are indicative, not too bright.

There are men who have the rather desperate hope that the degree of mutual danger will overcome the constant inclination of nations to fear each other more than they fear the danger which their enmity has caused for each and both. Were this to happen a really novel factor would have emerged in history. We cannot rule out the possibility that it will emerge, but we cannot have any confidence in its emergence.

The prospects of an agreement would be tremendously enhanced if both sides were not only more conscious of the common danger which transcends their enmities, but also if they refrained from



attributing to the other side the intention of beginning an atomic conflict, which neither side really believes of the other. Since the Geneva conference the Russians seem to have been convinced that it is not the purpose of America to start an atomic conflict; but this has not changed the propaganda of the Soviets against the alleged warlike designs of the "imperialists." As late as the NATO Conference in 1958 the West, on the other hand, has attributed the ambition of world domination by any means, including war, to the communists. The only justification for this charge is that the Russians continue to believe in their dogma of the ultimate triumph of Communism over Capitalism, whatever may be the vicissitudes of history.

During Malenkov's brief period as prime minister he asserted that an atomic war would mean the end of civilization, and made no distinction between Capitalism and Communism. This was a little too heretical and was amended by Khrushchev who, while changing the Leninist prediction of an inevitable war between the Communist and Capitalist civilizations in favor of a plea for "peaceful co-existence," declared that in the event of such a war, Communism would triumph in the end. "The war is not fatalistically inevitable," declared Khrushchev, despite the fact that "millions of people might be plunged into war for the sake of the selfish interests of a handful of millionaires." But their designs will be prevented by the growing strength of the communist nations, which do not want war because they see victory by the inevitable superiority of the socialist system over the capitalist system. The victory is within the frame of "peaceful co-existence," or perhaps more correctly, competitive co-existence;

for "the socialist mode of production possesses decisive advantages over the capitalist model of production. Precisely because of this the ideas of Marxism-Leninism are capturing the minds of the broad masses of the people in the capitalist countries."<sup>3</sup>

The affirmations are within the limits of the Marxist apocalyptic vision. One could have more confidence that Khrushchev believed what he said if he had not spoken of the "broad masses of the capitalist nations," and had confined himself to the historic truth about the triumphs of Communism in Asia and Africa. These are certainly sufficient to make the communist oligarchy hesitant to sacrifice known political advantages to the hazards of an atomic conflict. The communist leadership does not want a war any more than we do. The communist advantage over us on the dark continents has prompted Khrushchev in the memorable interview with Walter Lippmann (New York *Herald Tribune*, November 10 to 13, 1958) not only to assert the undoubted fact that the Russians do not want a war but also to repeat the charge that we do, making it immediately relevant with the explicit prediction that our prospective political and economic defeats, would persuade us to begin the ultimate conflict.

The Russian leader has at least brought his charges up to date while we were inclined to restate the original fear of Communism, as if it were analogous to Hitlerism. But in any case neither side fully realizes the fact that we not only face a common predicament, but that both sides have an identical inclination to attribute the predicament to the foe.

<sup>3</sup> From Khrushchev's report to the Twentieth Party Congress of the Soviet Union, February 1956.

NON-POLITICAL PROPOSALS  
FOR DISARMAMENT

SINCE THE DAWN of the modern era in the seventeenth century it has been one of the fondest dreams of modern culture that the same scientific procedures which were so efficacious in mastering natural forces would be equally effective in mastering the problems and perplexities of human history. This faith, so eloquently expressed by Auguste Comte in the past century, seemed to have a particular relevance in a nuclear age. Scientific advances were undoubtedly responsible for the nuclear dilemma. What could be more logical than to resort to the same "methods of science" to solve the problems created by these methods in the realm of the natural sciences?

Such a point of view is given in Linus Pauling's book *No More War*.<sup>4</sup> The greater part of the book is devoted to a very interesting and terrifying account of the horrible destructive powers of the nuclear weapons of all types but particularly of the "super-bombs," bigger even than the hydrogen bombs. This description leaves one with the uneasy feeling that, because of sheer ignorance, we are all, as laymen, not as hysterical as we well might be about the insecurity of the nuclear stalemate.

The description leads Pauling to the conclusion that the nature of the new weapons makes wars simply impossible. The result of this conviction of the impossibility of war in a nuclear age is a proposal for a "World Peace Research Organization" which would carry out "research for preserving the peace of the world. . . . This would mean of course carrying out research on how to solve the great world problems of the kind

which have in the past led to war."<sup>5</sup> It would "make a thorough analysis of the problems involved in reaching agreements to stop the testing of nuclear weapons." This world peace research organization is conceived in non-political terms. Pauling declares: "We cannot expect that the problems of the world can be solved by government officials, who have many duties and who cannot be expected to devote to these problems the long and careful thought that they require for their solution. These problems need to be attacked in the way that other problems are attacked in the modern world—by research, carried out by people who think about the problems year after year. . . . If thousands of able investigators are attacking world problems by imaginative and original methods, working on these problems year after year, many of the problems should be solved."<sup>6</sup>

It is clear what form of non-political rationalism lies at the foundation of this proposal for world disarmament. The contest between nations, in which their pride and security is at stake, is reduced to the dimension of a problem of natural science, which can be solved if disinterested specialists devote themselves to it.

Statesmen are dismissed from the solution because they are too busy; but it does not seem to occur to Pauling that statesmen, however wise or stupid, have a responsible relation to their communities which no pure specialist can have. He does not consider this facet of the problem of disarmament because it is a scientific rather than a political problem in his mind.

For this reason Pauling's proposals have not been taken seriously by either the statesmen or the political scientists,

<sup>4</sup> Linus Pauling, *No More War*, New York, Dodd, Mead & Co., 1958.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 211.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 203.

though everyone recognizes the legitimacy of the moral anguish which prompted them. Significantly, many of the scientists who supported Pauling were geneticists who were most aware of the awful peril to which radiation exposed not only this but succeeding generations.<sup>7</sup>

#### CAPITULATION

THE VERY CONSIDERABLE strategic and political advantages the Russians have over us make disarmament negotiations more difficult, for they are best conducted under conditions of practical parity. Even under such conditions, there would be the rivalries, as previously referred to, for specific strategic advantages in the disarmament treaty. Our handicaps may not be as serious as some now believe, even as our advantages were hitherto not as great as our optimists assumed. But the advantages of the Russians are real. This has prompted a mood of defeatism in some European circles which regards nothing less than

capitulation to the Russians as a way out of the nuclear terror.

A recent booklet by the English writer Philip Toynbee expresses the hopelessness of those who think that the Russian advantage over us has become so impressive that "There is only one step, which is to negotiate with the Russians and get the best terms available to us. There is little reason to think that they would be crushing."<sup>8</sup> Toynbee's proposals are clearly proposals for capitulation. He assumes that the negotiations would proceed in a defeatist mood on the part of the democratic nations. This mood presumably would be engendered both by the acknowledgement of Russian superiority, strategically and politically, and by the conviction that nothing but capitulation would prevent a nuclear holocaust. His proposals also assume that the novelty of the nuclear danger would efface many of the characteristics of national behavior which any careful study of history must reveal as constant characteristics. These perennial characteristics may be defined briefly as consisting of three inclinations of national communities which are generally interwoven. The first is a stubborn will to live and to preserve the liberty and identity of the nation. This will to live may be transmuted into the will to power, but the basis of the will to power is the will to live. The second drive or inclination is a sense of loyalty to an alliance of nations of which the nation is a member; and the third source of action is the sense of devotion to the culture and civilization which may overarch or may be embodied in the alliance.

This complex of interests and loyalties raises questions about identifying the "national interest" with the moral norm of states. The "national interest"

<sup>7</sup> Since these lines were written Lord Bertrand Russell's plea for disarmament has been published: *Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare* (Simon and Schuster, 1959). While on a higher level of political sophistication than Pauling's book, Russell approaches the nuclear dilemma with the combination of common sense tinged with irony, and naivete, which characterize all the approaches of the eminent philosopher to political issues. He admonishes both sides, perhaps needlessly, not to believe that the other side desires to begin the nuclear conflict. He sees the differences between the two sides as "ideological" which hardly does justice to the dynamics of two contrasting civilizations. He is realistic enough to assert that "The removal of American troops from western Europe cannot become practical politics except as a sequel of an agreement for the abolition of nuclear weapons" (p. 61). In analyzing the prospects for such an agreement he consistently assumes that the rather desperate need for the abolition of nuclear weapons will overcome hazards which we have previously analyzed.

<sup>8</sup> Philip Toynbee, *The Fearful Choice*, London, Victor Gollancz, 1958, p. 15.

accurately describes the dominant motive of autonomous nation-states. But all nations are involved in a web of interests and loyalties. Their problem, therefore, is to choose between their own immediate, perhaps too narrowly conceived, interests and the common interests of their alliance, or more ultimately of their civilization, in which, of course, their "national interest" is also involved.

Toynbee's proposals assume that both vanquished and victors—who would, incidentally, acknowledge their respective status before a real trial of strength has taken place—would not behave according to these interests and loyalties which seem to be the constant characteristics of national behavior. He expects the vanquished to suppress both their desire for life and freedom, and their loyalty to their alliance and to their civilization or culture, for the sake of avoiding an ultimate conflict. He expects his own nation, Great Britain, to be disloyal to its alliance, though it is Great Britain which rightly prides itself on its record of loyalty to the ideals of western civilization and to the European community when this loyalty meant bearing the brunt of the conflict with Nazism almost alone. If the "Americans" persist in their nuclear struggle, declares Toynbee, "We must employ the sanction of unilateral withdrawal."<sup>9</sup> He thinks these novel forms of behavior are possible for nations because of the uniqueness of the nuclear dilemma. He recognizes that the action proposed has similarities with the policy of appeasement for which "Munich" has become a symbol, but claims that "... the situation [of the nuclear dilemma] is unique in history, and nothing in the past can instruct us how to conduct ourselves."<sup>10</sup>

The nation which is to gain a victory without a struggle is expected to behave as uniquely as the nations which have capitulated without a struggle. He expects a nation which has no compunction about a monopoly of power, nevertheless, to refrain from grasping the final monopoly of power, namely the monopoly of nuclear weapons. He thinks that we might press for the best terms possible for "there is little reason to think that they would be crushing."<sup>11</sup> He is so confident about Russian moderation because he thinks of power realities very simply in terms of "military occupation" and "military conquest"<sup>12</sup> for he, rightly no doubt, thinks it unlikely that the Russians would occupy the nations which had thrown themselves upon her mercy. But he does not realize that such obvious and crude methods would be unnecessary once all the eminences of power were in Russian hands. Toynbee does not measure all the cultural and political consequences which might flow from such a capitulation. Our predicament is assumed to be so unique that it is expected to prompt nations to behave quite differently from the way they have behaved in past history. Nations are expected to sacrifice both their freedom and their dearest possessions for the sake of escaping nuclear terror. If this were mankind's only hope then, indeed, we would be in a desperate situation.

While Philip Toynbee's escape from the modern nuclear dilemma may be naïve, it is no more naïve than the various proposals for disarmament which rightly regard agreements without a complete reign of world law as hazardous, but wrongly assume that the depth of the dilemma may scare the nations into vaulting over all the possibilities of cre-

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 17, 19.

ating world community by the slow processes of history by which communities can be created; and presume to create it instead by endowing an international authority with a monopoly of power.<sup>13</sup>

PROPOSAL FOR "LIMITED WARS"  
IN A NUCLEAR AGE

IT WOULD NOT SEEM FAIR to include Henry Kissinger's proposals for limited wars in the same category as the unpolitical and implausible proposals for the abolition of nuclear weapons. But it is necessary to include his significant proposal in a total consideration of the nuclear dilemma. Kissinger<sup>14</sup> rightly excoriates a policy which has not learned any of the lessons of the past decade, and which, therefore, still assumes that the only danger is a surprise attack from the Russians. According to this policy the only safeguard against this danger is the mounting of a tremendous nuclear power to act as a deterrent against the surprise attack, accompanied by the promise, on the one hand, that we will never start a war and, on the other, the threat that we will use "massive retaliation" against the surprise attack.

Kissinger points out that this policy has put an undue emphasis on the hydrogen bomb and robbed us of the weapons by which we might successfully fight limited wars. Kissinger defines these wars as those which do not involve the survival of either side and are fought with weapons of limited destructive power. He thinks we were probably too hesitant about the possibilities of starting

an ultimate conflict in the Korean war; and he envisages Europe as the probable locale of such a limited war in the future. His polemics against preoccupation with the weapons, which are needed only to preserve the balance in the armament race but can never be used, has been widely praised here and in Europe. The dubious part of his plea for limited wars is his assumption that tactical atomic weapons can be useful instruments in such wars. The original arming of NATO troops with tactical weapons for the sake of overcoming Russian superiority in manpower has been overtaken by history as surely as the idea of a surprise attack by the Russians has been refuted by the realization that the Russians have no incentive for such an attack as long as they win victory after victory over the West in the "uncommitted" world.

The idea of limited wars with limited objectives which do not involve the survival of the contestants is always valid. But two emphases in Kissinger's thesis seem dubious. The one is that Europe is a possible battleground for such a war. It has become apparent that no power realities in Europe can be changed without culminating in the ultimate war; for strategic points in Europe are too precious in the policies of each side, even though they do not involve the "survival" of the contestants. The other emphasis is the idea that limited wars can safely be fought with "tactical" atomic weapons. Some of these tactical weapons are as destructive today as the bombs which fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were in their day. The general use of tactical weapons obscures the necessary absolute dividing line between the limited war and the ultimate war. This is too dangerous even though that dividing line is symbolic and psychological rather than actual in terms of comparative destructive power. There is no

<sup>13</sup> See, for instance, Granville Clarke and Louis Bruno Sohn, *World Peace Through World Law*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1958.

<sup>14</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, Council of Foreign Relations, New York, Harper Brothers, 1957.



chance of avoiding the ultimate conflict if this line is obscured.

The prospects either of abolishing the nuclear terror altogether or of limiting nuclear weapons to tactical dimensions are not too bright. The possibility that the uniqueness of the danger may negate some of the factors in the behavior of communities which our study has defined as "constant" forces, cannot be excluded. But the presumption must remain strong that the collective impulse for survival and loyalty to a civilization which an alliance embodies are certainly more powerful than the proposals for either disarmament or the limitation of weapons assume.

#### RELAXING THE "COLD WAR"

WHILE THE PROSPECT of abolishing the nuclear threat completely is slight, we are also confronted with the less difficult task of sharing the world with a despotic system which we abhor and which decades of polemics have made the more abhorrent. Yet unless we annihilate each other in a nuclear war we must come to terms with the possibilities of co-existence with this regime. This task is easier than the abolition of nuclear weapons but it is not as interesting and does not excite the same devotion among the idealists. It is easier because it does not demand that the impulse for survival of each collective system be challenged directly. It is only required that each side allow historical developments to modify the animosities and to change the power realities within each system.

The first precondition of survival in such competitive co-existence is that both sides come to a full recognition of their involvement in a common fate. Included in this common fate are fear of mutual annihilation and also the common inclination to attribute malice to

the other side, particularly the evil design of initiating the ultimate conflict. It would be sobering to the West to make an honest analysis of the situation of a common fate. Such an analysis might well prompt the conclusion that the temptation to begin the ultimate conflict is greater on the western side than on the Russian, because the Russians have all the immediate political advantages in the Middle East and in Asia and Africa; and their prospective victories there are much more likely to lead to desperation in the democratic alliance. We have the absurd situation that a system which some of our leaders regard as ephemeral because of its inflexible dogmas and fanaticism seems much more plausible and available to the nascent nations of the new continents. It will, of course, suffer some defeats in Europe where the communist system is an economic blight even to the less advanced nations of eastern Europe, and where its imperialism is an affront to historically established nations. At the same time, it offers emancipation, economically and politically, to the nations of the Orient.

The task of managing to share the world without bringing disaster on a common civilization must include, on our part, a less rigid and self-righteous attitude toward the power realities of the world and a more hopeful attitude toward the possibilities of internal developments in the Russian despotism. Our rigid and self-righteous attitude is manifest particularly in our insistence that Chinese Communism is "ephemeral" and will disappear if we oppose it rigorously enough. Communist despotism in China is undoubtedly more absolute than in Russia. But the system which, according to our official dogma, is fated to extinction has meanwhile gained enough power to influence the Russian strategy, chiefly by exchanging

loyalty to Russian hegemony for the tangible benefits of technical equipment and guidance. Our China policy appears to the uncommitted world as dogmatic as anything in the rigid dogmatism of the communist world. Nor can we forget the irrelevant dogmatism of our policy in the Middle East, where the more flexible policy of the Russians has outflanked us and breached our military alliances and made profitless our defense of certain unviable nations.

The other side of the problem of co-existence is to hope for, and abet, those aspects of the communist system which offer some promise of gradual change in the despotic rigidity of the communist totalitarianism. It would be foolish to expect an inflexible system either quickly or even gradually to develop into an open society. But it is not wrong to reflect on historical analogies between the monarchical absolutism which gripped Europe only a few centuries ago and the present Russian system. Monarchical absolutism succumbed in France to the Revolution, but in Britain it evolved into an open society because a group of Whig aristocrats, who controlled Parliament, disputed the authority of the monarch; and the tension between King and Parliament gradually benefited the common people of Britain. It may not be too sanguine to draw the analogy and to point to the fact that the remnant and the beginning of democracy in the communist system may be the Central Committee of the party. Its power seemed to be qualified by the more closely knit oligarchy, originally devised in purely *ad hoc* terms, of the "Politbureau" and now the "Presidium" of the party. Stalin managed to dominate both this little oligarchy and the party through terror. Much has been said about the ease with which this despotism established itself in the name of "democratic centralism"; but

with the death of Stalin new forces expressed themselves in Soviet society, and the execution of Beria and the abolition of the police terror showed that the surviving oligarchs could express a will to resist absolute tyranny. The system still allows shrewd and ruthless leaders to emerge with almost absolute power; but it is wise to remember that Khrushchev has achieved his present eminence partly by appealing to the central committee against the Presidium where he was outvoted. Evidently there is something like a Whig aristocracy in the Russian system of the Central Committee. One remembers too that Gomulka, who almost lost his life in one of Stalin's purges, came to power through the vote of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party and tries to preserve the quasi-independence of the Polish nation in the communist imperialistic system, sustained by the partially communist and partially nationalist convictions of the Polish people. Clearly there is a possibility of historical development within this system, though one must not paint the prospects in too bright colors.

The second aspect of the communist system in Russia which offers the prospect for dynamic internal developments, which we must not discount, is the educational system. In Russia children of peasants can receive a university education if their intelligence merits it. The political system may be despotic but the rudiments of democracy are in the educational system. Only a short time ago we regarded Russia condescendingly as a backward community; but now we wonder whether we can match the Russians in training technicians for a technical society. This despotism differs from the traditional despotic communities because it is a dynamic society which requires a great deal of competence for its health on all levels of the community. Technical competence is not synony-

mous with a humanistic training, aware of all the nuances of culture. Russia probably will be "vulgar" for decades to come; and we might reflect that the vulgarity of our own mass culture may be destroying the humanities as rapidly as the Russians may be becoming conscious of the limits of their technical achievements.

There is, of course, no immediate prospect of achieving political emancipation by raising the level of intellectual competence. Dictatorships have co-opted a technical oligarchy for their purposes; and have kept them quiet and docile by finding the point of concurrence between the prestige and security of the technicians and the ambitions of the oligarchy. We cannot think in short-term goals when we think of leavening the lump of despotism by intellect alone. But the long-term result must be that a technically competent culture cannot avoid a rational ferment which yet may prove politically subversive. We cannot build any immediate hopes on these probabilities. But we must realize that we are not fated to share the world with the present despotism forever. It is under the ferment of a culture which is bound to produce political effects in the long run.

Two characteristics of the communist system discourage even those rather desperate hopes which we have enumerated. One is that it is the first system of government which identifies without reservation the ideal and the real, claiming for its system of power if not the immediate then the ultimate realization of an ideal justice. The only despotic system which made an analogous identification was the Islamic one. Both Stoic Rome and Western and Eastern Christian empires had conceptions of an ideal justice which transcended the historic possibilities or at least realities. Perhaps this identification in Russia is related

to the consistent subordination of the individual to the social whole, thus giving the individual conscience no leavening influence in the community. The artists and writers have tried in the post-Stalin era to exploit this leavening influence of the individual; but they have not succeeded markedly in defying the canons of "socialist realism," which means the canons of conformity which make the glorification of the given historic reality of the Soviet State into the norm of art and morals.

The other characteristic of the communist system which tempts even the most hopeful to lose their hope is that none of the oligarchies—rivalries among which must be one of the conditions of increasing freedom—have independent sources of power, not related to the state bureaucracy. The managerial oligarchy, for instance, is distinguished from the rising business class of western history in early modernity by the fact that they have no property of their own but are only the managers of state property.

The twin forces of freedom in western history were property and conscience. They are also the sources of freedom in some of the newer countries like Tunisia. There seems no room in the communist system for either of these forces.

The sharp distinction made in this analysis between the perennially manifest behavior of nations and empires with reference to their collective self-regard and the more hopeful attitude toward the possible transformation of the communist system can be justified by observing that political systems and communities are subject to various developments by the shift of historic circumstances; and that systems built on revolutionary ardor are particularly subject to development as the revolutionary enthusiasm abates and the oligarchy acquires a sense of responsibility for the

preservation of order and the adjustment of interests within the growing system. It must be understood, of course, that these hoped-for developments do not change the common characteristics of communities. They can only mitigate the uncommon characteristics of Communism, including the fury of its fanaticism and the rigor of its despotism. It would be foolish to expect that the development of a democratic system within the foreseeable future, or to hope for any other than a collective self-regard within the communist system, even if a full-blown democracy should develop. All that can be expected is that historical developments finally will re-

duce the communist system to more or less the same dimensions which are universally manifest in the traditional communities of history. Such a development might make accommodation between the democratic and the communist alliance easier, but it would not eliminate the peril of war. That peril may be avoided in the future, as in the present, by the fear of mutual annihilation and the processes of diplomacy. The peril will be lessened, also, by mutualities of trade and culture which will increase as the revolutionary animus abates in Russia in the second and third generations of post-revolutionary leaders.

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# UNJUSTIFIABLE WAR

E. I. WATKIN

ACCORDING to the traditional moral theology of the Catholic Church, there are seven conditions which must all be satisfied if a war is to be just, that is, morally justifiable. Let us consider these briefly in their applicability to the situation which confronts us.

(1) The cause must be just. Whatever may be the case with minor wars, a war of defence against Communist domination of the world would certainly be waged for a just cause.

(2) The war must be made by a lawful authority, that is to say, in default of an international authority—and the attitude of the Communist members has rendered the U.N. impotent where issues between the Communist and Western powers are concerned—by the legitimate

government of a sovereign state. This condition would undoubtedly be fulfilled.

(3) The intention of the government declaring war must be just. Once again, however dubious the intention may be in the case of minor wars, for example the war waged by the French to retain possession of Algeria, the intention of a defensive war against Communist aggression would certainly be just.

(4) War must be the only possible means of securing justice. This condition also would surely be fulfilled in the case of a defensive war against Communist aggression.

There remain, however, three other conditions.

(5) Only right means may be employed in the conduct of the war. The employment of immoral means renders it unjustifiable.

(6) There must be a reasonable hope of victory.

(7) The good probably to be achieved by victory must outweigh even the probable, *a fortiori* the certain, evil effects of the war.

It is, I submit, certain, I should say indubitable, that the major war against the Communist bloc in view of which we are manufacturing, developing, and testing nuclear weapons of ever-increasing range and destructiveness, could not fulfil these three last conditions of a justifiable war. What hope of victory (6) can there be in a war which, even in the present development of nuclear weapons, must prove the mutual suicide of both parties? What good, even freedom from the tyranny of the Communist state, could outweigh (7) the evil effects, not merely probable but certain, of a war waged with such weapons,

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*E. I. Watkin's essay is taken from the recently published MORALS AND MISILES, CATHOLIC ESSAYS ON THE PROBLEM OF WAR TODAY (James Clarke & Co., Ltd., 33 Store St., London, W.C. 1, 6s). This little volume, edited by Charles S. Thompson, and presented in behalf of the Pax Association (which also publishes the quarterly PAX BULLETIN (37 Northiam, Woodside Park, London, N. 12, England, \$1 a year), also contains essays by Archbishop Roberts, S. J., Canon F. H. Drinkwater, Dom Bede Griffiths, O.S.B., Christopher Hollis, Sir Compton Mackenzie, and Fr. Franziskus Strattmann, O.P. (revised and brought up to date from its appearance in CROSS CURRENTS, Winter 1953).*

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wholesale massacre on a scale hitherto unprecedented, enormous devastation? The permanent genetic damage caused by nuclear explosions must be added as a probable, if not certain, effect. Most obvious of all is the certain violation of condition (5). Right means alone will not be used in any such major war. For on both sides weapons are being perfected and accumulated which will massacre and mutilate millions of innocent non-combatants (whole cities can now be wiped out of existence), devastate vast areas thickly populated, probably poison the health, even the physical integrity of surviving generations. No cause however just, however important the issue, however great the value to be achieved by victory, can justify such diabolism, or should we rather call it criminal lunacy. No end however excellent can justify means so flagrantly immoral.

It is often argued that in the modern total war there are no longer any non-combatants. The entire citizen body on one side is, they tell us, mobilised in a united war effort against the entire citizen body on the other. Were this the case such total war, by the mere fact of refusing civilians non-combatant status, offends against the stipulation that a just war must respect the lives of civilians. But it is obviously absurd to maintain that children, the infirm and the aged are in any sense combatants. Yet they are just as liable to be slaughtered by nuclear weapons as the most combatant sections of the population, soldiers or munition workers.

In face of this evident relevance, this irrefutable condemnation, to argue that the traditional criteria of just war are no longer relevant is patently false. Never before has their relevance been so clear, their application so easy. For the non-fulfilment by any war employing nuclear weapons of the three criteria of

just war we have just been considering (5, 6 and 7) is more obvious than it was or could have been in many, if not most, wars of the past. Certain evil outweighing possible good, no reasonable prospect of victory for either combatant, the employment of immoral means, these certain characters of a war fought with nuclear weapons are evident breaches of three traditional conditions of justifiable war. Any intelligent man can judge of the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of these conditions and reach a certain decision. The criteria of a just cause and a just intention and the impossibility of achieving justice by pacific means have in most cases been more or less doubtful in their application; were they to decide the moral issue the private citizen could therefore be reasonably advised to accept the decision of his government on a matter as to which he is hardly capable of reaching a decision, though to do so admits the government's claim to be judge in its own cause, a claim inadmissible in any legal system. But it requires no knowledge inaccessible to the private citizen to be aware of the certain violation of the three above-mentioned conditions of just war by the nuclear war for which the antagonistic power blocs are arming. In fact, the weapons employed need not be nuclear to incur the condemnation of immoral means. Any indiscriminate massacre of civilians, as for example by our area bombing of German cities in the last war, is immoral, not to be justified by the justest of war aims. If indeed such wholesale slaughter of the innocents—and on a scale immeasurably greater than Herod's—be not immoral, morality has no meaning. No conduct can be moral or immoral. Catholics who, confronted by this obvious relevance, put forward the plea that the revolutionary conditions of modern war have rendered the traditional criteria of the just war

obsolete do so for no better reason than that their obvious relevance condemns out of hand what unhappily the majority of Catholics, for patriotic motives or fear of Communist rule, are prepared to condone.

Many are deterred from opposing nuclear weapons by the fact that the Communists from evil motives encourage the agitation against them. But it should scarcely need argument that the approval and support of evil men from evil motives in a particular instance cannot render moral conduct immoral, nor can their disapproval render immoral conduct moral. If the devil himself for some end of his own should be opposed to a murder, I may not therefore commit or condone it. The attitude therefore of the Communists has no bearing on the moral issue with which we are concerned. It must be judged solely on its merits.

Many, I fear most, Catholics are persuaded that the evil of worldwide subjection to Communist governments is so great that the employment of *any* means indispensable for preventing it, even the worldwide slaughter and ruin of atomic warfare, is justifiable. Their plea, however, affirms nakedly that an end sufficiently good justifies any means whatsoever. And this contradicts flatly a fundamental moral principle inculcated by reason and approved by Catholic ethics. Moreover, it surrenders to Marxist Communism by accepting implicitly its fundamental materialism. Those who urge it agree, however unintentionally and consciously, with the Marxists that material force is more powerful, therefore in the last resort more real, than spiritual; the sword of atomic weapons can decisively and finally defeat the sword of the spirit. If this were true, matter thus more powerful than spirit, it would not be easy to maintain that the ultimate and fullest reality is spirit, is God.

Indeed, though they do not, like the Marxist, deny God's existence, these Christians have little faith in His action. They cannot believe that, if in obedience to His law they refuse to resist Communist aggression by flagrantly immoral means, by wholesale massacre and mutilation of the innocent, and even if He should permit the Communists to conquer the world, He can or will enable His servants to win by spiritual weapons victory over a materially triumphant foe. The historic victory of the Cross, though the centre of their religion, seems to them irrelevant to the realities of the contemporary situation, something which cannot be continued, in a sense repeated, today. They cannot be persuaded that the victory of faith, which overcomes the world, can overcome the Communist world.

May it not be that God is inviting us to meet and defeat the challenge of modern materialism and confident secularism in all its forms, not only Marxist, by a supreme act of faith in His Omnipotence which renounces methods of warfare conscience plainly condemns?

Such faith moreover is already supported by evidence that in Soviet Russia the victory of the official creed, Marxism-Leninism, though upheld by the education given universally and the terrorism of a police state, is far from complete.<sup>1</sup> Not only has the practice of religion survived forty years of propaganda and persecution. On all hands young people are refusing ready-made answers and debate with passionate interest whether or no God exists, that is to say, far from swallowing without question the official materialism, because it is official, are seeking the truth—which we know, even when they do not, is in fact God. "The one theme," Miss Hunter Blair quotes

<sup>1</sup> See "God and the Russians," by Gunnar D. Kumlien and Katherine Hunter Blair. *The Sword of the Spirit*.

from an 'atheist' workman with whom she spoke in Moscow, "that every Russian whatever his philosophical or political views, loves to discuss by the hour, is—Does God exist?"<sup>2</sup> And this anxious search for God is surely more worshipful, brings man closer to Him, than the superficial acceptance of His existence or contented indifference to religion all too widespread today in the Western world. There may well be more genuine religion in Russia today than in Scandinavia, possibly even in Britain. That is to say, Marxism has failed to suppress the too deeply rooted freedom of the human spirit, to bar its congenital aspiration after God. God evidently is acting in Russia in His own spiritual way. Why must we intervene with the weapons of Satan or the threat of their use? Why should Marxist Communism be more successful in countries where there is a tradition of political freedom, such as has never existed in Russia, and where all forms of religious faith and unfaith have long enjoyed the peaceful co-existence of a mutual tolerance? That is to say, the act of faith in God demanded so imperiously by the situation confronting us today is supported by an empirical motive of credibility; the failure of Communism, in its strongest citadel and longest held, to defeat decisively the forces of the spirit, the religion native to the human soul. This demand for an act of faith, however, it must be pointed out, is made not by faith but by moral principles evident to reason, dictates of moral common sense.

There are many who maintain that, although the employment of nuclear weapons is immoral, it is right, indeed necessary, to possess them as a deterrent against Communist aggression. A bluff, that is to say, of nuclear warfare is moral provided it is no more than bluff. Can it, however, be morally right to threaten

immoral conduct, to create the belief that we will in certain circumstances be guilty of it? For, if the threat were known universally to be bluffing, it would not be taken seriously and therefore be completely ineffective. It could scarcely be argued that it would be morally right to attempt the enforcement even of a just claim by threatening murder provided there was no intention actually to commit it. How then can it be morally right to attempt the enforcement even of man's just claim to freedom by the threat of mass murder? This, however, is not the only objection to a bluffing defence by a supply of nuclear weapons. As experience has shown only too plainly, an armaments race tends to issue in war.

Even if both sides began the war with what are called conventional weapons—and would these exclude the non-nuclear but certainly immoral bombings of the last war?—as the struggle became more intense and passions more inflamed, it is most unlikely that a ban imposed by prudence rather than morality would continue to be observed. In particular, the losing side faced with the prospect of defeat (and defeat today is no longer what it was in the days of limited war) would be tempted to risk a gambler's throw of nuclear warfare. All we know of the behavior of modern nations engaged in total war suggests the overwhelming probability that a major war would become nuclear—the sooner if nuclear weapons were from the outset possessed by the combatants. No one moreover can be certain that those scientists are mistaken who are convinced that the continued testing of nuclear weapons will seriously, permanently, and irreparably damage human health and heredity. It is clearly immoral to take a risk so extremely grave, for no positive benefit to humanity, but for military deterrence and military power.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

At this point, however, a question obtrudes itself and with a pressing insistence. If—it will be asked—as you assert, the traditional teaching of Catholic moralists condemns as immoral the employment of weapons which involve the slaughter of civilians and consequently, not only wars which cannot be or are not in fact waged without such weapons, but even the preparation of these immoral weapons, why have not the Catholic Bishops forbidden plainly and unambiguously any participation by Catholics in such war or preparation?

Painful as the admission must be, we cannot in the interest of false edification or dishonest loyalty deny or ignore the historical fact that Bishops have consistently supported all wars waged by the government of their country. I do not know in fact of a single instance in which a national hierarchy has condemned as unjust any war, however patently an unjust aggression, declared by such a government. Napoleon's attempt to make himself master of Europe, Mussolini's aggression against Abyssinia, our own Boer War undertaken in the interest of the Rand capitalist (though its injustice was later rectified),<sup>3</sup> the refusal by the national hierarchies during the first world war to support Pope Benedict XV's attempts to secure the negotiated peace which would have prevented the slaughter, misery and dispossession of millions, these are but a few more or less recent instances of plainly unjust wars supported by Bishops blinded by a misconceived patriotism. Even the German Bishops tarnished the lustre of their noble resistance to Hitler's tyranny at home by giving their flocks to under-

stand that it was their Catholic duty to fight for the triumph of the Nazi anti-christ, the inhuman fiend who tortured and murdered millions of innocent men, women and children. Whatever the official theory, in practice "my country always right" has been the maxim followed in wartime by Catholic Bishops. Speaking on other occasions in the name of Christ, where belligerent nationalism is concerned they have spoken as the mouthpiece of Caesar. One of the most powerful, if not the most powerful, of human instincts, nationalism, particularly when confronted with a foreign enemy, has proved itself again and again more potent even than spiritual wisdom or personal holiness, spokesmen for the supra-national Catholic Church.

What, however, of the Bishop who is not a national citizen, the supreme shepherd of Catholics throughout the world, their Holy Father? Why has he not given a decisive and final answer to this urgent question of conscience? Why has he not condemned nuclear warfare without reserve or qualification? In fact Pope Pius XII has, and on more than one occasion, spoken strongly against the enormous horrors of nuclear warfare. No one reading his words can doubt that he holds it in utter abhorrence.

Why then—it may be insisted—has he not implemented his opposition to atomic war by pronouncing it immoral for Catholics to participate in any war in which such weapons are employed or in the preparation of these weapons? Many Catholics indeed are hoping for such a condemnation, more are perplexed, if not dismayed, that it has not already been pronounced.

A realistic view of the position should, I would suggest, convince us not only that such a pronouncement is most unlikely but that the reasons for refraining from it are weighty in the extreme.

<sup>3</sup> Perhaps even excessively when, as Prof. Halévy has pointed out, a war undertaken to subject the Afrikaners to the rule of the British colonists was followed by a constitution involving the complete subjection of the latter to the former.

The most illuminating comment upon the present situation is, I believe, a fact of past history. In the year 1139 Pope Innocent II presided over a council in Rome, invested with the supreme authority of an ecumenical council. For it was the tenth ecumenical council, the second Council of the Lateran. No moral verdict, surely, could be more authoritative than a verdict passed by an ecumenical council under the presidency of the Pope. A canon enacted by this council forbade as immoral the employment in warfare between Christians of bows and arrows—the weapons in fact that later won Crécy and Agincourt. At this time all the rulers of Western Europe, Kings or lords, were Catholics, convinced Catholics. No one of them took the least notice of this solemn condemnation by the highest Catholic authority. They did not even trouble to protest against it. They simply ignored it, as though it had never been made. A commentator, in fact, more concerned for edification than historical truth, has attempted to save the face of Catholic obedience by the preposterous explanation that archery was condemned only in private warfare though there is nothing in the canon to suggest this restriction. Pope Innocent III repeated the prohibition of archery in war—but with no more effect. That is to say, the most powerful of medieval popes, who vanquished the Albigensian heretics, defeated the kings of Portugal, France, and England, and triumphed even over imperial opposition, proved completely impotent to restrict armaments.

If then the rulers of a wholly Catholic Europe paid no attention whatsoever to the authority of Pope and ecumenical council condemning weapons they deemed necessary in their wars, would the rulers of a Europe now largely secularised be more obedient today? The question answers itself. "No," you

may reply, "not the governments but their Catholic subjects." There is no evidence that in the Catholic twelfth century a single Catholic refused on conscientious grounds to fight as an archer, still less to participate in any war employing archery. Today we are certainly better off in this respect. A minority of Catholics would undoubtedly obey a papal condemnation of nuclear weapons or the preparation of nuclear weapons. But it is equally certain that it would be comparatively a small, I believe a very small, minority. An overwhelming majority of Catholics would disregard, many of them even denounce, the prohibition and condemn the obedient minority, which moreover would probably receive as little support from the national hierarchies as Pope Benedict's endeavours to secure a negotiated peace. Moreover, the dissension between the obedient and disobedient would rend the Catholic body asunder, into two hostile camps. Such considerations must, as they should, weigh heavily with the shepherd of all Catholic souls.

Nor is this all. The governments confronted with such a condemnation of weapons deemed by them, however mistakenly, indispensable for national defence would undoubtedly persecute the obedient Catholic minority, some of them probably Catholics as a body, on the ground of their religious allegiance to a Pope who by condemning the sole defence against them had made himself in fact the Communists' ally or tool.

It may be replied that nevertheless, if the Pope would accept the defection even of the majority of Catholics, the persecution of the minority—as Our Lord accepted the defection of the multitude at Capharnaum, St. Peter's indignant remonstrance, and finally the flight of His apostles, rather than compromise His Divine Mission, though it led Him to Calvary—the crucifixion of



the Church would achieve a victory over a world so largely irreligious analogous to the victory won on the Cross, would effect what might be termed its moral redemption. This may well be true. It is in fact my personal belief. Like every Catholic, every man, I have the right to form a personal opinion. But to expect the Holy Father to share it is an entirely different matter. Who indeed can be *certain* of this result? Not even the Pope himself, despite his unique knowledge of the Church he rules, can be as certain of the result of any decision he may take as Our Lord was certain of the result of His choice to suffer and die. Moreover His choice was of His own death alone. On the Pope's choice would depend the lives and even the faith of Catholic multitudes. What a man may choose most laudably for himself, he may not think himself entitled to choose for others. The father of Christians, moreover, is responsible for his entire flock, not least for the many who in consequence of his decree could no longer accept nuclear warfare in the good faith of ignorance and would henceforward accept it in bad faith, therefore with formal sin. And after all are we, whose emotions may be stirred by the imagination of a crucifixion of the Church to be followed by her triumphant resurrection, so ready to share personally in the crucifixion? Many no doubt are, but we are weak men or women. Even the apostles fled from Gethsemane.

Moreover the Papal Curia is a bureaucracy on which the Pope depends for the work of administration. And the bureaucrat plays for safety. Not for him the risk, the venture of naked faith. That the Holy Father has not forbidden and, for such powerful reasons as I have attempted to indicate, in all probability will not forbid Catholics to co-operate in any way with nuclear warfare or participate in any war which

employs it is in truth a scandal, a stumbling block. But it is the scandal not of the Papacy but of an overwhelming Catholic majority too completely enthralled by a false patriotism or at best lacking in faith or fortitude to obey the prohibition. In any case how illogical are the non-Catholic critics who condemn Catholics for servile obedience to the commands of ecclesiastical authority and the Pope for not issuing a command which would be met by disobedience on a colossal scale.

**A**RE Catholics therefore left without guidance on this urgent moral issue of nuclear war? Certainly not. As I have sought to show, canons of just war, doubly entrenched in reason and ecclesiastical tradition, unequivocally condemn all wars involving—as nuclear warfare must—massacre of the innocents. If Catholics will not obey them, they are unlikely to obey a Papal prohibition. Those Catholics therefore—and thank God, as the appalling efficacy of nuclear weapons progressively and rapidly develops, their numbers are increasing—who are convinced that it is under any circumstances utterly immoral to participate in any way in the preparation, still less in the employment, of such weapons or in any war which employs them have no excuse for refusing to implement their conviction in the fact that no Papal decree has forbidden them to employ, prepare or co-operate with such warfare. For they possess the evident support of principles traditional in the Catholic schools, principles moreover which are determined by a dispassionate use of reason unclouded and undeflected by the emotions aroused by nationalism or by particular sympathies, antipathies or interests.

A war likely to produce more evil than the good to be achieved by victory—unjustifiable.

A war without prospect of victory for the just combatant, because nuclear warfare has made victory impossible for either—unjustifiable.

A war in which immoral methods

are employed—unjustifiable.

No directives could be clearer, more cogent than these. It is for us to obey them.

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# EMPIRE AND DESERT: ANTINOMIES OF CHRISTIAN HISTORY

GEORGES FLOROVSKY

CHRISTIANITY entered history as a new social order, or rather a new social dimension. From the very beginning Christianity was not primarily a "doctrine," but exactly a "community." There was not only a "Message" to be proclaimed and delivered, and "Good News" to be declared. There was precisely a New Community, distinct and peculiar, in the process of growth and formation, to which members were called and recruited. Indeed, "fellowship" (*koinonia*) was the basic category of Christian existence. Primitive Christians felt themselves to be closely knit and bound together in a unity which radically transcended all human boundaries—of race, of culture, of social rank, and indeed the whole dimension of "this world." They were brethren to each other, members of "One Body," even of the "Body of Christ." This glorious phrase of St. Paul admirably summarizes the common experience of the faithful. In spite of the radical novelty of Christian experience, basic categories of interpretation were taken over from the Old Testament, of which the New Covenant was conceived to be the fulfilment and con-

summation. Christians were indeed "a chosen race, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, a people set apart" (I Peter 2:9). They were the New Israel, the "Little Flock," that is, that faithful "Remnant" to which it was God's good pleasure to give the Kingdom (Luke 12:32). Scattered sheep had to be brought together into "one fold," and assembled. The Church was exactly this "Assembly," *ekklesia tou Theou*—a permanent Assembly of the new "Chosen People" of God, never to be adjourned.

In "this world" Christians could be but pilgrims and strangers. Their true "citizenship," *politeuma*, was "in heaven" (Phil. 3:20). The Church herself was peregrinating through this world (*parokousa*). "The Christian fellowship was a bit of extra-territorial jurisdiction on earth of the world above" (Frank Gavin). The Church was an "outpost of heaven" on the earth, or a "colony of heaven." It may be true that this attitude of radical detachment had originally an "apocalyptic" connotation, and was inspired by the expectation of an imminent *parousia*. Yet, even as an enduring historical society, the Church was bound to be detached from the world. An ethos of "spiritual segregation" was inherent in the very fabric of the Christian faith, as it was inherent in the faith of Ancient Israel. The Church herself was "a city," a *polis*, a new and peculiar "polity." In their baptismal profession Christians had "to renounce" this world, with all its vanity, and pride, and pomp—but also with all its natural ties, even family ties, and to take a solemn oath of allegiance to Christ the King, the only true King on earth and in heaven, to Whom

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all "authority" has been given. By this baptismal commitment Christians were radically separated from "this world." In this world they had no "permanent city." They were "citizens" of the "City to come," of which God Himself was builder and maker (Hebr. 13:14; cf. 11:10).

The Early Christians were often suspected and accused of civic indifference, and even of morbid "misanthropy," *odium generis humani*—which should be probably contrasted with the alleged "philanthropy" of the Roman Empire. The charge was not without substance. In his famous reply to Celsus, Origen was ready to admit the charge. Yet, what else could Christians have done, he asked. In every city, he explained, "we have another system of allegiance," *allo systema tes patridos* (*Contra Celsum*, VIII 75). Along with the civil community, the local Church. And she was for Christians their true home, or their "fatherland," and not their actual "native city." The anonymous writer of the admirable "Letter to Diognetus," written probably in the early years of the second century, elaborated this point with an elegant precision. Christians do not dwell in cities of their own, nor do they differ from the rest of men in speech and customs. "Yet, while they dwell in the cities of Greeks and Barbarians, as the lot of each is cast, the structure of their own polity is peculiar and paradoxical. . . . Every foreign land is a fatherland to them, and every fatherland is a foreign land. . . . Their conversation is on the earth, but their citizenship is in heaven." There was no passion in this attitude, no hostility, and no actual retirement from daily life. But there was a strong note of spiritual estrangement: "and every fatherland is a foreign land." It was coupled, however, with an acute sense of responsibility. Christians were confined in the world, "kept" there as

in prison; but they also "kept the world together," just as the soul holds the body together. Moreover, this was precisely the task allotted to Christians by God, "which it is unlawful to decline" (*Ad Diognetum*, 5, 6). Christians might stay in their native cities, and faithfully perform their daily duties. But they were unable to give their full allegiance to any polity of this world, because their true commitment was elsewhere. They were socially committed and engaged in the Church, and not in the world. "For us nothing is more alien than public affairs," declared Tertullian: *nec ulla magis res aliena quam publica* (*Apologeticum*, 38:3). "I have withdrawn myself from the society," he said on another occasion: *secessi de populo* (*De Pallio*, 5). Christians were in this sense "outside society," voluntary outcasts and outlaws—outside of the social order of this world.

It would be utterly misleading to interpret the tension between Christians and the Roman Empire as a conflict or clash between the Church and the State. Indeed, the Christian Church was more than "a church," just as ancient Israel was at once a "church" and a "nation." Christians also were a nation, a "peculiar people," the People of God, *tertium genus*, neither Jew nor Greek. The Church was not just a "gathered community," or a voluntary association, for "religious" purposes alone. She was, and claimed to be, a distinct and autonomous "society," a distinct "polity." On the other hand, the Roman Empire was, and claimed to be, much more than just "a state." Since the Augustan reconstruction, in any case, Rome claimed to be just *the City*, a permanent and "eternal" City, *Urbs aeterna*, and an ultimate City also. In a sense, it claimed for itself an "eschatological dimension." It posed as an ultimate solution of the human problem. It was a Universal

Commonwealth, "a single Cosmopolis of the inhabited earth," the *Oikoumene*. Rome was offering "Peace," the *Pax Romana*, and "Justice" to all men and all nations under its rule and sway. It claimed to be the final embodiment of "Humanity," of all human values and achievements. "The Empire was, in effect, a politico-ecclesiastical institution. It was a 'church' as well as a 'state'; if it had not been both, it would have been alien from the ideas of the Ancient World" (Sir Ernest Baker). In the ancient society—in the ancient polis, in Hellenistic monarchies, in the Roman republic—"religious" convictions were regarded as an integral part of the political creed. "Religion" was an integral part of the "political" structure. No division of competence and "authority" could ever be admitted, and accordingly no division of loyalty or allegiance. The State was omniscient, and accordingly the allegiance had to be complete and unconditional. Loyalty to the State was itself a kind of religious devotion, in whatever particular form it might have been prescribed or imposed. In the Roman Empire it was the Cult of Caesars. The whole structure of the Empire was indivisibly "political" and "religious." The main purpose of the Imperial rule was usually defined as "Philanthropy," and often even as "Salvation." Accordingly, the Emperors were described as "Saviours."

In retrospect all these claims may seem to be but utopian delusions and wishful dreams, vain and futile, which they were indeed. Yet, these dreams were dreamt by the best people of that time—it is enough to mention Vergil. And the utopian dream of the "Eternal Rome" survived the collapse of the actual Empire and dominated the political thinking of Europe for centuries. Paradoxically, this dream was often cherished even by those who, by the logic

of their faith, should have been better protected against its deceiving charm and thrill. In fact, the vision of an abiding or "Eternal Rome" dominated also the Christian thought in the Middle Ages, both in the East, and in the West.

There was nothing anarchical in the attitude of Early Christians toward the Roman Empire. The "divine" origin of the State and of its authority was formally acknowledged already by St. Paul, and he himself had no difficulty in appealing to the protection of Roman magistrates and of Roman law. The positive value and function of the State were commonly admitted in the Christian circles. Even the violent invective in the book of Revelation was no exception. What was denounced there was iniquity and injustice of the actual Rome, but not the principle of political order. Christians could, in full sincerity and in good faith, protest their political innocence in the Roman courts and plead their loyalty to the Empire. In fact, Early Christians were devoutly praying for the State, for peace and order, and even for Caesars themselves. One finds a high appraisal of the Roman Empire even in those Christian writers of that time, who were notorious for their resistance, as Origen and Tertullian. The theological "justification" of the Empire originated already in the period of persecutions. Yet, Christian loyalty was, of necessity, a restricted loyalty. Of course, Christianity was in no sense a seditious plot, and Christians never intended to overthrow the existing order, although they did believe that it had ultimately to wither away. From the Roman point of view, however, Christians could not fail to appear seditious, not because they were in any sense mixed in politics, but precisely because they were not. Their political "indifference" was irritating to the Romans. They kept themselves away from the concerns of the Commonwealth



at a critical time of its struggle for existence. Not only did they claim "religious freedom" for themselves. They also claimed supreme authority for the Church. Although the Kingdom of God was emphatically "not of this world," it seemed to be a threat to the omnicompetent Kingdom of Man. The Church was, in a sense, a kind of "Resistance Movement" in the Empire. As Christopher Dawson has aptly said, "Christianity was the only remaining power in the world which could not be absorbed in the gigantic mechanism of the new servile state." Christians were not a political faction. Yet, their religious allegiance had an immediate "political" connotation. It has been well observed that monotheism itself was a "political problem" in the ancient world (Eric Peterson). Christians were bound to claim "autonomy" for themselves and for the Church. And this was precisely what the Empire could neither concede, nor even understand. Thus, the clash was inevitable, although it could be delayed.

The Church was a challenge to the Empire, and the Empire was a stumbling block for the Christians.

## II

THE AGE OF CONSTANTINE is commonly regarded as a turning point of Christian history. After a protracted struggle with the Church, the Roman Empire at last capitulated. The Caesar himself was converted, and humbly applied for admission into the Church. Religious freedom was formally promulgated, and was emphatically extended to Christians. The confiscated property was restored to Christian communities. Those Christians who suffered disability and deportation in the years of persecution were now ordered back, and were received with honors. In fact, Constantine was offering to the Church not only

peace and freedom, but also protection and close cooperation. Indeed, he was urging the Church and her leaders to join with him in the "Renovation" of the Empire. This new turn of Imperial policy and tactics was received by Christians with appreciation, but not without some embarrassment and surprise. Christian response to the new situation was by no means unanimous. There were many among Christian leaders who were quite prepared to welcome unreservedly the conversion of Emperor and the prospective conversion of the Empire. But there were not a few who were apprehensive of the Imperial move. To be sure, one could but rejoice in the cessation of hostilities and in that freedom of public worship which now had been legally secured. But the major problem had not yet been solved, and it was a problem of extreme complexity. Indeed, it was a highly paradoxical problem.

Already Tertullian was asking certain awkward questions, although in his own time they were no more than rhetorical questions. Could Caesars accept Christ, and believe in Him? Now, Caesars obviously belonged to "the world." They were an integral part of the "secular" fabric, *necessarii saeculo*. Could then a Christian be Caesar, that is, belong at once to two conflicting orders, the Church and the World (*Apologeticum*, 21:24)? In the time of Constantine this concept of the "Christian Caesar" was still a riddle and a puzzle, despite the eloquent effort of Eusebius of Caesarea to elaborate the idea of the "Christian Empire." For many Christians there was an inner contradiction in the concept itself. Caesars were necessarily committed to the cause of "this world." But the Church was not of this world. The office of Caesars was intrinsically "secular." Was there really any room for Emperors, as Emperors, in the structure of Christian Community? It has been

recently suggested that probably Constantine himself was rather uneasy and uncertain precisely at this very point. It seems that one of the reasons for which he was delaying his own baptism, till his very last days, was precisely his dim feeling that it was inconvenient to be "Christian" and "Caesar" at the same time. Constantine's personal conversion constituted no problem. But as Emperor he was committed. He had to carry the burden of his exalted position in the Empire. He was still a "Divine Caesar." As Emperor, he was heavily involved in the traditions of the Empire, as much as he actually endeavored to disentangle himself. The transfer of the Imperial residence to a *new* City, away from the memories of the *old* pagan Rome, was a spectacular symbol of this noble effort. Yet, the Empire itself was still much the same as before, with its autocratic ethos and habits, with all its pagan practices, including the adoration and *apotheosis* of Caesars. We have good reasons to trust Constantine's personal sincerity. No doubt, he was deeply convinced that Christianity was the only power which could quicken the sick body of the Empire and supply a new principle of cohesion in the time of social disintegration. But obviously he was unable to abdicate his sovereign authority, or to renounce the world. Indeed, Constantine was firmly convinced that, by Divine Providence, he was entrusted with a high and holy mission, that he was chosen to reestablish the Empire, and to reestablish it on a Christian foundation. This conviction, more than any particular political theory, was the decisive factor in his policy, and in his actual mode of ruling.

The situation was intensely ambiguous. Had the Church to accept the Imperial offer and to assume the new task? Was it a welcome opportunity, or rather a dangerous compromise? In fact, the

experience of close cooperation with the Empire was never altogether happy and encouraging for Christians, even in the days of Constantine himself. The Empire did not appear to be an easy or comfortable ally and partner for the Church. Under Constantine's successors all inconveniences of "cooperation" became quite evident, even if we ignore the abortive attempt of Julian to reinstate Paganism. The leaders of the Church were compelled, time and again, to challenge the persistent attempts of Caesars to exercise their supreme authority also in religious matters. The rise of monasticism in the fourth century was no accident. It was rather an attempt to escape the Imperial problem, and to build an "autonomous" Christian Society outside of the boundaries of the Empire, "outside the camp." On the other hand, the Church could not evade her responsibility for the world, or surrender her missionary task. Indeed, the Church was concerned not only with individuals, but also with society, even with the whole of mankind. Even kingdoms of this world had to be brought ultimately into obedience to Christ. Nor was the Empire prepared to leave the Church alone, or to dispense with her help and service. The Church was already a strong institution, strong by her faith and discipline, and spread everywhere, even to the remote corners of the inhabited earth. Thus, the Church was forced finally into alliance with the Empire, by the double pressure of her own missionary vocation and of the traditional logic of Empire.

By the end of the fourth century Christianity was ultimately established as the official religion of the Roman Empire. Under Theodosius the Great, the Roman Empire formally committed itself to the Christian cause. Paganism was legally disavowed and proscribed. "Heresy" was also outlawed. The State for-

mally engaged in the maintenance of the Orthodox Faith. The basic presupposition of the new arrangement was the *Unity of the Christian Commonwealth*. There was but *One* and comprehensive *Christian Society*, which was at once a Church and a State. In this one society there were different orders or "powers," clearly distinguished but closely correlated—"spiritual" and "temporal," "ecclesiastical" and "political." But the "Society" itself was intrinsically *One*. This idea was by no means a new one. Ancient Israel was at once a Kingdom and a Church. The Roman Empire had always been a "politico-ecclesiastical institution," and it also retained this double character after it had been "christened." In the Christian Commonwealth "Churchmanship" and "Citizenship" were not only "co-extensive," but simply identical. Only Christians could be citizens. And all citizens were obliged to be Orthodox in belief and behavior. The Christian Commonwealth was conceived as a single "theocratic" structure. Moreover, the Roman Empire always regarded itself as a "Universal Kingdom," the only "Empire." As there was but *One Church*, the Church Universal, so there could be but *One Kingdom*, the Ecumenical Empire. The Church and the Kingdom were in effect but *One Society*, indivisible and undivided. *One Civitas—Respublica Christiana*. "The *One Commonwealth* of all mankind, conceived partly as an Empire—the surviving image of ancient Rome, but mainly and generally as a Church, is the essential society of that long period of human history which we call by the name of the Middle Ages. It was a fact, and not merely an idea; and yet it was also an idea, and not altogether a fact" (Sir Ernest Baker).

It was a momentous and magnificent achievement, a glorious vision, an ambitious claim. But it was also an ominous

and ambiguous achievement. In fact, the two orders, "spiritual" and "temporal," could never be truly integrated into one system. Old tensions continued inside of the "One Society," and the balance of "powers" in the Christian Commonwealth has been always unstable and insecure. It would be an anachronism to describe this internal tension between "powers" in the Medieval Commonwealth as a conflict or competition between the Church and the State, conceived as two distinct societies, with an appropriate sphere of competence and jurisdiction. In the Middle Ages, Church and State, as two distinct societies, simply did not exist. The conflict was between the two "powers" in the same society, and precisely for that very reason it was so vigorous and acute. In this respect there was no basic difference between the Christian East and the Christian West, as different as the actual course of events has been in these two areas of the Christian Commonwealth. The major problem was the same, in the East and in the West—the problem of a "Christian Society," of a "Holy Empire." It was but natural that this problem should assume special urgency and dimension precisely in the East. In the East "the Holy Empire" was a formidable reality, "a tangible fact in an actual world," in the phrase of James Bryce, while in the West it was rather an idea, or just a claim. Since Constantine the heart of the Empire was at Constantinople, and no longer in the old City of Rome. The story of Byzantium was an immediate continuation of Roman history. In the West, Roman order disintegrated at an early date. In the East, it survived for centuries. Even in Oriental garb, Byzantium continued to be "the Kingdom of the Romans," up to its very end. The main problem of Byzantium was precisely the problem of "the Eternal Rome." The whole weight of the

Empire was felt there much more than ever in the West. It is highly significant, however, that all "Byzantine problems" reappear in the West, with the same urgency and the same ambiguity, as soon as "Empire" had been reconstituted there, under Charlemagne and his successors. Indeed, Charlemagne regarded himself as a lawful successor to Constantine and Justinian. His claims and policy in the matters religious were almost identical with those of the Byzantine Caesars.

It has been often contended that in Byzantium the Church had surrendered her "freedom" into the hands of Caesars. The Byzantine system has been derogatorily labelled as a "Caesaropapism," with the assumption that Emperor was the actual ruler of the Church, even if he was never formally acknowledged to be her head. It has been said more than once that in Byzantium the Church simply ceased to exist, that is, to exist as an "independent institution," and was practically reduced to the status of a "liturgical department of the Empire." The evidence quoted in support of these charges, at first glance, may seem to be abundant and overwhelming. But it does not stand a closer examination. The charge of "Caesaropapism" is still maintained in certain quarters. It has been emphatically rejected by many competent students of Byzantium as a sheer misunderstanding, as a biased anachronism. Emperors were indeed rulers in the Christian Society, also in religious matters, but never rulers over the Church.

The story of Byzantium was an adventure in Christian politics. It was an unsuccessful and probably an unfortunate experiment. Yet it should be judged on its own terms.

### III

JUSTINIAN HAS CLEARLY stated that basic principle of the Byzantine political

system in the preface to his Sixth Novel, dated March 16, 535:

"There are two major gifts which God has given unto men of His supernal clemency, the priesthood and the imperial authority—*hierosyne* and *basileia*; *sacerdotium* and *imperium*. Of these, the former is concerned with things divine; the latter presides over the human affairs and takes care of them. Proceeding from the same source, both adorn human life. Nothing is of greater concern for the emperors than the dignity of the priesthood, so that priests may in their turn pray to God for them. Now, if one is in every respect blameless and filled with confidence toward God, and the other does rightly and properly maintain in order the commonwealth entrusted to it, there will be a certain fair harmony established which will furnish whatsoever may be needful for mankind. We therefore are highly concerned for the true doctrines inspired by God and for the dignity of priests. We are convinced that, if they maintain their dignity, great benefits will be bestowed by God on us, and we shall firmly hold whatever we now possess, and in addition shall acquire those things which we have not yet secured. A happy ending always crowns those things which were undertaken in a proper manner, acceptable to God. This is the case, when sacred canons are carefully observed, which the glorious Apostles, the venerable eye-witnesses and ministers of the Divine Word, have handed down to us, and the holy Fathers have kept and explained."

This was at once a summary, and a program.

Justinian did not speak of State, or of Church. He spoke of two ministries, or of two agencies, which were established in the Christian Commonwealth. They were appointed by the same Divine authority and for the same ultimate purpose. As a "Divine gift," the Imperial power, *imperium*, was "independent" from the Priesthood, *sacerdotium*. Yet

it was "dependent" upon, and "subordinate" to, that purpose for which it had been Divinely established. This purpose was the faithful maintenance and promotion of the Christian truth. Thus, if "the Empire" as such was not subordinate to the Hierarchy, it was nevertheless subordinate to the Church, which was a Divinely appointed custodian of the Christian truth. In other words, the Imperial power was "legitimate" only *within* the Church. In any case, it was essentially subordinate to the Christian Faith, was bound by the precepts of the Apostles and Fathers, and in this respect "limited" by them. The legal status of the Emperor in the Commonwealth depended upon his good standing in the Church, under her doctrinal and canonical discipline. *Imperium* was at once an authority, and a service. And the terms of this service were set in rules and regulations of the Church. In his coronation oath, the Emperor had to profess the Orthodox faith and to take a vow of obedience to the decrees of the ecclesiastical Councils. This was no mere formality. "Orthodoxy was, as it were, the *supernaturality of Byzantium*, the basic element of the life of the State and people" (I. I. Sokolov).

The place of Emperor in the Byzantine system was high and exalted. He was surrounded with a halo of theocratical splendor. The court ceremonial was rich and elaborate, and it was distinctively a religious ceremonial, a ritual, almost a kind of "Imperial liturgy." Yet, the Emperor was no more than a layman. He had a certain position in the Church, and a very prominent and high position. But it was a lay position. There was, as it were, a special office in the Church reserved for a layman. Emperors did not belong to the regular hierarchy of the Church. They were in no sense "ministers of Word and sacraments." Some special "priestly" character might be con-

ceded to them, and indeed has been often claimed and asserted. In any case, it was a very specific "Royal priesthood," clearly distinguishable from the "Ministerial priesthood" of the clergy. Certainly, the Emperor was a high dignitary in the Church, but in a very special sense, which it is not easy to define exactly. Whatever the original meaning of the rite of Imperial Coronation might have been—and it seems that originally it was definitely a strictly "secular" ceremony, in which even the Patriarch acted as a civil servant—gradually it developed into a sacred rite, a *sacramentale*, if not a regular "sacrament," especially since it was combined with the rite of "anointment," a distinctively ecclesiastical rite, conferred by the Church. The rites of Imperial Coronation convey a thoroughly "consecrational" conception of the "temporal power." Probably, this "theocratical" emphasis was even stronger in the West than in Byzantium. It is specifically significant that the rite included a solemn oath to obey faithfully all rules of the Church, and above all to keep inviolate the Orthodox faith, in conformity with the Holy Scripture and the ordinances of the Councils.

The crux of the problem is in the claim of the "temporal" rulers, and in their endeavor, "to be Christian" and to perform accordingly certain Christian duties in their own right, as their own assignment. This claim implied a conviction that basically "the secular" itself was, in a certain sense, "sacred." In a Christian society nothing can be simply "secular." It may be argued that this claim was often insincere, no more than a disguise for worldly motives and concerns. Yet it is obvious that in many instances—and one should emphasize, in all major and crucial instances—this claim was utterly sincere. Both Justinian and Charlemagne—to quote but the most spectacular cases—were deeply sincere in



their endeavor to be "Christian rulers" and to promote the cause of Christ, as much as their actual policies were open to criticism. It was commonly conceded that the Emperor's duty was "to defend" the Faith and the Church, by all available means at his disposal, including even "the sword," but probably first of all by appropriate legislation. A tension would arise every time that Emperors displayed their concern for matters religious, as many Byzantine Emperors, and most of all Justinian, actually did on many occasions. In principle, this was not beyond their lawful competence. Neither "the purity of the Faith," nor "the strictness of the Canons," is a purely "clerical concern." Emperors should care for the "right belief" of the people. Nor could they be prohibited from holding theological convictions. If the right of formal decision in the matters of faith and discipline belonged to the Priesthood—and this right was never contested or abrogated—the right of being concerned about doctrinal issues could never be denied even to laymen, nor the right to voice their religious convictions, especially in the periods of doctrinal strife or confusion. Obviously, Emperors could raise their voice more powerfully and impressively than anybody else, and use their "power" (*potestas*) in order to enforce those convictions which they might, in full honesty, believe to be Orthodox. Yet even in this case Emperors would have to act through appropriate channels. They would have to impose their will, or their mind, upon the hierarchy of the Church, which they actually attempted to do more than once, using sometimes violence, threat, and other objectionable methods. The legal or canonical form had to be observed in any case. To act in religious matters without the consent and concurrence of the Priesthood was obviously *ultra vires* of the Imperial power, beyond its lawful

competence. Flagrant abuses by Byzantine Caesars should not be ignored. On the other hand, it is obvious that in no case were Emperors successful when they attempted to go against the Faith of the Church. The Church in Byzantium was strong enough to resist the Imperial pressure. Emperors failed to impose upon the Church a compromise with the Arians, a premature reconciliation with the Monophysites, Iconoclasm, and, at a later date, an ambiguous "reunion" with Rome:

"Nothing could be more false than the charge of Caesaropapism which is generally brought against the Byzantine Church—the accusation that the Church rendered servile obedience to the orders of the Emperor even in the religious sphere. It is true that the Emperor always concerned himself with ecclesiastical affairs; he endeavored to maintain or to impose unity in dogma, but his claims were by no means always submissively recognized. Indeed, the Byzantines became accustomed to the idea that organized opposition to the Imperial will in religious matters was normal and legitimate. . . . Without any suspicion of paradox the religious history of Byzantium could be represented as a conflict between the Church and the State, a conflict from which the Church emerged unquestionably the victor" (Henry Grégoire).

It can be argued that, in the course of time, the actual influence and the prestige of the Church in Byzantium were steadily growing. In this connection, the *Epanagoge*, a constitutional document of the late ninth century, is especially significant and instructive. It was apparently no more than a draft, which has never been officially promulgated. The draft was prepared probably by Photius, the famous Patriarch. Certain portions of the document were incorporated in the later legal compilations and received wide circulation. In any case, the document reflected the cur-

rent conception of the normal relationship between the Emperor and the hierarchy, prevailing at that time. The main principle was still the same as in Justinian. But now it was elaborated with greater emphasis and precision.

The Commonwealth, *politeia*, is composed of several parts and members. Of these the most important, and the most necessary, are the Emperor and the Patriarch. There is an obvious parallelism between the two powers. The peace and prosperity of the people depend upon the accord and unanimity between the Imperial power and the Priesthood. The Emperor is the supreme ruler, yet the purpose of the Imperial rule is Beneficence, *euergesia*. It is an old idea, inherited from Hellenistic political philosophy. In his rule the Emperor must enforce justice. The Emperor must be well instructed in the doctrines of faith and piety. He must defend and promote the teachings of the Scripture and of the Councils. His main task is to secure peace and happiness for the soul and the body of his subjects. The place of the Patriarch is no less exalted. "*The Patriarch is a living and animate image of Christ.*" In all his words and deeds he must exhibit truth. He must be crucified to the world, and live in Christ. To the infidel he must appeal by the holiness of his life. In the believers he must strengthen piety and honesty of life. He must endeavor to bring back the heretics into the fold of the true Church. He must be just and impartial to all men. Before the Emperors he must speak without shame in the defense of the right faith. To the Patriarch alone is given the authority to interpret the rules of the Fathers, and to rule about their lawful application.

Of course, this was an idealized picture. The actual reality was much darker and more ambiguous. The Emperors were always able to influence the elec-

tion of the Patriarchs and to arrange, by various devices, for the deposition of the unsuitable occupants of the throne. On the other hand, the Patriarchs also had ample resources in their eventual resistance to the imperial power, of which suspension and excommunication were not the least significant. Nevertheless, the ideal pattern, as depicted in the *Epanagoge* and elsewhere, has never been forgotten. "The really significant theory was that of the *Epanagoge*: Patriarch and Emperor, as allies not rivals, both essential for the prosperity of the East Roman polity—both parts of a single organism" (Norman H. Baynes).

The theory of a "dual government" in the single Commonwealth was commonly accepted in the Middle Ages, both in the East and in the West. The theory had various and divergent versions. It was the common background of both competing parties in the West, the Curialist and the Imperialist, the Papacy and the Holy Empire. The Church has been victorious in her struggle with the Empire in the West. But it was a precarious victory. The meaning of Canossa was ambiguous. The theocratic claims of the Empire were defeated. But, in the long run, this only led to the acute "secularization" of the temporal power in Western Society. A purely "secular" Society emerged, for the first time in Christian history. Accordingly, the "spiritual" Society, the Church, has been thoroughly "clericalized." Tensions did not diminish, nor were they calmed or tamed. But the "theocratic" mission of the Church was sorely reduced and compromised. The Unity of the Christian Commonwealth was broken. In the East, the Church won no spectacular victories over the Empire. The impact of the Imperial power on Ecclesiastical affairs has been ponderous, and often detrimental. Yet, in spite of all imperial abuses and failures, the Byzantine Commonwealth

retained to the very end its Christian and "consecrational" character. Religion and polity were never divorced or separated from each other. Byzantium collapsed as a Christian Kingdom, under the burden of its tremendous claims.

#### IV

**M**ONASTICISM WAS, to a great extent, an attempt to evade the Imperial problem. The period of the bitter struggle between the Church and the Empire, under the Arianizing Caesars of the fourth century, was also the period of Monastic expansion. It was a kind of a new and impressive "Exodus." And the Empire always regarded this "Exodus," the flight into the Desert, as a threat to its very existence, from the times of St. Athanasius to the cruel persecution of monks by the Iconoclastic Emperors. It is often suggested that people were leaving "the world" simply to escape the burden of social life, with its duties and labors. It is difficult to see in what sense life in the wilderness could be "easy" and "leisurely." It was, indeed, a strenuous life, with its own burdens and dangers. It is true that in the West at that time the Roman order was falling to pieces, was sorely endangered, and partly destroyed by barbarian invasions, and apocalyptic fears and apprehensions might have crept into many hearts, an expectation of an imminent end of history. Yet, we do not find many traces of this apocalyptic dread in the writings of the Desert Fathers. Their motives for desertion were quite different. In the East, where the Monastic Movement originated, the Christian Empire was in the process of growth. In spite of all its ambiguities and shortcomings, it was still an impressive sight. After so many decades of suffering and persecution, "this World" seemed to have been opened for the Christian conquest. The

prospect of success was rather bright. Those who fled into the wilderness did not share these expectations. They had no trust in the "christened Empire." They rather distrusted the whole scheme altogether. They were leaving the earthly Kingdom, as much as it might have been actually "christened," in order to build the true Kingdom of Christ in the new land of promise, "outside the gates," in the Desert. They fled not so much from the world's disasters, as from the "worldly cares," from the involvement with the world, even under the banner of Christ, from the prosperity and wrong security of the world.

Nor was the Monastic endeavor a search for "extraordinary" or "supererogatory" deeds and exploits. The main ascetical emphasis, at least at the early stage of development, was not on taking "special" or "exceptional" vows, but rather on accomplishing those common and essential vows, which every Christian had to take at his baptism. Monasticism meant first of all a "renunciation," a total renunciation of "this world," with all its lust and pomp. And all Christians were bound to renounce "the world" and to pledge an undivided loyalty to the only Lord, Christ Jesus. Indeed, every Christian was actually taking this oath of undivided allegiance at this Christian initiation. It is highly significant that the rite of Monastic profession, when it was finally established, was made precisely on the pattern of the baptismal rite, and the Monastic profession came to be regarded as a kind of "second baptism." If there was a search for "perfection" in the Monastic endeavor, "perfection" itself was not regarded as something "peculiar" and optional, but rather as a normal and obligatory way of life. If it was a "rigorism," this rigorism could claim for itself the authority of the Gospel.

It is also significant that, from the

very beginning, the main emphasis in the Monastic oath was placed precisely on "social" renunciation. The novice had to disown the world, to become a stranger and pilgrim, a foreigner in the world, in all earthly cities, just as the Church herself was but a "stranger" in the earthly City, *paroikousa* on earth. Obviously, this was but a confirmation of the common baptismal vows. Indeed, all Christians were supposed to disown the world, and to dwell in this world as strangers. This did not necessarily imply a contempt for the world. The precept could also be construed as a call to its reform and salvation. St. Basil the Great, the first legislator of Eastern Monasticism, was desperately concerned with the problem of social reconstruction. He watched with grave apprehension the process of social disintegration, which was so conspicuously advanced in his time. His call to the formation of monastic communities was, in effect, an attempt to rekindle the spirit of mutual-ity in a world which seemed to have lost any force of cohesion and any sense of social responsibility. Now, Christians had to set a model for the new society, in order to counterbalance the disruptive tendencies of the age. St. Basil was strong in his conviction that man was essentially a social or "political" being, not a solitary one—*zoon koinonikon*. He could have learned this both from the Scriptures and from Aristotle. But the present society was built on a wrong foundation. Consequently, one had first of all to retire or withdraw from it. According to St. Basil, a monk had to be "home-less" in the world, *oikos*, his only home being the Church. He had to go out, or to be taken out, of all existing social structures—family, city, Empire. He had to disown all orders of the world, to sever all social ties and commitments. He had to start afresh. The later custom or rule to change the

name in taking the habit was a spectacular symbol of this radical break with the previous life. But monks leave the society of this world in order to join another society, or rather to actualize in full their membership in another community, which is the Church. The prevailing form of Monasticism was "coenobitical," the life in common. The solitary life might be praised as an exception for a few peculiar persons, but it was firmly discouraged as a common rule. The main emphasis was on obedience, on the submission of will. "Community" was always regarded as a normal and more adequate manner of ascetical life. A monastery was a corporation, "a body," a small Church. Even hermits usually did dwell together, in special colonies, under the direction of a common spiritual leader or guide. This communal character of Monasticism was strongly reemphasized by St. Theodore of Studium, the great reformer of Byzantine Monasticism (759–826). St. Theodore insisted that there was no commandment of solitary life in the Gospel. Our Lord Himself lived in a "community" with His disciples. Christians are not independent individuals, but brethren, members of the Body of Christ. Moreover, only in community could Christian virtues of charity and obedience be properly developed and exercised.

Thus, monks were leaving the world in order to build, on the virginal soil of the Desert, a New Society, to organize there, on the Evangelical pattern, the true Christian Community. Early Monasticism was not an ecclesiastical institution. It was precisely a spontaneous movement, a drive. And it was distinctively a *lay movement*. The taking of Holy Orders was definitely discouraged, except by order of the superiors, and even abbots were often laymen. In early times, secular priests from the vicinity

were invited to conduct services for the community, or else the neighboring Church was attended on Sundays. The monastic state was clearly distinguished from the clerical. "Priesthood" was a dignity and an authority, and as such was regarded as hardly compatible with the life of obedience and penitence, which was the core and the heart of monastic existence. Certain concessions were made, however, time and again, but rather reluctantly. On the whole, in the East Monasticism has preserved its lay character till the present day. In the communities of Mount Athos, this last remnant of the old monastic regime, only a few are in Holy Orders, and most do not seek them, as a rule. This is highly significant. Monasticism cut across the basic distinction between clergy and laity in the Church. It was a peculiar order in its own right.

Monasteries were at once worshipping communities and working teams. Monasticism created a special "theology of labor," even of manual labor in particular. Labor was by no means a secondary or subsidiary element of monastic life. It belonged to its very essence. "Idleness" was regarded as a primary and grievous vice, spiritually destructive. Man was created for work. But work should not be selfish. One had to work for common purpose and benefit, and especially to be able to help the needy. As St. Basil stated it, "in labor the purpose set before everyone, is the support of the needy, not one's own necessity" (*Regulae fusius tractatae*, 42). Labor was to be, as it were, an expression of social solidarity, as well as a basis of social service and charity. From St. Basil this principle was taken over by St. Benedict. But already St. Pachomius, the first promoter of coenobitical Monasticism in Egypt, was preaching "the Gospel of continued work" (to use the able phrase of the late Bishop Kenneth Kirk). His

coenobium at Tabennisi was at once a settlement, a college, and a working community, in principle a "non-acquisitive society." One of the main monastic vows was the complete denial of all possessions, not only a promise of poverty. There was no room whatsoever for any kind of "private property" in the life of a coenobitical monk. And this rule was sometimes enforced with rigidity. Monks should not have even private desires. The spirit of "ownership" was strongly repudiated as an ultimate seed of corruption in human life. St. John Chrysostom regarded "private property" as the root of all social ills. The cold distinction between "mine" and "thine" was, in his opinion, quite incompatible with the pattern of loving brotherhood, set forth in the Gospel. He could have added at this point also the authority of Cicero: *nulla autem privata natura*. Indeed, for St. John, "property" was man's wicked invention, not of God's design. He was prepared to force upon the whole world the rigid monastic discipline of "non-possession" and obedience, for the sake of the world's relief. In his opinion, separate monasteries should exist now, in order that one day the whole world might become like a monastery.

As it has been well said recently, "Monasticism was an instinctive reaction of the Christian spirit against that fallacious reconciliation with the present age which the conversion of the Empire might seem to have justified" (Père Louis Bouyer). It was a vigorous reminder of the radical "otherworldliness" of the Christian Church. It was also a mighty challenge to the Christian Empire, then in the process of construction. This challenge could not go without a rejoinder. The Emperors, and especially Justinian, made a desperate effort to integrate the Monastic Movement into the general structure of their Christian



Empire. Considerable concessions had to be made. Monasteries, as a rule, were exempt from taxation and granted various immunities. In practice, these privileges only led ultimately to an acute secularization of Monasticism. But originally they meant a recognition, quite unwillingly granted, of a certain Monastic "extra-territoriality." On the other hand, many monasteries were canonically exempt from the jurisdiction of the local bishops. During the Iconoclastic controversy, the independence of Monasticism was conspicuously manifested in Byzantium. Up to the end of Byzantium, Monasticism continued as a peculiar social order, in perpetual tension and competition with the Empire.

Obviously, actual Monasticism was never up to its own principles and claims. But its historical significance lies precisely in its principles. Whereas in the pagan Empire the Church herself was a kind of "Resistance Movement," *Monasticism was a permanent "Resistance Movement" in the Christian Society.*

## V

IN THE NEW TESTAMENT the word "Church," *ekklesia*, has been used in two different senses. On the one hand, it denoted the One Church, the Church Catholic and Universal, the one great Community of all believers, united "in Christ." It was a theological and dogmatic use of the term. On the other hand, the term, used in the plural, denoted local Christian Communities, or Christian congregations in particular places. It was a descriptive use of the word. Each local community, or Church, was in a sense self-sufficient and independent. It was the basic unit or element of the whole ecclesiastical structure. It was precisely the Church in a particular locality, the Church "peregrinating," *paroikousa*, in this or that particular city. It had, within itself, the

fullness of the sacramental life. It had its own ministry. It can be asserted with great assurance that in the early second century, at least, each local community was headed by its own Bishop, *episcopos*. He was the main, and probably exclusive, minister of all sacraments in his Church, for his flock. His rights in his own community were commonly recognized, and the equality of all local Bishops was acknowledged. This is still the basic principle of the Catholic canon law. The unity of all local communities was also commonly acknowledged, as an article of faith. All local Churches, as scattered and dispersed as they actually were in the world, like islands in a stormy sea, were essentially One Church Catholic, *mia ekklesia catholike*. It was, first of all, the "unity of faith" and the "unity of sacraments," testified by mutual acknowledgement and recognition, in the bonds of love. Local communities were in frequent contact, according to the circumstances. The Oneness of the Church was strongly felt in this primitive period, and was formally professed in manifold ways: "One Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all" (Ephes. 4: 5,6). The external organization was loose. In the early years of the Church, contacts were maintained by travels and supervision of the Apostles. In the post-apostolic age they were maintained by occasional visits of the Bishops, by correspondence, and in other similar ways. By the end of the second century, under the pressure of common concerns, the custom of having "Synods," that is, the gatherings of Bishops, developed. But "Synods," that is, councils, were still but occasional meetings, except probably for North Africa, for a special purpose, and in a restricted area. They had not yet developed into a permanent institution. Only in the third century did the process of consolidation advance, and lead to

the formation of "ecclesiastical provinces," in which several local Churches in a particular area were coordinated, under the presidency of the Bishop in the capital of the province. The emerging organizations seem to have followed the administrative divisions of the Empire, which was practically the only natural procedure. The local "autonomy" was still firmly preserved and safeguarded. The chief Bishop of the province, the Metropolitan, was no more than a president of the episcopal body of the province and chairman of the synods, and had some executive authority and a right of supervision only in behalf of all Bishops. He was not authorized to interfere with the regular administration of particular local episcopal districts, which came to be known as "dioceses." Although in principle the equality of all Bishops has been strongly maintained, certain particular sees came to prominence: Rome, Alexandria, Antioch, Ephesus, to mention but the most important.

The new situation obtained in the fourth century. On the one hand, it was a century of Synods. Most of these Synods, or Councils, were extraordinary meetings, convened for particular purposes, to discuss some urgent matters of common concern. Most of these Councils dealt with the matters of faith and doctrine. The aim was to achieve unanimity and agreement on principal points, and to enforce a certain measure of uniformity in order and administration. On the other hand, the Church had now to face a new problem. The tacit assumption of the basic identity between the Church and the Empire demanded a further development of administrative pattern. The provincial system, already in existence, was formally accepted and enforced. And a further centralization was envisaged. As the Commonwealth was one and indivisible,

a certain parallelism had to be established between the organization of the Empire and the administrative structure of the Church. Gradually, a theory of five Patriarchates, a *pentarchy*, was promoted. Five principal episcopal sees were suggested, as centers of administrative centralization: Rome, Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem. An independent status was conceded to the Church of Cyprus, in consideration of its Apostolic origin and ancient glory. What was more important, the Synod system was formally enforced. The Council of Nicea ruled that Provincial Synods should be regularly held twice in the course of the year (Canon 5). According to the established custom, their competence included, first, all matters which might emerge in the province, and also appeals from the local congregations. It does not seem that the system worked well or smoothly. The Council of Chalcedon observed that Synods were not regularly held, which led to the neglect of important business and disorder, and reconfirmed the earlier rule (Canon 19). And still the system did not work. Justinian had to concede that Synods might meet but once each year (*Novel* 137.4). The Council in Trullo (691-692), which codified all earlier canonical legislation, also ruled that meetings should be held yearly, and the absentees should be brotherly admonished (Canon 8). And finally, the Second Council of Nicea confirmed that all Bishops of the province should meet yearly, to discuss "canonical and evangelical matters" and to deal with "questions" of canonical character. The aim of the system was obvious. It was an attempt to create a "higher" instance in administration, above the episcopal office, in order to achieve more uniformity and cohesion. Yet, the principle of episcopal authority in local communities was still firmly upheld. Only, by that time, a

Bishop was no longer the head of a single local community, but "a diocesan," that is, the head of a certain district, composed of several communities which were committed to the immediate charge of priests, or presbyters. Only acting Bishops, that is, those who were actually in office, had jurisdiction, and the authority to function as Bishops, although the retired Bishops were keeping their rank and honor. Nobody could be consecrated as a Bishop, or ordained as a priest, except to a definite "title," that is, for a particular flock. There was no ministry "at large."

The logic of the single Christian Commonwealth seemed to imply one further step. The Imperial power was centered in one Emperor. Was it not logical that the Priesthood, the Hierarchy, should also have one Head? This has been actually claimed, if for completely different reasons, by the Popes of Rome. The actual basis of the "Roman claims" was in the Primacy of St. Peter and in the Apostolic privileges of his See. But, in the context of the Commonwealth-idea, these claims were inevitably understood as claims for the Primacy of the Empire. The "primacy of honor" was readily conceded to the Bishop of Rome, with the emphasis on the fact that Rome was the ancient capital of the Empire. But now, with the transfer of the capital to the New City of Constantine, which had become a "New Rome," the privileges of the Bishop of Constantinople also had to be safeguarded. Accordingly, the Second Ecumenical Council (Constantinople 381) accorded to the Bishop of Constantinople "the privilege of honor," *ta presbeia tes times*, after the Bishop of Rome, with an open reference to the fact that "Constantinople was the New Rome" (Canon 3). This put the Bishop of Constantinople above that of Alexandria in the list of ecclesiastical precedence, to the great anger and offence of

the latter. In this connection it was strongly urged that this exaltation of the Constantinopolitan See violated the prerogatives of the "Apostolic Sees," that is, those founded by the Apostles, of which Alexandria was one of the most renowned, as the See of St. Mark. Nevertheless, the Council of Chalcedon reconfirmed the decision of 381. Privileges of Rome were grounded in that it was the Capital City. For the same reason it seemed to be fair that the See of the New Rome, the residence of the Emperor and of the Senate, should have similar privileges (Canon 28). This decision provoked violent indignation in Rome, and the 28th Canon of Chalcedon was repudiated by the Roman Church. It was inevitable, however, that the prestige and influence of the Constantinopolitan Bishop should grow. In the Christian Commonwealth it was but natural for the Bishop of the Imperial City to be in the center of the ecclesiastical administration. By the time of the Council of Chalcedon, there was in Constantinople, along with the Bishop, a consultative body of resident Bishops, *synodos endemousa*, acting as a kind of permanent "Council." It was also logical that, in the course of time, the Bishop of Constantinople should assume the title of an "Ecumenical Patriarch," whatever exact meaning might have been originally connected with the name. The first Bishop who actually assumed the title was John the Faster (582-593), and this again could not fail to provoke the protest from Rome. St. Gregory the Great, the Pope, accused the Patriarch of pride and arrogance. There was no personal arrogance—the Patriarch was a severe and humble ascetic, "the Faster"—there was but the logic of the Christian Empire. Political catastrophes in the East, that is, the Persian invasion and Arab conquest, together with the secession of Monophysites and Nestor-

ians in Syria and Egypt, reduced the role of the ancient great Sees in those areas, and this accelerated the rise of the Constantinopolitan See. At least *de facto*, the Patriarch had become the chief Bishop of the Church in the Eastern Empire. It is significant that the *Epanagoge* spoke plainly of the Patriarch, meaning of course the Patriarch of Constantinople. He was the opposite number to the Emperor. By that time the political unity of the Christian Commonwealth had been already broken. Byzantium had actually become precisely an Eastern Empire. And another, and rival, Empire had been founded in the West, under Charlemagne. After a period of indecision, the See of Rome finally took the side of Charlemagne. On the other hand, the missionary expansion among the Slavs in the ninth and tenth centuries greatly enlarged the area of the Constantinopolitan jurisdiction.

It is commonly admitted that "Roman Unity," the *Pax Romana*, facilitated the missionary expansion of the Church, which only in rare cases went beyond the boundaries of the Empire, the *limes Romanus*. It is also obvious that the empirical unity of the Church had been so speedily realized precisely because the Empire was one, at least in principle and in theory. Those countries which were outside of the Empire were also loosely fitted into the institutional unity of the Church. The factual identity of the main ecclesiastical organization with the Empire created considerable difficulty for those Churches which were beyond the Imperial border. The most conspicuous example is the Church in Persia, which was compelled to withdraw from the unity with the West already in 410 and constitute itself into an independent unit, precisely because the Church in the West was too closely connected with the Roman Empire, an enemy of Persia. The split was caused by non-theological fac-

tors, and was limited to the level of administration. Thus, "Roman Unity" was at once a great advantage and a handicap for the Church's mission.

Now, it can be reasonably contended that in the period before Constantine the Church did not evolve any organization which could have enabled her to act authoritatively on a really "ecumenical" scale. The first truly "ecumenical" action was the Council in Nicea, in 325, the *First Ecumenical Council*. Councils were already in the tradition of the Church. But Nicea was the first Council of the whole Church, and it became the pattern on which all subsequent Ecumenical Councils were held. For the first time the voice of the whole Church was heard. The membership of the Council, however, was hardly ecumenical, in the sense of actual representation. There were but four Bishops from the West, and the Roman Bishop was represented by two presbyters. Few missionary Bishops from the East were present. The majority of Bishops present came from Egypt, Syria, and Asia Minor. The same is true of all subsequent Ecumenical Councils, recognized in the Eastern Orthodox Church, up to the Second Council of Nicea, 787. Strangely enough, we do not find in our primary sources any regulations concerning the organization of the Ecumenical Councils. It does not seem that there were any fixed rules or patterns. In the canonical sources there is no single mention of the Ecumenical Council, as a permanent institution, which should be periodically convened, according to some authoritative scheme. The Ecumenical Councils were not an integral part of the Church's constitution, nor of her basic administrative structure. In this respect they differed substantially from those provincial and local Councils which were supposed to meet yearly, to transact current matters and to exercise

the function of unifying supervision. The authority of the Ecumenical Councils was high, ultimate, and binding. But Councils themselves were rather occasional and extraordinary gatherings. This explains why no Ecumenical Councils have been held since 787. In the East there was a widely spread conviction that no further Councils should be held, beyond the sacred number "Seven." There was no theory of the Ecumenical Councils in Eastern theology, or in the canon law of the East. Seven Councils were, as it were, the seven gifts of God, as there were seven gifts of the Spirit, or seven Sacraments. The ecumenical authority of those Seven Councils was of a "super-canonical" character. The Eastern Church, at least, did not know any "conciliar theory" of administration, except on a local level. Such a theory was elaborated in the West, in the late Middle Ages, during the so-called "Conciliar Movement" in the Western Church, in the struggle with the growing Papal centralization. It has no connection with the organization of the Ancient Church, especially in the East.

It is well known that Emperors were taking an active part in the Ecumenical Councils, and sometimes participated in the conciliar deliberations, as, for example, Constantine at Nicea. Councils were usually convened by Imperial decrees, and their decisions were confirmed by the Imperial approval, by which they were given the legally binding authority in the Empire. In certain cases, the initiative was taken by the Emperor, as it was with the Fifth Ecumenical Council, at Constantinople, 553, at which the pressure and violence of the Emperor, the great Justinian himself, was so conspicuous and distressing. These are the facts which are usually quoted as proof of the Byzantine Caesaropapism. Whatever influence the Emperors might have

had on the councils, and however real their pressure might have been, the Councils were definitely gatherings of Bishops, and only they had the authority to vote. The Imperial pressure was a fact, and not a right. The active role of the Emperors in the convocation of the Council, and their great concern in the matter, are completely understandable in the context of an indivisible Christian Commonwealth. It is obviously true that Ecumenical Councils were in a certain sense "Imperial Councils," *die Reichskonzilien*, the Councils of the Empire. But we should not forget that the Empire itself was an *Oikoumene*. If "ecumenical" meant just "Imperial," "Imperial" meant no less than "Universal." The Empire, by conviction, always acted in behalf of the whole of mankind, as gratuitous as this assumption might have been. Attempts have been made, by modern scholars, to construe the Ecumenical Councils as an Imperial institution, and, in particular, to draw a parallel between them and the Senate. This suggestion is hardly tenable. First of all, if the Senate was an institution, the Councils were just occasional events. Secondly, the Emperor's position at the Council was radically different from his position in the Senate. The vote belonged solely to the Bishops. Decisions were "acclaimed" in their name. The Emperor was an obedient son of the Church and was bound by the voice and will of the hierarchy. The number of Bishops present was, in a sense, irrelevant. They were expected to reveal the *common mind* of the Church, to testify to her "tradition." Moreover, decisions had to be unanimous: no majority vote was permissible in matters of eternal truth. If no unanimity could be achieved, the Council would be disrupted, and this disruption would reveal the existence of a schism in the Church. In any case, Bishops in the Council did not act



as officials of the Empire, but precisely as "Angels of the Church," by the authority of the Church, and by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Above all, as Edward Schwartz, the greatest modern authority on the history of the Councils, has aptly said, "the Emperor was a mortal, the Church was not."

## VI

THE CHURCH is not of this world, as her Lord, Christ, was also not of the world. But He was in this world, having "humbled" Himself to the condition of that world which He came to save and to redeem. The Church also had to pass through a process of the historical *kenosis*, in the exercise of her redemptive mission in the world. Her purpose was not only to redeem men out of this world, but also to redeem the world itself. In particular, since man was essentially a "social being," the Church had to wrestle with the task of the "redemption of society." She was herself a society, a new pattern of social relationship, in the unity of faith and in the bond of peace. The task proved to be exceedingly arduous and ambiguous. It would be idle to pretend that it has ever been completed.

The "Holy Empire" of the Middle Ages was an obvious failure, both in its Western and its Eastern forms. It was at once a utopia and a compromise. The "old world" was still continuing under the Christian guise. Yet it did not continue unchanged. The impact of the Christian faith was conspicuous and profound in all walks of life. The faith and the hope were impatient. People really did believe that "this world" could be "christened" and converted, not only that it was "forgiven." There was a firm belief in the possibility of an ultimate renewal of the entire historical existence. In this conviction all historical tasks

have been undertaken. There was always a double danger involved in the endeavor: to mistake partial achievements for ultimate ones, or to be satisfied with relative achievements, since the ultimate goal was not attainable. It is here that the spirit of compromise is rooted. On the whole, the only ultimate authority which has been commonly accepted at this time is that of the Christian truth, in whatever manner this truth might have been expounded and specified. The myth of "the dark Middle Ages" has been dispelled by an impartial study of the past. There has even been a shift in the opposite direction. Already Romantics have started preaching a "return" to the Middle Ages, precisely as an "Age of Faith." They are impressed by the *spiritual unity* of the Medieval world, in striking contrast with the "anarchy" and "confusion" of Modern times. Obviously, the Medieval world was also a "world of tensions." Yet, tensions seemed to be overarched by certain crucial convictions, or coordinated in the common obedience to the supreme authority of God. The sore shortcomings of the Medieval settlement should not be ignored or concealed. But the nobility of the task also should not be overlooked. The aim of the Medieval man was to build a truly Christian Society. The urgency of this aim has been recently rediscovered and recognized. Whatever may be said about the failures and abuses of the Medieval period, its guiding principle has been vindicated. The idea of a Christian Commonwealth is now again taken quite seriously, as much as it is still enveloped in fog and doubt, and in whatever particular manner it may be phrased in our own days. In this perspective, the Byzantine politico-ecclesiastical experiment also appears in a new light. It was an earnest attempt to solve a real problem. The experiment probably should not be reenacted, nor, in-

deed, can it be actually repeated in the changed situation. But lessons of the past should not be forgotten or unlearned. The Byzantine experiment was not just a "provincial," an "Eastern" experiment. It had an "ecumenical" significance. And much in the Western legacy is actually "Byzantine," both good and bad.

For obvious reasons, Monasticism could never become a common way of life. It could be, of necessity, but a way for the few, for the elect, for those who might have chosen it. An emphasis on the free decision was implied. One can be born into a Christian Society, one can be but re-born into Monasticism, by an act of choice. The impact of Monasticism was much wider than its own ranks, nor did the monks always abstain from a direct historical action, at least by the way of criticism and admonition. Monasticism was an attempt to *fulfil* the Christian obligation, to organize human life exclusively on a Christian basis, in opposition to "the world." The failures of historical Monasticism must be admitted and duly acknowledged. They were constantly exposed and denounced by the Monastic leaders themselves, and drastic reforms have been periodically undertaken. Monastic "degeneration" has been a favorite theme of many modern historians. And again, in recent times "the call of the Desert" has assumed a new urgency and thrill, not only attracting those who are tired of the world and are dreaming of "escape" or "refuge," but also awakening those who are zealous to enforce a "renewal" upon a world confused by fear and despair. Monasticism attracts now not only as a school of contemplation, but also as a school of obedience, as a social experiment, as an experiment in common life. Here lies the modern thrill of the cloister. In the context of this new experience, the legacy of the Eastern and By-

zantine Monasticism is being readily and gratefully received and reassessed by an increasing number of fervent Christians in the West and elsewhere.

The Church, which establishes herself in the world, is always exposed to the temptation of an excessive adjustment to the environment, to what is usually described as "worldliness." The Church which separates herself from the world, in feeling her own radical "otherworldliness," is exposed to an opposite danger, to the danger of excessive detachment. But there is also a third danger, which has probably been the major danger of Christian history. It is the danger of double standards. This danger has been precipitated by the rise of Monasticism. Monasticism was not meant originally to be just a way for the few. It was conceived rather as a consequent application of common and general Christian vows. It served as a powerful challenge and reminder in the midst of all historical compromises. Yet a worse compromise was invented, when Monasticism became reinterpreted as an exceptional way. Not only was the Christian Society sorely rent asunder and split into the groups of "religious" and "secular," but the Christian ideal itself was split in twain and, as it were, "polarized," by a subtle distinction between "essential" and "secondary," between "binding" and "optional," between "precept" and "advice." In fact, all Christian "precepts" are but calls and advice, to be embraced in free obedience, and all "advice" is binding. The spirit of compromise creeps into Christian action when the "second best" is formally permitted and even encouraged. This "compromise" may be practically unavoidable, but it should be frankly acknowledged as a compromise. A multiplicity of the manners of Christian living, of course, should be admitted. What should not be admitted is their

grading in the scale of "perfection." Indeed, "perfection" is not an advice, but a precept, which can never be dispensed with. One of the greatest merits of Byzantium was in that it could never admit in principle the duality of standards in Christian life.

Byzantium had failed, grievously failed, to establish an unambiguous and adequate relationship between the Church and the larger Commonwealth. It did not succeed in unlocking the gate of the Paradise Lost. Yet nobody else has succeeded, either. The gate is still

locked. The Byzantine key was not the right one. Neither were the other keys. And probably there is no earthly or historical key for that ultimate lock. There is only an eschatological key, the true "*Key of David*." Yet Byzantium was for centuries wrestling, with fervent commitment and dedication, with a real problem. And in our own days, when we are wrestling with the same problem, we may get some more light for ourselves through an impartial study of the Eastern experiment, both in its hope and in its failure.

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# THE QUMRAN SCROLLS: A GENERAL SURVEY<sup>1</sup>

JOSEPH BOURKE

## I

UP TO A FEW YEARS AGO it used to be said that it was still far too early to make more than a cautious interim evaluation of the importance of the Qumrân scrolls. Today one feels almost that the opposite is true, that in a certain sense it is too late. It has been done so often already. So many popular presentations of the subject have appeared, many of them highly competent, some few sensationalist in approach and grossly misleading, but all of them attempting to answer the same basic questions: What exactly has been discovered and how? What sort of people were the members of that strange Jewish sect who owned, and in many cases who must actually have written the scrolls? What is the bearing of these documents on the origins and on the sacred books of Judaism and Christianity? These are, I think, the questions everyone would like answered. My excuse for going over the same ground again must be primarily that the answers suggested have often been so bewilderingly different.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A talk at the Aquinas Centre, London, in January 1959.

<sup>2</sup> Two particularly useful books have appeared recently. In his latest book, *More Light on the Dead Sea Scrolls* (Viking, \$6.50), Dr.

FIRST, THEN, what has been discovered are the relics of a sect whose history in its total span (c. 125 B.C. to 68 A.D.) overlapped the lifetime of Christ, and the emergence of the Christian church from Judaism. These relics are of two kinds: documentary, and archaeological, and the one exactly complements the other. Coins and pottery from the community building which has been found are identical in type and date with coins and pottery found in the caves which contained the documentary remains. Of these eleven caves, Cave Four, which incidentally has alone yielded eight to ten thousand scraps of manuscript, is situated only a few yards away from this building, across a little ravine, while the rest of the caves in this otherwise desert region are all fairly near to it. A jar discovered sunk in the floor of the community building is of exactly the same

Millar Burrows gives an exhaustive survey of the more important interpretations which have been suggested, especially with regard to the bearing of Qumrân on Christianity. This author's absolute mastery of the whole complex subject, and the cool balance of his judgments make his contribution unsurpassed. The sole defect that must be noticed in this work is the vagueness and inadequacy of its references to other works cited. As a shorter and more popular survey of the whole subject, Fr. Van der Ploeg's new book *The Excavations at Qumrân* (Longmans, \$4.00) is most warmly to be recommended.

But of all the shorter 'general survey' books which have appeared, Fr. J. T. Milik's *Ten Years of Discovery in the Wilderness of Judaea* (S.C.M. Press 1959, Studies in Biblical Theology 26) still seems to me the clearest, the most authoritative, and the most penetrating. The long-awaited English translation, which is by Fr. Milik's colleague on the 'Scrolls team,' Dr. Strugnell, contains some important revisions and expansions of the French original.

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*Fr. Joseph Bourke, O.P., has been a close student of the literature on the Qumrân scrolls. At present teaching Scripture at Hawkesyard, study house of the English Dominicans, he will shortly return to Jerusalem for further study at the Ecole Biblique. His survey, which appeared first in BLACKFRIARS (April 1959), should be of service to the general reader who is unable to keep up with the voluminous literature on the scrolls.*



peculiar type (otherwise unknown in Palestine) as the jars in which the first scrolls were placed. The building was equipped with what was certainly a 'scriptorium,' complete with special writing tables and ink-wells. The cumulative evidence is overwhelming. The documents and the community building 'belong' to one another, in the sense that they are relics of the same community. It follows that we can use the evidence of the one to complement the evidence of the other. This is, it seems to me, one of several factors which make Qumrân uniquely important. Firstly it enables us to establish the date after which the documents could not have been written. The building was certainly occupied up to 68 A.D., and no less certainly destroyed then by the Romans in the first Jewish war (68-70 A.D.). Given the connection between the building and the documents, it follows that no document can be later than 70 A.D. at the very latest. This conclusion can be disputed only by those who choose to discount (as admittedly some do) the clearest possible archaeological evidence. Secondly, this connection between the documentary and the archaeological evidence places us in a uniquely advantageous position for investigating the beliefs and ideals of the Sectarials themselves. The documents reveal to us vividly and in some detail what those ideals were. The archaeological remains disclose to us hardly less vividly how the Sectarials put their ideals into practice in their daily lives. Here then we have a sect which diverged from the main stream of Judaism, just as Christianity was to diverge about a century and a quarter later, and which seems to have died out soon after Christianity as a world movement had really established itself. The sect resembles Christianity in this respect also, that its driving force is messianic belief. Obviously there are

vital differences, and those who slur over those differences do a very ill service to the cause of truth. Still, Qumrân and Christianity do seem to have overlapped in time, to have drawn inspiration in many cases from the same books, to be characterized by a common interest in the messianic prophecies, and to evince a certain similarity of thought and expression, and even of rite, in the sacred books and sacred ceremonies peculiar to each religious movement. These common factors, general though they are, do invite further investigation and comparison.

Let us return to the first basic question: What exactly has been discovered? The total collection of documents comprises about a dozen substantially complete manuscript scrolls, and the remnants (amounting in most cases to no more than a few words written on a mouldering scrap of leather) of about six hundred others.

For Jews or Christians, the fragments of biblical manuscripts are, of course, far the most important. The remains of rather more than one hundred of these have survived. Among them every book of the Jewish canon of Scripture is represented except Esther. Of the first five books of the Bible (known as the Torah), the first four books are represented by fragments of between six and nine manuscripts apiece, while of Deuteronomy the remains of no less than fourteen manuscripts have been found. Several of these are in archaic script, and were certainly written before 50 B.C. The group of Old Testament books known as the 'Former Prophets' (Joshua to Kings) has fewer manuscripts to represent it, but this group does include the most ancient, and in many ways the most interesting example of all, relatively substantial portions of a manuscript of I-II Samuel, dating from the late third century B.C. Among the 'Latter

Prophets' (Isaiah to Malachi) Isaiah was evidently far the most popular. This book is represented by two virtually complete scrolls, and fragments of eleven more, as well as by commentaries. The 'Writings' (Job to Chronicles) are less well represented, except for Psalms, of which fragments from seventeen manuscripts have survived. Among the relatively complete scrolls found in Cave Eleven (the cave that was found last of all in 1956) a scroll of Psalms and an Aramaic Targum (paraphrased translation) of Job promise to be especially interesting and important. Mention should also be made of Daniel, of which seven manuscripts have come to light. In addition the deuterocanonical books of Ecclesiasticus and Tobit are represented by fragments of Hebrew or Aramaic text. This is the first time that a version of Tobit has come to light in what now appears to have been its original language, Aramaic.

The supreme importance of these biblical texts, all of which are, it will be remembered, earlier than 68 A.D., lies in the field of textual criticism. To appreciate this fact we must briefly recall where we stood in this field up to twelve years ago, and where, presumably, we would still be standing, if it were not for Qumrân.

The manuscripts of the Hebrew Bible available to us before Qumrân, suffered, from the text critic's point of view, from two basic defects: they were not old enough, and they were not independent enough one of another or of a common source. The oldest and probably the best complete Hebrew manuscript of the Old Testament dates only from about 1008 A.D. What is still worse, all the extant Hebrew manuscripts derive from one and the same process of artificial unification and standardization, a process which started at the Jewish Synod of Jamnia at the end of the

first century A.D., and culminated in the rabbinical schools of the Massoretes in the seventh-eighth centuries. By this process, a single 'authorized' text was declared to be correct, and all others which disagreed with it were eliminated. Up to twelve years ago, all the extant manuscripts of our Hebrew Bible were simply copies of this 'authorized' Massoretic text. The consequence was that the text-critic found himself far too dependent on the judgment of the Massoretic schools as to what was, or was not, the best reading in a given passage. It seemed to him at once highly desirable, and quite impossible, to reach back beyond this process of artificial standardization, and to find witnesses older than, and independent of it, by which to test its worth. Eleven years ago Qumrân supplied him with exactly what he had been longing for, and had despaired of ever finding: the remnants of literally hundreds of biblical manuscripts, not one of which is, if one accepts the archaeological evidence, less than twenty years older than Jamnia. At one blow the text-critic has by-passed Jamnia and the Massoretes, and found witnesses at least a thousand years older than those on which he had previously been forced to rely.

Second only in importance to the Massoretic text, as a witness to the original text of the Hebrew Bible, is the Septuagint, the Greek version made probably at Alexandria in the course of the third century B.C. This is certainly older than, and independent of, the 'authorized' text of Massoretes, and where it diverges from this, the independent text underlying it can be reconstructed. Nevertheless, its value as a witness has been seriously called in question. According to one modern theory, the Septuagint as we know it never existed before the second century A.D., when it was compiled by Christians from a number of unoffi-

cial and unreliable Greek translations of sections of the Old Testament. If this theory were correct, the Septuagint would represent no one distinct and definitive tradition, generally held by non-Palestinian Jews, and capable of bearing its own independent witness to the original text. It may be said at once that the Qumrân discoveries have rendered this theory quite untenable. The claims of the Septuagint to be an independent witness of the utmost value have been more than vindicated.

A third benefit which Qumrân has conferred on text critics has been to afford them an invaluable insight into the actual process by which a text is transmitted. It is only when a scribe is convinced that the book he is copying is 'sacred' or 'revealed,' that he will strive to copy it exactly and without alteration. Now normally an interval elapses between the original writing of the book and the point at which its 'sacred' character becomes generally recognized. This interval we may call the 'fluid' period of transmission. During the fluid period the text is copied not necessarily inaccurately, but far more freely, and with far less regard for verbal exactitude. Applying this to the Qumrân texts themselves, we find certain texts, notably the early manuscript previously referred to of I and II Samuel, which seem to represent this more fluid stage of transmission. The variant readings involved are not such as to make a notable difference to the meaning, but they are invaluable in enabling the text critic to examine for the first time what happens to a text just as it is emerging from the 'fluid' stage. One manuscript of Daniel is also interesting in this respect, since it can hardly be more than fifty years younger than the original, and may not yet have acquired 'sacredness' or canonicity.

By contrast it is evident that the text

of the Law (Genesis to Deuteronomy) had long been sacred and so 'fixed.' Apart from one or two manuscripts which are closer to the Hebrew archetype of the Septuagint, the Qumrân witnesses for these books agree closely and consistently with the Massoretic texts of our Hebrew Bibles. The 'Former Prophets' (Joshua to Kings), on the other hand, are predominantly 'proto-Septuagintal,' that is they conform more closely to the Hebrew archetype from which the Septuagint is derived. It is of course immensely impressive and reassuring to see so many of the ancient texts conforming to one or other of the archetypes which underly our existing Hebrew and Greek versions respectively. There are variant readings; there is even a third prototype which appears in a few texts, namely the Samaritan. But it is clear that the Massoretic and Septuagintal prototypes are far the most important. The manuscripts of the two remaining groups, the 'Latter Prophets' and the 'Writings' are mainly 'proto-Massoretic,' the second being far nearer to the 'fluid' stage than the first.

Of these biblical manuscripts, it will be noticed that Deuteronomy, Isaiah and Psalms seem to have been far the most popular, for they are represented by more than ten manuscripts apiece. This is interesting for our comparisons with Christianity, because it is precisely these books which appear to have exercised the greatest influence on the New Testament.

## II

AS FAR AS THE SECTARIANS are concerned, one can relate their special interest in these books to the nature of their beliefs. Deuteronomy is *par excellence* the book of Israel's election, and so would recommend itself especially to a sect which regarded itself as the 'elect' of God, the 'true Israel.' Psalms is the

book of Israel's piety, that is to say the book of those who strive by personal prayer to steep themselves in the holiness of the God who has chosen them. This was certainly the chief daily preoccupation of the Qumrân Sectarian. The thought of First Isaiah seems above all to have exercised a creative influence. This book is, as Dr. Fichtner has so well shown,<sup>3</sup> dominated by an awareness of Yahweh's plan for Israel now approaching its consummation. The three essential factors in the divine plan are firstly the purging, or testing of Zion, secondly the theme of the righteous remnant, thirdly the expectation of the messiah-figure, Immanuel, in and through whom the plan is to be implemented. The relation of all this to the beliefs of the Sectarans is clear. They regarded themselves as the righteous remnant, the true Israel living through a time of testing, and awaiting the consummation of Yahweh's plan through the coming of the Messiah. Another biblical concept which pervades their thought is the idea of the New Covenant predicted by Jeremiah and Ezekiel (Jer. xxxi, 31-34; Ezek. xxxvi, 22-28). But the idea of Yahweh's plan, now on the point of being accomplished, seems to have been the chief creative factor in their beliefs. Their founder (probably, though not quite certainly, the figure referred to as the 'Teacher of Righteousness') had been vouchsafed secret knowledge of this plan, especially in its application to himself, to his followers, and to the contemporary world.

From his childhood the Teacher of Righteousness is endowed with special graces and God takes the place of his natural parents (IQH ix, 29-32, 34-36).<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> J. Fichtner: "Jahwes Plan in der Botschaft des Jesaja," *Z.A.T.W.*, 1951, pp. 16-33.

<sup>4</sup> IQH is the recognized abbreviation for the *Hodayot* psalms found in Cave I. IQpHab. is the Habacuc Commentary. IQS is the "Manual of Discipline."

He is a priest (IQpHab. ii, 5), endowed with mystic enlightenment (IQH iv, 53), and as a result becomes a spiritual guide for others (IQH iv 27 f.; xiv, 17-19). He undergoes trials (IQH ii, 8-10, 13-15) and exile (IQH lv, 8-11) but is eventually granted peace. 'Thou hast rescued the life of the afflicted man in the den of lions . . . so that the life of thy servant was not destroyed' (IQH v, 10-15). It is his steadfast loyalty throughout these trials which makes him father of the 'Pious' (IQH vii, 19-23, 25). He repeatedly thanks God for having given him, a mere 'creature of clay' . . . 'knowledge of thy true plan' (IQH xi, 2, etc.). 'By the spirit thou didst put into me, which is trustworthy, I have listened to the wondrous plan' (IQH xvii, etc.). God has made him know 'all the mysteries of the words of his servants the prophets' (IQpHab. vii, 4-5), that is, to discern the deeper meaning of their oracles, a meaning of which they, and everyone else until the Teacher himself, had been unaware. Again he writes in the Manual of Discipline: 'All that is, and that is to be, comes from the God of knowledge; and before they came into being he established the whole plan of them; and when they come into being for their testimony according to his glorious plan, they fulfil their work. . . . (IQS iii, 13 ff.).

This pervasive sense of being admitted to secret knowledge of the divine plan is also characteristic of apocalyptic writing, another *genre* which was significantly popular at Qumrân. Broadly speaking the apocalypticist is one who represents himself as having been assumed into the 'other world,' and admitted to the company of angels. He himself has been supernaturally endowed with what might be called an 'angel's view' of the universe. It is given to him to survey the whole of God's plan in history, and to see how it leads up to its final con-

summation in his own epoch. Then he returns to explain the deeper significance of contemporary events to his fellows, in the light of what he has seen. The three most popular apocalyptic works at Qumrân, the Books of Jubilees and Henoch, and the Testaments of Levi and Naphtali, are of exactly this type. The numerous astrological texts which have been found are especially revealing in this regard, for the laws governing the movements of the planets are considered the key to understanding the divine plan. The fact that some of these texts are in code indicates the secret and esoteric nature of the knowledge they impart.

This esoteric insight enabled the Qumrân Sectarrians to see how the Old Testament prophecies applied to themselves, to their leader, and to their contemporary world. They alone were the righteous remnant of Israel, the heirs to the promises, and the rest of the world, not excluding their fellow Israelites, constituted the 'Sons of Darkness,' the workers of iniquity destined to be destroyed in the approaching consummation. By means of an artificial esoteric exegesis, inner meanings called 'interpretations' (*pesarim*) were drawn out of Habakkuk, Micah, Nahum, Isaiah and Psalms. Thus it is from the biblical commentaries in particular that we see what part the Sectarrians themselves are to play in the accomplishment of the divine plan.

The consummation of the divine plan is to take the form of a supreme cosmic 'holy war' which will bring the present age to an end and inaugurate a new and infinitely more glorious one. The Sectarrians are the 'Sons of Light,' the warriors of God. Having conquered the 'Sons of Darkness,' they are to preside for ever, under their two Messiahs of Aaron and Israel, over the whole world in the ensuing golden age. The approaching conflict is fore-ordained by

God, and its outcome is predestined. He himself created the spirits of good and evil who are to lead the two armies, and presides over the conflict between them. Thus we encounter one of Israel's ancient and most deeply rooted traditions, the tradition of the holy war, here projected on to the eschatological plane in the Sectarrian scroll entitled 'The War of the Sons of Light with the Sons of Darkness' (so called by Dr. Sukenik, its original publisher). Recently Dr. von Rad has described in detail the essential characteristics of the 'holy war' tradition,<sup>5</sup> and it seems to me amazing and deeply significant that these characteristics should reappear one after another in this first-century scroll, merely being magnified to fit the eschatological context. The strict ritual purity prescribed for the warriors, the elaborate prayers and the sounding of the sacred trumpets by the priests, the numinous battle-cry (*terou'ah*) uttered by the warriors to 'strike terror into the heart of the enemy,' and above all the sense that it is 'the right hand of God' rather than the army itself that overthrows the powers of evil, are examples of such 'holy war' characteristics.

I have dwelt on this factor at some length because 'Preparation for the eschatological holy war' seems to me to be the fundamental attitude inspiring the whole quasi-monastic movement of Qumrân. Elsewhere<sup>6</sup> I have suggested that monasticism as a way of life is a reformulation in Christian terms of this same ancient 'holy war' ideal. At Qumrân we find a pre-Christian formulation of this same ideal. These Sectarrians, like Christian monks, separate themselves from the world and go to live in community

<sup>5</sup> G. von Rad: *Der heilige Krieg im alten Israel*, Zürich 1951.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. "The Religious Vows and the Holy War," in *The Life of the Spirit*, November 1958, pp. 203-212.



under a rule of life laid down by a leader who is conceived to be saintly. Like Christian monks, they are inspired by two fundamental ideas: the holiness of God, and the menace of the powers of evil. To fight the enemies of God, to be his warriors in the 'holy war,' they must first steep themselves in his holiness, and so, necessarily, participate in his otherness to the profane, the 'this-worldly.' For that is what holiness in its most elemental terms implies. Every detail of their lives must be governed by these two ideas. The 'Rule of the Community' tells them in detail how they are to achieve the holiness they need in order to fight the eschatological war. This document opens with a general exhortation to do good and avoid evil, to love the Sons of Light and hate the Sons of Darkness. Those who enter the community must bind themselves by a most solemn covenant to its discipline. Each year the covenant is renewed. Blessings are invoked on those who observe it, and curses on those who infringe it. Then follows the famous description of the two spirits of good and evil who are forever striving to draw men into their respective spheres of influence. The 'modified' dualism apparent here ('modified' because both spirits are created by God) has been held to be one of the most significant factors in the beliefs of the Sectarians. This introductory section is followed by regulations concerning precedence and authority, by which the righteousness of God's will is to be applied to the organization of the community. The rule goes on to prescribe for constant ritual purity, obedience to superiors, sacred meals to be eaten in community, and the study of the Law. 'Community of goods' is obligatory, as it is in Christian monasteries, and, I suggest, for the same reason: because property belongs to the profane sphere, and is therefore,

though good in itself, alien to the state of strict holiness enjoined upon those who live constantly in the immediate presence of God. In Christian monasticism these ideas are of course transformed and elevated, but they do seem to me to be rooted in the same Old Testament earth, the tradition of the holy war in Israel. Obedience to superiors is also strictly enjoined as a means of holiness. Did the Sectarians also practice celibacy? The rule does not say so, yet there are considerable grounds for believing that they did for one phase at least of their existence. It seems overwhelmingly probable that the Sectarians belonged to the Jewish sect of the Essenes, of whom three independent witnesses, Pliny the Elder, Philo and Josephus explicitly assert that they remained celibate. Pliny in particular locates the Essene community known to him west of the Dead Sea, at a certain distance from its shore, and above Engaddi. There are certain difficulties, but on the whole it is extremely hard to avoid the conclusion that Pliny is here referring to Qumrân. Again, in a great area of the community cemetery only male skeletons have been discovered. The few female skeletons which have been found were buried in an adjoining area. Then too the Rule seems to visualize only men, though the Damascus document certainly does legislate for wives and families too. On the whole it seems reasonable to conclude that *some* of the Sectarians at any rate remained celibate, perhaps during the strictest phase of the community's existence.

The excavations have thrown vivid light on the manner in which these rules were applied in the Sectarians' daily lives. Their preoccupation with ritual purity was catered for by an elaborate system of fresh-water conduits and cisterns. The cleanliness of the 'refectory' where the sacred meal was taken was

the object of special care. By means of an ingenious device, a stream of fresh water could be directed at will over the whole floor, including the 'pantry' where piles of dishes were found. Peculiar shallow basins have been found in the 'scriptorium,' and it has been presumed that the scribes would have used these for ritual washing before and after coming into contact with the sacred text. In fact the requirement of ritual purity governed every phase of the Sectarian's life. His day was divided principally between manual labor for the support of the community, and assemblies to read the Book, expound the sense of it, and spend time in communal prayer. These religious duties continued during 'a third part of the night.' Thus he strove to prepare himself for the approaching eschatological conflict.

The general eschatological expectations of the community converge and focus upon the two protagonists of good and evil, the Teacher of Righteousness on the one hand, and the Wicked Priest on the other. The latter is the unjust persecutor of the former. A *peser* (interpretation) of Habakkuk xi, 4-8 runs: 'Its interpretation concerns the Wicked Priest who persecuted the Teacher of Righteousness to bring about his downfall in the indignation of his fury. In the house of his exile, and on the day of the solemn rest, the day of Kippurim, he appeared to them to reduce them to confusion, and to bring about their downfall on the Day of Fasting, the Sabbath of their rest.' The most convincing explanation of this has been suggested by Dr. M. S. Talmon.<sup>7</sup> The Wicked Priest is the High Priest of Jerusalem who has come on an official visitation to Qumrân. According to the divergent calendar of the sect it is the Day of Expiation, but the High Priest is attempting to enforce observance of the ortho-

dox Jerusalem calendar on the Sectarrians. Other passages speak of chastisements and horrible scourges inflicted on the Wicked Priest in retribution for his crimes. (IQpHab. viii, 16-ix 2; xi, 12-15, etc.) No text comes anywhere near speaking of the Teacher of Righteousness himself having been crucified. It does seem probable however that the Wicked Priest is in one passage accused of the unprecedented cruelty of crucifying his fellow Jews (crucifixion being a common form of punishment among Gentile nations influenced by Rome). 'The interpretation of it is concerned with the lion of fury . . . who hanged men alive . . . in Israel before; . . . because for him who is hanged alive on a tree . . .' (QpNah. ii, 1-13). These are all the words that remain of the passage in question. There are no grounds whatever for supposing that they apply to the Teacher of Righteousness. The *peser* of Psalms applies to him the verse of Ps. xxxvii, 33: 'Yahweh will not leave him in the hands of (the impious).' The only explicit reference to his death speaks of the 'gathering in of the Unique Teacher,' a phrase which could hardly refer to a violent death. In any case it will be noticed that the *peser* of Nahum refers to the crucifixion of a group of men rather than of an individual. It has been held to reflect an incident in the life of Alexander Jannaeus in which he crucified eight hundred Pharisees who had rebelled against him. A reference to 'Demetrius, king of Greece' (possibly Alexander's adversary of that name) makes this more probable, though the Wicked Priest has also been plausibly identified with the earlier Jewish leaders, Jonathan or Simon Maccabaeus. Nor is there any real justification for the supposition that the Teacher of Righteousness was expected to return again as Messiah in the last days. The Damascus Document does indeed speak of 'the aris-

<sup>7</sup> In *Biblica*, xxxii, 1951, pp. 549-563.

ing of him who will teach righteousness at the end of days' (CD vi, 10 f.) and also in another passage of a *past* Teacher of Righteousness (CD i, 11; xix, 35-xx, 14), but as Dr. Millar Burrows has shown, there is no means of knowing whether these texts refer to the same individual, or to different individuals by the same title. Neither the past nor the future Teacher is anywhere identified with the Messiahs of Israel or of Aaron. The sensationalist claims that 'precedents' and 'parallels' have been discovered for Christ's death and resurrection are based on these and similar over-facile equations of one figure with another, first pushed to fantastic extremes, and then further embellished with their authors' own invention.<sup>8</sup> The whole tendency reflects a certain *a priori* eagerness to discover a natural explanation of Christianity in the Qumrân Scrolls at all costs. One has to be very eager indeed, it seems to me, to see the Teacher of Righteousness as prefiguring Christ or Christ as conforming to the Messianic ideal of the Teacher of Righteousness.

The idea that dominates the Sectarian movement may therefore be summarized as 'Preparation for the Consummation of God's plan in an eschatological "holy war." ' The idea itself was of course current coin among the Jews of the last century or so before Christ. But in the case of Qumrân the leader of the sect has taught his disciples to draw from this apocalyptic idea a rule that commands every detail of their lives. That is his real function: to teach. He plays an important, but not an essential role in the divine plan, as the 'enlightened' Teacher of those who are to be the Sons of Light.

<sup>8</sup> For a forthright and refreshing condemnation of this sort of treatment, cf. H. H. Rowley's little book, *The Dead Sea Scrolls and the New Testament* (Allenson, 1957).

### III

ON THIS BASIS let us briefly compare Qumrân with the early Christian Church, as two apocalyptic and eschatological communities, both derived from the common stock of Judaism. We may ask ourselves the same questions about the Church as we asked about Qumrân: What was God's plan, as the Church saw it? What role was assigned to her own members in it? What rule of life did it impose on them? How did they put that rule of life into practice in their daily lives?<sup>9</sup>

Like the Sectarians the Church is pre-occupied with the fulfilment of God's primordial plan. She too believes that it will be consummated in and through her. In and through her the divine will achieves its purpose, the ancient prophecies are fulfilled, and the eschatological age dawns. To her has been given the grace of perceiving the inner signifi-

<sup>9</sup> An invaluable collection of essays on this aspect of Qumrân is *The Scrolls and the New Testament*, edited by K. Stendahl (Harper, \$4.00).

On the same subject, P. Daniélou's *The Dead Sea Scrolls and Primitive Christianity* (Helicon Books, \$3.00) provides a stimulating and adventurous approach, and a welcome reaction against the somewhat over-defensive and over 'apologetic' attitude evinced by certain earlier Catholic writers:—Fr. Graystone's *The Dead Sea Scrolls and the Originality of Christ* (Sheed and Ward) is possibly an example of this. P. Daniélou finds 'astounding' connections—the word 'astonishing' is employed far too frequently to inspire general confidence—between Christianity and the Essene movement. A fairly characteristic conclusion is that by putting his hand on the bread (at the Last Supper) Jesus signified that he was both the Messiah and the expected Priest of the Sectarians. Similarly, P. Daniélou challenges us with the remark that 'If Christ is not God, then the Teacher of Righteousness is his superior.' Many of these 'connections' seem to me ill-substantiated and exaggerated. Yet the book is too stimulating to miss. It should be read by those equipped with a sober critical faculty, and with some previous knowledge of the subject.

cance of those oracles, and to see how they really apply to herself and to her leader. Like the Qumrân community, she believes that she is the true Israel, bound to God by a new covenant, the righteous remnant tried in the fire of tribulation. Her ideals and hopes, like those of Qumrân, are centred on a messianic leader, who will arise in the last days. What the Sectarrians await is the achievement in and through themselves of God's dominion over all the earth. What the Church awaits, too, is the establishment of the Kingdom of God in and through her members, to the utmost bounds of the earth. But for her the Kingdom is not of this world. Her warriors are to fight not the rulers of this world, but 'the spiritual hosts of wickedness' (Coloss. vi, 12). They are to conquer with spiritual weapons, 'the sword of the Spirit' and 'the whole armour of God' (Ephes. vi, 17, 11). The Kingdom is to embrace, not to destroy the Gentiles, and its God-given message is to be preached, not concealed. Its Priest is a new non-Levitical High Priest, of a new and eternal Covenant. The primacy of function and of honor which in the Qumrân writings is repeatedly ascribed to the Levites, is, in the Christian gospels, quite excluded. In the new Kingdom, ancestry counts for nothing; only rebirth in the Spirit can avail.

What then of the Christian rule of life? We find the essentials of it in the Sermon on the Mount. Under the inspiration of the new commandment of love, the terms of the Old Law are consistently re-interpreted and projected further into the realm of the interior spirit. The rule of Qumrân, on the contrary, is inspired by a spirit of harsh exclusiveness, and the material observance of the law, so far from giving way to a spiritual reinterpretation, becomes more rigidly literal and legalistic than ever.

How do Christians put their rule of

life into practice? They, like the Qumrân Sectarrians, strive to steep themselves in God's holiness. Like the Sectarrians, they occupy themselves with psalms and hymns and spiritual canticles. The similarities in communal organization are even more striking. Both religious bodies seem to have practiced 'community of goods'; that is to say, the members made over their property to the community on entering. At Qumrân this was obligatory, in the Jerusalem Church it seems to have been voluntary, but we are told that all the members without exception practiced it. Authority in both communities is in the hands of a college of twelve, in which three are supreme. 'Overseers' (the Christian term '*episkopoi*' (bishops) and the Sectarrian term '*mebaqqerim*' both mean this) presided over groups of 'elders' in the community centers of the two bodies. Both imposed a period of probation on their prospective members before admitting them. Again, the liturgical life of the Sectarrians seems to center on a sacred meal, in which bread and 'sweet' wine blessed by the presiding priest constituted the chief elements. This corresponds perhaps to the Christian *agape*. Ritual baptisms, of which one was an initiatory ceremony, and in which true interior repentance was enjoined upon the recipient, also seems to have been an important element in Sectarrian worship, and again there is an obvious comparison to be drawn with Christian baptism.

This similarity extends itself naturally to the writings of the two communities. St. John's Gospel in particular seems to plunge its roots into the same intellectual soil as that of Qumrân. This in itself is important. Characteristically Johannine ideas, once thought to derive from a late Hellenistic or Gnostic milieu, are now discovered in this early Palestinian Jewish sect. The author of this gospel, like the Sectarrian writers, visual-

izes the world as divided into two spheres, of light and darkness, good and evil, each with its own leader. This has been arranged by God the creator of all things, who now presides over the eschatological war between the two spheres. For Qumrân the two leaders are the two created 'angels' of light and darkness; for St. John the leader of the forces of light is the Uncreated Word, while the forces of darkness are commanded by the 'prince of this world.' Both literatures hold that all men belong to one or other of the two spheres. In the Qumrân texts we find a curious mixture of determinism and free will, while St. John's Gospel states quite unequivocally that men decide by their own free choice to which sphere they are to belong.

Again, St. Paul in his epistles seems sometimes to draw upon, sometimes to presuppose in the minds of those whom he is addressing, ideas which are found in the Qumrân writings. Here too we occasionally encounter the 'two-sphere' mentality, though it is far less predominant than in the Johannine writings. More important is the idea of predestination and concepts connected with it. Man can do no good *merely* of himself; all the good that he does comes from God who had predestined his good actions before he created him. (II Cor. iii, 5, etc.; IQS 10-11). The Sectarian idea that man yields himself up to one of the two presiding spirits of good and evil (IQS iii, 13-iv, 26) is also important. We may compare Romans vi, 13: 'Neither present your members unto sin, as instruments of unrighteousness; but present yourselves to God . . .,' etc. For the Sectarrians, as for St. Paul, God in his primordial plan permits the wicked to exist so that in their ultimate overthrow his glory and greatness may be manifest (QH xv, 15-21; cp. Rom. ix). In Rom. xvi, 25-27, 'The mystery which

was kept secret from eternity which is now made manifest by the scriptures of the prophets . . .' also reminds us strongly of the esoteric power of discerning God's plan in the scriptures which the Sectarrians believed they had received. St. Paul's ethical and moral concepts of 'sin,' 'flesh' and the 'spirit,' etc., are also expressed in terms reminiscent of Qumrân. Finally, valuable light is thrown on the Pauline 'angelology.'

For the synoptic gospels Qumrân seems far less important. It is my strong impression that the rabbinical texts previously available to us are still more valuable here in providing verbal and conceptual parallels. Parallels with Qumrân are far less frequent, and those that there are seem far more superficial than in the case of St. John and St. Paul.

These are then, broadly speaking, the similarities. What we may safely conclude from them is that Christianity took over some of the raw material of its ideas, its language, its way of life, its communal organization and its liturgy either from Judaic sources which it held in common with Qumrân, or perhaps in some cases more directly from Qumrân itself. But this raw material was completely transformed. Where are we to look for the roots of this transformation? Where else but in the Person of Christ himself?

Qumrân looks forward exclusively to a *future* eschaton and a *future* messiah, who will bring the present world order to an end, and inaugurate a paradisaical age. Her eschatological ideal is, in other words, exclusively 'futurist.' Now Christianity looks not only forwards to the end of the world, but backwards too to an historical fact, the fact of the Death, Resurrection and Ascension of her Messiah, seen in retrospect as his messianic enthronement. Not only *will* Jesus come in the future, he *has* come already. Not only *will* he come in mes-



sianic glory at the end of the world, he *has already entered upon that glory*; already he sits enthroned at the right hand of God. Christian eschatology, that is to say, is both 'Realized' and 'Futurist.' In fact the Christian religion derives its fundamental meaning from a fact of the past: the Death and Resurrection of her Founder as *atoning*. The meaning of her sacraments is to make that past fact present in the lives of her members. Baptism for her is being born again into him, and living with his life. The Eucharist means that the Christian 'eats the

flesh and drinks the blood of the Son of Man.' Only so shall he have life in him. The Christian Church is what she is because her founder was not merely a prophet 'mighty in word and as the Teacher of Righteousness was conceived to be, not merely Messiah (if the Teacher of Righteousness was ever conceived to be that); she is what she is because truly this Man was the Son of God, and because his sacrificial Death as man has brought her as a community of men to divine life, by atoning for the sins of her members.

## VERBUM CARO

Dès sa naissance, il y a de cela douze ans, VERBUM CARO s'est voulu résolument *oecuménique*. Ses premiers numéros furent certes réservés à des théologiens réformés, mais, dès sa première année, on y trouvait des articles signés par des hommes dont la réputation de "théologiens de l'Unité" n'est plus à faire.

VERBUM CARO a choisi le chemin d'irénisme, de l'ouverture à tous ceux qui, au sein du Christianisme, essaient de rester fidèles à leur Chef, Tête de l'Eglise, et qui ont soif de l'unité de tous les chrétiens. En 1956, après neuf ans d'existence de VERBUM CARO, *La Communauté de Taizé* fut sollicitée de prendre en main la rédaction de la revue. Et en acceptant cette responsabilité, elle souhaitait que VERBUM CARO prenne un nouvel essor et s'élargisse aux dimensions du travail oecuménique d'aujourd'hui. Elle désire que par des articles de théologie biblique et de dogmatique, mais aussi par des exposés de théologie pastorale et de liturgique, cette revue soit l'instrument de travail de tous ceux qui cherchent le dialogue oecuménique comme un enrichissement. Plus que jamais, elle sollicite des collaborateurs de différentes Eglises qui permettent à la théologie réformée de s'ouvrir aux possibilités authentiques et fidèles du mouvement oecuménique.

Aujourd'hui, VERBUM CARO est l'instrument indispensable à tous ceux (protestants ou catholiques) qui veulent prier, penser, travailler et vivre, pour que "tous soient un afin que le monde croie."

VERBUM CARO doit figurer dans toutes les bibliothèques théologiques, pour informer tous ceux qui se réjouissent du Mouvement oecuménique et de l'annonce d'un Concile par le Pape Jean XXIII. Sa lecture prépare aux grandes événements de l'Unité.

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# TRUTH AND FREEDOM IN THE FAITH OF THE BELIEVER

M. D. CHENU

*The truth shall set you free (St. John).  
Truth is freedom.*

## THREE EPISODES

"THERE ARE some people who take pleasure in denouncing as erroneous the opinions of their fellow-theologians who expound our faith and instruct the Church. Such a hasty procedure is dangerous to the faith. The theologians' work, thanks to which we advance in the paths of truth, calls for a critic who is open and receptive, not an embittered negativist. Nor should a uniformity of opinion be imposed on all our followers, for our intelligence should not be docile to the tutelage of a man, but only to the direction of Christ. To declare that we consider the proposals of these theologians as errors, is to place faith in great danger by linking it to the inadequacy of our in-

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telligence.... Therefore, let such censors keep quiet. If they want to hold a contrary opinion, they are free to do so, but they must not judge the other opinion erroneous; this would show a rash judgment and a weak spirit, for in their pride they reveal that they do not know how to distinguish decisive arguments from weak ones."

Thus spoke Giles of Rome in about 1280, when he was a young master at the University of Paris, in the course of a controversy which reached a climax after an ecclesiastical intervention. It was Giles' position that man is not a spirit more or less integrated with a body which weighs it down, and from which it must free itself in order to be humanly and divinely fulfilled. He spoke of spirit as involved in the universe, linked to time and space, substantial with matter, even in its intellectual processes; he insisted that in order to understand it, all forms of dualism must be avoided, even by the man who would prepare in his soul a face turned directly to spiritual and divine realities.

In this Giles declared himself to be the disciple of his elder, the master Thomas Aquinas, who had died just a few years previously; he was continuing the latter's effort to define man, both in himself and in the universe, according to the scientific conceptions of Aristotle, as against Augustinian spirituality. Such an attempt, opposed to the general mentality of Christians and the common teaching of centuries, brought on a condemnation in 1277; the high-

est theological jurisdiction (but not pontifical), the corporation of the masters of Paris, under the presiding bishop, formulated a syllabus of 219 errors. Bonaventure, the celebrated Franciscan master, contributed actively to this work. It was a clear and rigid condemnation of Greek rationalism, which had been infiltrating, despite repeated condemnations, since the beginning of the century: it was introducing new methods in theology, it exalted earthly curiosities of the mind, it systematically proclaimed the autonomy of the various disciplines outside the influence of faith, and had even taught the most equivocal hedonism implied by this rationalism. A dozen of the condemned propositions, with some perspicacity, touched on the metaphysical root of the problem: the nature of spirit in the human being. It was on this point that St. Thomas, in spite of his great reputation, had been implicated. The masters of arts, in letters and science, openly preserved his influence and his doctrine. In the faculty of theology Giles of Rome denounced the development of a tendency that from then on placed the whole effort and freedom of theologians under suspicion. Nevertheless, he was forced to give in, and in order to be approved for official teaching, he had to apologize and to subscribe to the condemnation of Thomas Aquinas.

**S**ECOND EPISODE. The Renaissance and the Reformation had dislocated medieval Christendom, even in its fundamental doctrines. The Church was in the process of reviving herself, not only by a reform of practices, but by an affirmation of the authentic Gospel and her divine tradition. Several high prelates of the surest orthodoxy sensed the problems posed by the confrontation of the Gospel with a world in effervescence. Cardinals Morone and Pole, among others, had the deserved repu-

tation of this balanced clear-sightedness which could discern truth both in its definition and in its problems. In the first sessions of the Council of Trent, as well as in the Christian culture of the day, they had played a leading role. But the newly chosen Paul IV (1555)—unlike his predecessor, the grave, noble and refined Marcel II—both in his struggle against the enemy of faith, and in his political combat against Spain, did not maintain the discretion of a perfect mastery of his faith and his temperament: "He scented heresy in a number of cases where a prudent and circumspect observer would have found no trace of it, and he gave only too willing an ear to every denunciation, even the most absurd. Envious and slanderous men were eager to isolate a suspect word, without considering its place in the rest of the sentence, and to formulate an accusation of heresy against men who had been strong defenders of the Church." (L. Pastor). Ignatius of Loyola was obstinately thwarted by these suspicions, and his *Spiritual Exercises* met with explicit reserves from the Pope. In his inexorable zeal, Paul IV denounced the two cardinals, Morone and Pole, as favoring heresy; since he was unable to reach Pole in England, he threw Morone into prison to the astonishment of all, charging that he associated with Lutherans, showed friendliness to heretics, and made equivocal statements. The venerable and venerated prelate bore this trial with serenity, professing reverence and docility to the Pope, although he courageously maintained the justice of his case. He was refused the sacraments; he was forbidden any means of defense; favorable testimony was eliminated from the proceedings. He refused to ask for pardon, which would have implied he was in error. He did not leave prison until two days after the death of the Pope. His confidant and

executor, the Dominican Foscari, who had been master of the sacred palace before succeeding him as bishop of Modena, had also been jailed with him; in the aftermath he was to be one of the three editors of the Catechism of the Council of Trent, a great theological work of its time, and the quasi-official expression of Christian doctrine.

**WE ARE NOW** in 1910. The encyclical *Pascendi* has just drawn up a profession of faith against modernism. This document denounced the pressures, tendencies, and ambiguities of modernism (especially in biblical exegesis and Church history), hardening them perhaps, but nevertheless showing extreme lucidity—just as the syllabus of 1277 denounced Greek rationalism. Cardinal Billot, who was the authorized interpreter of the encyclical, wore his orthodoxy with an authoritarian intellectualism which was as little sensitive to the mysterious ways of faith as to the realities of history. Father Lagrange, director of biblical studies at the school in Jerusalem, was denounced for having introduced historical method into exegesis; his books were forbidden in the seminaries; because of these charges he was removed from his post, and his school was threatened with suppression. Nevertheless, supported by his superiors before papal authority, and thanks to the intervention of Pius X, as well as his friend Msgr. Battifol, he avoided more serious sanctions. The encyclical *Divino afflante Spiritu*, a new charter of biblical theology in 1943 (Father Lagrange died in 1938) was to consecrate, as far as this could be done in a solemn text, the main lines of his methods and his doctrine. Today the biblical movement has blossomed, both in scientific value and in spiritual depth.

**THE VERY VARIETY**, both historical and doctrinal, of these well known epi-

sodes<sup>1</sup> shows two constants—the equilibrium of the faith, and the concrete conditions of theological work in the Church.

The first thing to be observed in these difficult situations, which are often painful, is that they bear witness, after the event, to a fine intellectual and spiritual well-being in the midst of the painful uncertainties of a crisis, provoked not only by the research of a few specialists, but by the evolution of cultures and mentalities. The prudential measures are not without purpose, and their restrictions, although often awkward, are ultimately seen to have assured the truth of the most fruitful initiatives. Obviously this does not excuse any unnecessary personal suffering, or the sectarianism of intrigues; but these things do not break the line of growth of a faith's permanent understanding of its content. New methods, inspired by progress in secular disciplines, are assimilated according to the irreducible requirements of the transcendence of the mystery. The balance-sheet is positive, not only because the integrity of the Word of God is safe, but because this Word finds the means of speaking to the men of these new times.

Once we have affirmed this substantial efficacy, it is permissible and opportune to consider the proceedings, the excesses, the complexities of these critical moments. Allowing for the diversity of times and personalities, their development is uniform. Extreme sensitivity in regard to the faith, which is quite legitimate in principle, comes to provoke, in one type of mentality, a kind of contraction; it then becomes possible for such a mind, with the pretext of guaranteeing correct statements, to refuse to consider the problems which secular discoveries and human progress present to the believer, not simply as apologetical opposition, but in the very interior of

his understanding of the faith. The theologian, a professional in this understanding because of his constant reflection on his object, is very sensitive to new resources that human reason discovers, as much in the observation of nature as in the analysis of the spirit. It is not without boldness that a Thomas Aquinas, a Morone, a Lagrange do not hesitate to introduce, with necessary adaptations, the new methods of human disciplines, both those of history and those of speculation.

To certain men such a step seems an agreement to a dialogue with "error." Thomas Aquinas associated with Aristotle, who had been so often attacked just ten years previously as the most dangerous of rationalists; and even with Averroës, Aristotle's principal interpreter, the fascinating thinker of an Islam which at the time held Christianity at bay, militarily and culturally. Pole and Morone were sensitive, not only to the moral decadence of both clergy and laity, but to the evangelical values which were again springing up; was it necessary to suppress them, under the pretext that Luther extolled them against the established Church? Father Lagrange had perceived resources in the historical method for the understanding of an economy whose stages and texts were inscribed in the relativity of times and civilizations; why should this historicity of Christian man be incompatible with the speculative statements of revelation? And so on.

### THE THEOLOGIANS

IN SUCH HISTORICAL contexts, with their grandeur and pain, their problems and responses, "theologians"—that is, believers who, by their professional work, pursue the interior understanding of the faith—often do not have a good press. (We were going to say

theology, but in current usage the impersonal word is stretched beyond its field and the function proper to those whom we agree to call theologians.) Although we say theologians, we also include those adult believers who, because of the demands of their education or of their secular vocation, want to attain a faith which would be at the level of the problems posed by a humanity on the march; they feel that mankind is open, because of its distress, to the mystery of the incarnate Christ. The attitude of the masters of letters and sciences, the friends of Thomas Aquinas in the time of St. Louis, is analogous to that of cultivated Christians today, or those engaged in the problems of our technical civilization.

It is wrong to see these theological controversies only as irrelevant quarrels or academic hair-splitting. The ordinary good Christian, who is aware of his faith and reflects on his vision of the world, is working in theology without knowing it and without going to school. His choices, even if their implications are poorly understood, are charged with doctrine, with a very significant "understanding of faith"—as theology defines itself—whether it is a matter of an organized understanding and a method modeled on human science, or of an active witness in the presentation of the evangelical message.

As an assiduous reader of the *Imitation of Christ*, you may deeply realize the intense experience of Christian interiority which that admirable little book expresses; nevertheless, you may have reserves about the extreme individualism of a spirituality which, even when considering a sacrament like the Eucharist, does not emphasize the communal means of grace in the Mystical Body of Christ. A similar awareness underlines a value-judgment, which in fact is the effect of a theological decision.



Since you are anxious to bear testimony as a Christian, in the milieu in which your social life takes place, with the fraternal and apostolic solidarity which would make it lucid and efficacious, you may take part in a specialized Catholic Action group rather than in a branch of the Legion of Mary. Perhaps this is a matter of taste and style; in fact, it is already a conception of the relationship between the spiritual and the temporal, of nature and grace, which is being formed in you; when you reflect on it, you are in the area of theology.

In the face of the sensational transformations which the progress of a civilization of technics has brought to humanity, you may consider that the Christian may boldly enter this new universe, after untangling its ambiguities; he may even find in it material for a spirituality in which the cosmos is perceived as the summing up of the incarnate Christ in history. Other Christians, however, both Catholics and Protestants, are more sensitive not only to the unhappy effects of the ever-increasing use of machinery, but to the vanity of this picture of the world or even the radical inconsistency of a natural order which would be constructed by man. Without condemning their attitude, you maintain a more optimistic theology, which is unwilling to separate nature and grace. The attraction and opposition that the work of Teilhard de Chardin arouses bring the greatest problems of theology to the concern of the general public.

We are not referring to matters of pragmatic behavior that may be more in line with personal sympathies or local efficiency, but vigorous decisions that will affect our every thought and action. Professional theologians, like their colleagues in other fields, have sometimes been overly isolated from the needs and questions of Christian peo-

ple, but the technical conflict of their opinions only externalizes the common desires of the faithful, and organizes the questions that might be raised by reading a single verse of Scripture. To realize this, we do not need to go back to the great historical controversies, from the Council of Nicea to the dispute between Thomists and Molinists. We can see right before us the rigorous development (not without animosity) of two approaches to the understanding of faith, whether in contemplation of its mystery or in apostolic vitality. In the fourth century these tendencies divided the Christians of Antioch and those of Alexandria. One group centered its light and action on the incarnation of the gifts of God. Whether it was a matter of Scripture, the person of Christ, or the Church, they were attached to the human, the historical and social realism of the Christian economy; they were naturally responsive to all earthly contingencies, and the commitments that they include. The other prefers to emphasize the assumption of these realities into the grace that has seized and transformed them; they run the risk of emptying their historical density, leaving a Bible detached from any specific milieu, a notion of the Incarnation in which the Word is contemplated more than the Son of Man, and a Church in which a theocratic and idealistic spirituality would monopolize human contingencies, and a supernaturalist apostolate would be indifferent to the psychological and social conditions of gospel witness.

These are constant tensions in Christian thought, and their pressures have sometimes brought about ruptures in the equilibrium of a unique truth. Apart from these "heresies," it remains true that these choices (the Greek word is *airesis*) are the normal effect of a faith that is eager to seize its object, in an ever-inadequate investigation, but with

an appetite which is a good indication of health. *Fides quaerens intellectum*—the faith seeking understanding—: this celebrated formula is St. Anselm's definition of theology, and is a good statement of a "cogitation"—a word of Augustine, which Aquinas repeats—in which, to the surprise of a certain kind of authoritarian formalism, there come into play all the resources of intelligence, both individual and collective, according to the variable and progressive movements of the spirit.

This means introducing worldly and rational ingredients in the meditation of God's Word, in opposition to a "pure" faith, insensible in its transcendence. St. Bonaventure reproached his friend Thomas Aquinas for mixing the water of human reasons with the pure wine of divine truth; the Dominican master answered with humor that the faith of the theologian, as at Cana, transformed the water that he used into wine.

Let us recognize that this ever-curious search for reasons, both in thought and action, can appear to be a provocation to someone who wants simple submission. The journey has always been long for the man who sought to "give reason" to the content of faith and to incarnate the Word of God. It was, however, the great periods of Christianity which brought faith as a work of intelligence to this level; medieval theology—"scholastic," as it is called, somewhat equivocally—was built up completely by "placing in question" the articles of faith. The believer's curiosity was boldly expressed; he literally placed in question—the literary genre of this theology was based on "questions," not theses—each one of God's words. In this dialogue man speaks God's Word in human terms.

We know that Abelard initiated this method; each of the Christian declarations, each of the texts of Scripture and

Tradition, were submitted to the trial of this *Sic et non*. This verbal and mental dialectic exasperated St. Bernard, and it is true that the innovator was sometimes impertinent in the face of God's mysteries. Regardless of excesses, it remains true that this undertaking was ratified by St. Thomas and the whole 13th century school, and is unquestionably the prototype of western theological science. But the St. Bernards will always be upset at the worldly curiosity and the dialectic of new Abelards. Although retaining her freedom to judge the opportuneness of specific occasions, the Church will always give due reward to this kind of theological investigation, knowing that she needs such labor in order to acquire an intellectual and cultural grounding, both in civilizations and in individual minds. At this very moment the Church is insisting that she can truly implant the faith in African and Asiatic civilizations only if, by the active faith of her theologians and contemplatives, she can discover, love and adopt their human resources, in order to understand and give a "native" expression to her mystery.

There is thus pursued, along with the permanent incarnation of God's word, the sacred history of humanity. *Fides quaerens intellectum*. The teacher of theology, if he does not fall victim to the aristocratic and unbearable verbosity of Abelard, here fills a function in the Church. More precisely, he brings the healthiest curiosity of the believer to the level of the technical requirements of the spirit. The believer, conscious of his faith, adult in his commitment, is not afraid of his mind; his docility to the Word of God and to its qualified organs, far from stifling him, places him in a situation of constant inquiry. "If he comes to a decision simply on the basis of authority," St.

Thomas concludes, "he will undoubtedly possess the theoretical certainty of a good listener, but he will advance without understanding, with his mind empty."

### LEVELS OF ASSENT

THIS CURIOSITY of the believer, the question-method of the theologian, the spiritual and rational hunger for the faith, obviously are born and developed in the interior of the Word of God, with a loving and total docility to its "authority" when hearing it. This cogitation, no matter how demanding and organized, finds authentic vigor and value only in a constantly fresh and lively assent of faith. It is a secret assent to the mystery, and an agreement with the declarations which are proposed and defined by the qualified organs of that mystery, within the divine economy of the Church. The very nature of faith requires this assent to an authority, this "obedience" of the mind. Paul Ricoeur writes:

Authority in theology is not a super-added social accident; in it the believer recognizes a fundamental aspect of Revelation and Truth. The events of Revelation are capable of changing *my* life; they are equally the foundations of a new communitarian existence; in this sense they have authority over *my* life and *our* community. The Word of God is authority by virtue of its meaning for me and for us. Authority is a fundamental phenomenon of the religious sphere; God wants something for me and for us. As Cullmann has shown, this is the first sense of the word *dogma*, more radical and inclusive than *doctrine*, which only makes explicit its theoretical dimension; *dogma* is a command for me through an absolute event, and which, as such, contains the potential of *doctrine*. It is from this point of view that Truth is authority; the succession goes like this: authority of the Word, author-

ity of scriptural witness, authority of faithful preaching, authority of the theology.<sup>2</sup>

But it is in the nature of faith as a work of the intelligence, it is part of the divine-human economy, to discern the extremely varied forms that the human expression of the Word of God takes, from a single line of the Bible to the solemn definition of a dogma. The transcendence of the mystery requires a permanent stretching of our mental habits, and our methods of teaching and thinking; and to a similar degree the incarnation of this mystery, first in the historical tissue of Scripture, then in the person of Christ, and finally in the Church which is his mystical Body, requires an intelligence and frank attention to the structures—verbal, conceptual, contextual and individual—of those who give authentic declaration to this mystery, whether he is an inspired writer of the bible, or the certified magisterium within the ecclesiastical administration of this Word of God. To put it another way, the faith will provide an aware and enlightened truth only in observing the various levels of its statements. This will be the first act of this intelligence, which we previously described, and is the elementary condition of a theology: the inventory of the revealed data, its qualifications, and its transmission, is very important and satisfying work for the theologian. It is a critical work, in the good sense of the word, which will sometimes contain surprises for infantile docility, or sectarian absolutism, but will be the index of a good mental and apostolic health in the Church as the community of the faithful. Some hasty contractions of the believer at the errors of the world and dangers to faith are certainly very understandable; but ultimately they are the effect of an insufficient mastery, even a weakness of faith in the Word of God.

The three distressing cases to which we have referred help us to look, without anger or misunderstanding, at some recent incidents which have brought suffering and concern to some men in their whole faith.

IT IS CLEAR, first of all, that in statements of faith, whether those of the biblical writers or those of Church teaching, the personal qualities of the writers are echoed; neither inspiration nor the assistance of the Spirit constitute psychological miracles which would transform the mental processes of the prophet or doctor into absolute formulas. This mechanical conception sometimes tempts Christians, but it distorts the concrete economy of Revelation. To say the least it is clumsy to define the faith—its content, its light, its reflexes—by means of the individual features of Isaiah, or the character-complexes of a Boniface VIII, a Paul IV, or a Cardinal Billot, even though they are qualified, according to their ability, to present the object of faith in an authentic manner. On the other hand, we should not refuse to accept the Word of God that may be found beneath the personal behavior of Isaiah, Boniface VIII or Paul IV. The analysis of the concrete processes and influences will allow us to recognize, beneath its contingent outer surface, the truth that has been transmitted.

In addition, faith finds a realistic lucidity in observing the individual human capacities, indeed, the particular genius of these spokesmen of God in the Church. Innocent III, a 36-year-old Pope, in one of the Church's darker hours in the evolution of the world, was able to achieve not only fortunate decisions in the Church, but also authoritative definitions of truth in its authenticity. Historians have pointed out the political greatness of certain popes who not only played an important role

in world history, but exercised a spiritual clairvoyance thanks to which the faith was able to play its needed part in a particular period of civilization. The faith, therefore, is not limited to solemn dogmatic announcement, but includes a *sensus Ecclesiae* which is linked to the most changing circumstances.

It even happens sometimes, curiously enough, that dogmatic proclamations are encompassed by partisan considerations, which do not call for the assent of faith, and are dependent on free theological opinions. The bull *Unam Sanctam* is a famous example of this: it ends with an infallible teaching bearing on the influence of the moral conscience and the Christian faith on the whole of human life, both public and private. This "dogma" is always valid, and now more than ever. But the long preamble, in a fragile and questionable symbolism, affirms a theology of the powers of the Church, which was that of its author, a mind dominated by the political Augustinianism then fashionable, as against the "new ideas" of St. Thomas, who was at the moment held in suspicion. St. Thomas' successor in his chair at the University of Paris, who was opposed to this theocraticism, was discharged from his post, until the following Pope re-established him in his rights. The truth of the faith is not to be integrated with the ideological contexts which introduce it, and perhaps favor it at the moment.

We might mention another case, more serene, but equally striking for the believer. In his Encyclical on the Holy Spirit (1887) Leo XIII gave an excellent presentation of the high Augustinian-Thomist tradition, classic in the West; eastern theologians, however, do not discover in it their own perspective, or their notion of *agape*.

For one who perceives the sub-soil of texts, several documents of the last pontificate on the "social doctrine" of the

Church reveal the growing influence of a German theologian whose personal positions on the family and ownership are penetrated by an anti-socialism closer to the reactions of Adenauer than the perspectives of Pius XI.

Even in dealing with the most explicit declarations, theologians observe the various intelligence-levels of faith, and hence the levels of assent. Beginning in the 16th century, they have in this way developed a extremely technical treatise on the "sources" from which the faith draws the various statements of its mysteries. This is a real method in discrimination, in the line of Abelard's *Sic et non*; its intention is certainly not to minimize the docility of the believer, but on the contrary to give to a total communion with the Word of God its intelligent and balanced fullness. Sometimes these critical qualifications have been overburdened with minutiae; on the other hand, a servile passivity that God has certainly not wanted when speaking to us has, unfortunately, often been excused as fidelity. "We don't understand, but we must submit"; this summary emphasis on obedience can only be a very provisional reaction. Let us recognize that it is not within the reach of everyone to have the necessary equipment for the careful reading of all the documents of faith, from the first chapter of Genesis to the ecclesiastic directives which detail its day-to-day application.

LET US INTRODUCE here the case of encyclicals, solemn letters addressed by the Sovereign Pontiff to the entire Church. Especially since the 19th century, the Popes have used this means to give a public expression to the faith, not so much in its supreme objects, as in its concrete projection on the doctrinal and apostolic situations in which the faithful find themselves. Since those who write them observe their generic law,

the encyclicals are to be understood, *intellectus fidei*, in the geographical and historical contexts which envelope them and which most often they themselves define. Recently there has been a thorough study of the various editorial threads present in the celebrated encyclical *Rerum novarum*, in which Leo XIII took a stand on the economic and social evolution of the working class. By this means we are able to see clearly both the extreme care in finding terms of expression adequate for this meeting-point of the world and faith, and their strict connection with the vocabularies, experiences, and obscurities of that particular period (1891). To take one example among many: a well-balanced formula, worked out by Cardinal Zigliara, presented the problem of the family wage in such a way that for more than thirty years, many interpreters rejected it; who today would accuse the Church of condemning family allotments? Forty years later, Pius XI took up and revised the themes of the encyclical in a new document *Quadragesimo anno* (1931); when in 1936, during the revolutionary events in France, someone proclaimed his loyalty to the doctrine that had been proclaimed, the Pope answered quickly, "Yes, yes, but go forward now; those texts were published five years ago."

Moreover, the documents are not simply transmitted, in their profound outline, but interpretations, "oriented" according to needs, temperaments, and even passions, are also involved. The great texts of the Council of Trent, at the time of the Counter-Reformation, were ushered into a rigid atmosphere, both conceptual and institutional, which was relaxed only a century later. The famous brief *Cum alias*, through which Bossuet's efforts brought about the condemnation of Fenelon, was the signal for the defeat of mystics for two centuries. The *Syllabus* of Pius IX was the



object of such violently polemical interpretation by Veuillot that the pope intervened to protect Dupanloup. The encyclical *Pascendi* immediately provoked a series of official measures and officious procedures, and sometimes regrettable intrigues, like that of the Sapi-nière, which manipulated texts in a unilateral manner in the service of equivocal causes. The charge of modernism was used in an attempt to disqualify a Lagrange in the field of biblical exegesis, a Père Anizan in the worker apostolate, and the directors of *Action populaire* in the field of social doctrines.

In fact, vocabularies themselves, whose importance is primary, both for the purity of faith and the understanding of the faithful, normally change under the pressure of the circumstances, climates, and mentality. This mobility is difficult to measure: in some cases the terms employed are indispensable and definitive vehicles of a truth which has become homogeneous to them, at least in their semantic substance (like the words person and nature to describe the real incarnation of Christ); in others, especially with words linked to collective psychology and sociological conditions, we do not find this dignity or stability. The word *form*, used at the council of Vienna (1311) to signify the role of the soul in the human compound, requires a technical explanation, which depends on philosophical presuppositions governed by a whole system of anthropology. The principle of sufficient reason is obviously not being stated in the encyclical *Humani generis* (1951) according to its original meaning in the philosophy of Leibniz; the same is true of the principle of indetermination, in the discourse of Pius XII on science and faith (Sept. 1955). The word *socialism* has undergone a rapid evolution since its formation in the beginning of the 19th century; today it is the object of multiple ambigui-

ties, exploited by both the right and the left. What will be the history in Christian literature of such an evangelical word as peace, from the institutions for peace in the middle ages to the declarations of Pius XII against the atomic arms race in the 20th century? We can see, from these examples, what a tremendous problem it is when the Gospel is to be translated into languages that are completely without a Christian tradition, like those of Africa and the Far East. A recent session (1957) of the outstanding annual Spanish theological-cultural conferences at St. Sebastian, posed this problem directly for the inner vocabulary of the western Church, in both the language of liturgical symbolism and the proclamation of the message of the gospel. Missionary theologians were especially interested, both from a doctrinal and a sociological point of view.

In fact, it is at the very interior of thought that formulas, declarations, and categories experience this reference to changing human reality, both of mentalities and events. Systems of thought, more or less explicit, and—as is said—theological “opinions” (whose necessity, truth, and limits we have already pointed out), here come clearly into play. If in its moral teaching on earthly goods—in which the Gospel finds not only a material application, but in addition one of its clearest witnesses, from the poverty of St. Francis to the fraternal anguish at the intolerable destitution of “under-developed” countries—an encyclical proclaims the principles and the *raison d'être* of goods (commonly called property), it can make use of quite different theologies. St. Thomas sees in property only a “means” of realizing, with least harm, the distribution of earthly goods destined primarily for the whole human race. This notion of a collective destiny places sharp limits, particularly at certain times, on too sta-

tic or too capitalist a conception of the "natural right" of each individual; it tends to bring about an evangelical pressure which quickly disturbs the economic powers of the established order. If, with other theologians, we see in private property first the vital space of the human person, we will only take man's collective destiny into consideration later on, and first of all will guarantee property and the family as essential. All in all, a more complacent theology....

Similarly, theologians of social life in the human communities will look at the evolution of structures and reforms in business enterprises in different ways; some will be favorable to nationalisation, and others reserved. We know what nuanced interpretations were given to papal statements on the substitution of the company contract for a wage contract. Theories on the foundation of worker participation in management have given rise to similar polemics. Recently there has been insistence on the ambiguities in the word *corporation*, inevitably linked to political options; it must be expurgated, even if it requires subtle interpretations, which were certainly not foreseen by the editors of the official texts which date from before World War II.<sup>3</sup>

An acute sense of the transcendence of the Word of God disposes some writers to avoid using the customary phrase, "the social doctrine" of the Church, without scruple or explanation. This phrase underlines the degree to which the "teaching" of the faith includes the influence of the Gospel, both in thought and action, on social and economic life. If we take it in its precise sense, however, it would include an organized ensemble of intellectual decisions which depend, not on faith, but on the contingent evolution of societies and the human condition that this evolution determines. In fact, it happens that

some people take shelter behind this phrase in positions which are certainly free, but certainly not to be identified with Christian loyalty. Abelard would find here a fine example for his *Sic et non*. In France, for example, "social Catholicism" (according to its specific name) in its multiform and animated history, from menaces and condemnation to public approval, has been and remains one of the best organs of elaboration for the "social doctrine" of the Church; but there is no attempt to present the conclusions of the *Semaines sociales* as "doctrine" in which the economic basis of the "social" and the political forces that determine it are more radically taken into consideration.

The natural law itself, to which the teacher of the faith often refers, particularly in order to determine common grounds for all men in the reconstruction of society, as well as areas of disagreement between Christian and non-Christian, can only be defined in its content and in its requirement in terms of the course of civilizations, and by reference to quite different theologies of man. St. Thomas Aquinas spoke in terms of what some jurists call a natural right of progressive content. Pius XII has on several occasions proclaimed elements of this right that today might be or have been demanded, and in a way that Leo XIII did not foresee. With a Christian anthropology governed by the enormity of original sin, the Augustinian or Pascalian theologian will obviously have less confidence in the sufficient autonomy and the progressive development of human solidarity than a disciple of St. Thomas. At the solemn meeting of the U.N. at which the new "Social Rights of Man" were proclaimed (San Francisco, 1948), the presiding Jacques Maritain, the representative of France and at the time her ambassador to the Vatican, underlined vigorously, as a good Thomist, the value of these earthly sol-

idarities that were about to be promulgated. An exaggeratedly confessional mentality was alarmed at such an interpretation; some recent meddlesome statements have once again voiced these strange suspicions.

IT WOULD BE AS WRONG to be surprised at these variations and disagreements, which are sometimes bitter, as to refuse to accept such a relativism. It is a spiritual weakness to be willing to go ahead, in thought or in action, only on total certainty and with formal orders. The theologian is glad to introduce here, with his resources of sensibility, intelligence and reason, a well-considered assent and subtle clear-sightedness; the Christian, by instinct, at the heart of the most complete obedience of faith, experiences the freedom that the Spirit nourishes by virtue of his irreducibly personal concrete decision. Ultimately, this is the meaning of absolute docility to the Word of God and its authentic organisms, which the discerning sagacity of an *intellectus fidei* calls for and confirms; it is realized according to the internal laws of the spirit, through which the light of God is made incarnate.

This quality of discernment is founded and enlightened by two great lines of cleavage, according to the universal and explicitly professed teaching of the Church, even when polemical contingencies obscure their application. First, there has always been recognized the firm distinction between the content of the Word of God, on one hand, and of theological systems on the other, whose diversity was and remains well known, not only in academic disputes which are sometimes quite sharp, but also in collective mentalities, and, as is said, even in approaches to spirituality. In the West there is the celebrated case of the conflict between Thomists and Molinists, which in fact always involves along with the notion of liberty and the idea

of humanism, the nature of the relationship between God and man. Note well that the Church has always refused to resolve this debate, which nevertheless bears on the practice of the Christian economy, going beyond scholastic disputes, into the schools of spirituality and apostolic options. Nor will the Church today choose dogmatically within the areas of controversy among orthodox theologians on the autonomy of the temporal order, in which Augustinian pessimism and Thomistic optimism confront each other. In addition, despite *de facto* Westernization, the Church takes care to keep her official faith open to eastern theology, which is profoundly different from the common teaching of the Western doctors. As we have seen, this attitude does not lead to the disparagement of the labor of the "theological masters"; on the contrary, she associates the greatest, in their grave diversity—Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, Francis de Sales, Bellarmine, with her role as pedagogue of the divine mystery. Theology is not just a collection of "opinions"; a kind of open forum for the faithful, as a liberalism lacking in truth and in freedom sometimes imagines it; it remains a knowledge, with its power to conclude, in thought and in deed.<sup>4</sup>

There is a second cleavage, whose principle and method are classic: doctrinal statements are one thing, whether in the form of solemn definitions or as a matter of common teaching; disciplinary decisions are another. This is a distinction of great importance, which would be seriously minimized in being interpreted simply as discriminating between thought, a doctrinal submission to eternal truths, and action, an obedience of conduct within the area of shifting historical contingencies. This distinction even enters the domain of thought. In fact, the simplest theological manual classes a series of "truths"

as "disciplinary," whether they are reformable or irreformable. Such are, for example, the decrees of the Biblical Commission, in the course of the modernist controversies, on the meaning of the first chapters of Genesis. A certain doctrinaire attitude cannot easily resign itself to these nuances. Such distinctions are, however, precisely the effect of an incarnation of truth in that mental borderland where the transcendence of the Word of God imposes the relativity of declarations that are linked to the double contingency of history and research.

We surely touch here on the most revealing indication of what faith is, in the *motif* which constitutes it as the "theological" virtue in the intelligence. It is assent to the Word of God in an intimate communion with God's Truth and Life; because it is supremely interior and supremely free, it cannot be contrived by any "sociological Christianity."<sup>5</sup> Although this mystery of faith is inviolate, its sociological expression within the community nevertheless includes a "discipline," not only in action, but in thought, where the Church is teacher. Here is where obedience comes into play, in the midst of those shifting modalities that we have pointed out. But it would be as false to define the faith in terms of this disciplinary "obedience," as it would be to transfer the proper characteristics of the *moral* virtue of obedience into the *theological* light of faith. There is a certain mystical exaltation of obedience, which in the process, by an unhappy inversion, lowers faith to its sociological aspect and a herd morality. Faith has, surely, quite a different appearance. To use the technical language of theologians, we may say that the formal motive of faith, which defines its epistemological *quality*, is not the declaration of the Church, but divine Truth itself. "The act of faith, even if it is imposed by the Church, is

not motivated by respect for her authority; through the Church, which in some sense effaces herself and loses all the persuasive force normally inherent in a human institution," there is communion in the Word of God, within the human structure of faith.<sup>6</sup> Because of this, truth and freedom can here embrace without destroying each other.

### The Human Structure of Faith

IT IS THEREFORE faith itself, in its great work of theological understanding, which is the key to the problem, and not some liberalism of the spirit that might erroneously extend the relativism of contexts to divine truth. Because of the same fundamental demand which, just previously, made us require *authority* as an essential characteristic of the *truth* of God's revelation, we now point out that truth, and above all divine truth, because it is the nourishment of the spirit, calls for appetite. Appetite is the sign of good health. It is the spontaneous reflex, which, in the believer, becomes conscious. With it there are all the natural forces of the intelligence—as Scripture says, the organic structures of the "heart"—which are going to become the subject of faith, both in its most secret intimacy and in its declarations. Certainly, in the initiative of his mystery and incarnate mercy, the living God, subsistent Truth, is not in me as a simple mental object; he offers himself as a gift of the Spirit, in a growing communion, to which love gives welcome. But this "faith" is not achieved by a kind of transfer into an inhuman "beyond" of the mind; it is realized in a joyful incarnation of his light into the tissues of the soul, even to the propositions which conceptualize it according to the human condition. The object of faith, therefore, is simultaneously, consubstantially, the divine reality graciously given in the assent to

the mystery, and the statement which, in my mind, expresses and guarantees mental existence in such communion. This is why the Church is so sensitive about doctrinal formulas and gives so much attention to them, even when their verbal material is borrowed from the rational products of philosophy. The Gospel does not talk about two natures in one person in Christ; but the most evangelical faith in Christ, even the simplicity of a Francis of Assisi, can maintain its consistency and truth only by means of this declaration. Such a statement is not only protective covering of an ecstatic perception; it enters the very substance of faith. This mental immanence, this incarnation of the Word of God is the necessary condition for the transcendence of faith.

Let us consider the believer in terms of this "conditioning" (*conditionnement*) of faith. The faith is built up in him, spiritually, intellectually, theologically, sociologically, in terms of the structures of the man in whom it is embodied. This term ("conditioning") has been used recently in the sociology of religion to designate the social coordinates of a transmission of the Christian message, in a society in which collective determinisms greatly affect the life of the mind as well as economic life. This new word for a partly new phenomenon is in fact the exact expression of the most traditional theology for a phenomenon which is completely at one with the faith. St. Thomas' whole theology of faith is developed from the "conditions" of the human subject, at the same time that it is based on the absoluteness of divine truth. The recent controversy in France over the development of a "new" catechism has shown the existence in some areas of an obsession with a summary objectivism which believes itself jeopardized by any taking into consideration of the subject and his behavior.

Here we find located and balanced the interior tensions which we have discerned not only in the theologian, but in the ordinary believer as soon as he becomes conscious of his faith. The more the Christian is committed, the more he experiences the individual and collective "conditioning" of his faith, whether in his interior growth, its external expression, or its power of testimony. The majority of problems receive considerable illumination through this excellent theology. One of the most important is that of a faith and a Gospel which, although in fact it is in solidarity with western "conditions," preserves in principle—and today ought to realize in fact—their expression and incarnation in civilizations which Graeco-Roman culture has not animated. Everyone is agreed on this, but the controversies that the career of a Father Lebbe aroused recently, like those of Father Ricci in the 17th century, or even the resistance, whether passive or open, of colonialist nationalism to the development of native churches, show that these theoretical agreements are not easily translated into action.

More radically, the conditioning of the faith by philosophical mentalities, cultural-economic influences, and theories about the world and history, present material and questions of tremendous implications for theological elaboration and apostolic expression. For example, a Thomist anthropology, in which author and disciples are involved in the syllabus of 1277, is obviously more open to the understanding—to the *Christian* understanding—of a world in which economics introduces determinisms even in the most intimate aspects of the spiritual condition of man, person, family, culture. The theological systems were formerly exposed to criticism because of an excessive scholasticism; in fact, their inspiration, method, and situation in the Church are rediscovered today



in those theoretical and practical choices which are debated among Christians. The "statement of the question" of medieval theology preserves, both in method, actuality and richness, the same stubborn search for understanding. Theology, both for the learned and the apostolic-minded, is enjoying a healthy period; the present multiplication of courses in theology for adults, under various forms, shows an awakened taste and its possible satisfaction at various levels. Some are disturbed, of course, caught between fear and hope, since they suppose implicitly that faith, pure obedience without reason, should look on the reasons which develop it into a theology only as casual curiosities—in the final account, as hindrances to a total and monolithic loyalty. Let us repeat with St. Thomas that if the faithful are satisfied merely with the *authority* of faith, its living *truth* will suffer; perhaps they will advance in certitude, but with an emptiness of spirit. The relativity of theological systems, in the sense we have described, and which always has been professed in the Church as guardian of the transcendence of the Word of God, is like the expression and the guarantee of that free search

for the understanding of faith. *Fides quaerens intellectum*.

Both for the proclamation of the gospel message, and its learned development, the believer, because of his commitment as well as his curiosity, bears witness to freedom in the most faithful assent to the Gospel of the Word of God.

<sup>1</sup> For documentation on these cases, consult the works of Mandonnet and Van Steenberghe in regard to the 13th century, Pastor on the reformation (or the relevant volume of Daniel-Rops' *History of the Church*), and J. Rivière on modernism.

<sup>2</sup> P. Ricoeur, *Histoire et Vérité* (Paris, 1955, Edition du Seuil), pp. 160-1.

<sup>3</sup> Special issue of *Chronique Sociale* (Lyon) Dec. 1957.

<sup>4</sup> M. D. Chenu, *La théologie est-elle une science?* (Paris, 1957, Fayard), Ch. 4.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. the excellent analysis of this "sociological Christianity" in the present crisis by R. Théry, in *Chronique sociale* (Lyon), 1955, fasc. 3.

<sup>6</sup> We borrow the expression of L. Renwart, S.J., in his analysis of one of the most delicate decisions of the Church (a "disciplinary" decision) and one which remains changed with emotion—on the non-validity of Anglican ordinations (Leo XIII, 1896), *Nouvelle Revue théologique*, 1957, pp. 1052-3.

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# Notes on other Publications

## THE NOVEL AND CURRENT CRITICISM

AUDEN, as usual, puts it well:

... art is a *fait accompli*.  
What they should do, or how or when  
Life-order comes to living men  
It cannot say, for it presents  
Already lived experience...

The successful work of art has this quality of historical fact; we cannot wish it away. The poet's "New Year Letter" of 1940 suggests what happens to men's experiences when they are rendered into art:

In the new field they occupy,  
The unique serves to typify,  
Becomes, though still particular,  
An algebraic formula,  
An abstract model of events  
Derived from dead experiments...

"Art is not life," he has previously said, nor can it be "a midwife to society." How, then, does this "abstract model of events" move outside its own closed circle? Auden replies:

And each life must itself decide  
To what and how it be applied.

The critics we are considering here have not neglected the other critical tasks. But, if they have a common inclination, it is their concern with pointing out "to what and how"—by implication at least—art can be applied.

### 1.

*From Jane Austen to Joseph Conrad*, edited by Robert C. Rathburn and Martin Steinmann, Jr. (University of Minnesota, 1958), 326 pp., \$5.75.

Of course, few collections of essays will fit any neat compartment. This one is no exception. Charles Murrah's careful study of "The Background of *Mansfield Park*" usefully demonstrates the

subtle unity that was Jane Austen's great gift to the technique of the novel but does not relate that unity to anything outside itself. Gordon S. Haight's "George Eliot's Originals" proves what all but the most naive reader would assume: that George Eliot's characters, though modeled often on real people, are not carbon copies. Done in depth, this sort of thing has scholarly value; done superficially it has little point.<sup>1</sup> William York Tyndall's chief concern is to show that Scrutineer Leavis is wrong when he simplistically assumes that Marlowe is the voice of Conrad; the approach obscures Tyndall's occasionally stimulating insights.

One danger of a criticism that tries to apply art is its inclination toward high seriousness. We can quickly perceive the relevance of *Piers Plowman*, but what doth it profit a man to read the *Canterbury Tales*? As Douglas Bush remarks in "A Note on Dickens' Humor":

...it may be hoped that the new criticism of Dickens will not become too severely and solemnly intellectual and analytical. After all, as Mr. Sleary said, "People muht be amuthed."

The essay following Bush's at first seems designed to prove the point by its ominous title, "Self-help and the Helpless in *Bleak House*." Yet the analysis, by George H. Ford, of Dickens' view of the human will is precise and perceptive, placing Dickens in the Victorian age while making him clearly relevant to our own. Bush, on the other hand, carelessly makes the comic and the humorous interchangeable: today's reader, one rather hopes, is not amused by lithy thpelling, nor by many other examples of Dickens' elephantine humor;

that very humor against which we react hinders our perception of the comic validity of, say, Mr. Micawber, whom George Orwell called a "cadging scoundrel." Certainly serious criticism must learn to handle the comic and its implications. Subtler analysis by a veteran like Bush would have helped in the job.

## 2.

*The New Literature*, by Claude Mauriac, translated by Samuel I. Stone (George Braziller, 1959), 251 pp. \$4.00.

Semantic turmoil greets the reader of this book by François Mauriac's critic son. First we learn that the new literature is *aliterature*—"literature freed from the hackneyed conventions which have given the word a pejorative meaning." It occurs to the reader that he had always thought of that sort of thing as writing that didn't make the grade as literature. Evidently a similar notion troubled Mauriac. In the same paragraph he changes his mind. *Aliterature* is not literature at all: "The history of literature and that of *aliterature* are parallel." A few moments later we find what seems to be the key to *aliterature*, and it is an appropriate key indeed: incoherence.

Fortunately, what follows is a quite useful collection of book reviews. Mauriac has an affinity for the writers of guilt and alienation, from Kafka to Robbe-Grillet, and, if he exaggerates their newness and neurosis, he makes up for it by introducing us to writers like Nathalie Sarraute, who are not yet available in English.

After reading the individual pieces, it is possible to account for the confusing concept of *aliterature*. Mauriac uses it as a category that gives logical standing to his own predispositions. Catchwords like guilt, torture, paralysis, stranger, seem to hypnotize the critic. Because

each shares that vocabulary, Mauriac seems equally to approve of Camus and Simenon, Beckett and Henry Miller. Because he himself makes few judgments—after all, Simenon is a hack, Henry Miller a projector of narcissistic self-pity—and responds chiefly to the catchwords, Mauriac wants to avoid literary questions. Instead of admitting that he does not care about literature and is indulging in genteel sociology, he muddies the discussion with a term designed to make literary values unimportant. This of course diminishes the significance of what he has to say. The bad writers are symptoms of the age and its diseases. Kafka and Camus, and Beckett and Robbe-Grillet are something more.

## 3.

*The Picaresque Saint*, by R. W. B. Lewis (J. B. Lippincott, 1959), 317 pp. \$6.00.

R. W. B. Lewis' *The Picaresque Saint* is a superb contribution to our reading of Moravia, Camus, Silone, Faulkner, Greene and Malraux. Its excellence rests not in his analysis of any one of the novelists but in the cumulative effect, which is extraordinary.

Lewis' thesis is that "the best way to distinguish the two or three literary generations of our century is in their manner of responding to the fact of death—that is, in their manner of somehow getting beyond it."

Of the first generation—the generation of Joyce, Proust and Mann—Lewis says:

And if . . . they busied themselves with the techniques of language and construction, it was because plot and character had already departed from the life they could observe; and in the paltry time they were honest enough to mirror, art appeared as the supreme consolation—with technique as the creative force that made it effective. Art was even more than that. Art was the answer given back by the first generation to the universal pressure of death.

There is room for argument here—an outline of the events of *Ulysses*, for example, reveals that plot is far from being absent.<sup>2</sup> But there is insight, too, an insight that stands up against our caviling.<sup>3</sup>

For the second generation, the pressure of death is even greater. Earlier, art had been a haven among the ruins. But war and totalitarianism destroyed even the ruins. The sense of loss is universal and behind it "is the felt loss of the presence or even the life of God." The representative work of the second generation, says Lewis, is *The Myth of Sisyphus*, Camus' passionate contemplation of suicide.

What has been the response of the second generation to these varieties of loss—loss felt so sharply in the imagination and spirit that some mode of death has appeared as the natural starting point of the contemporary novel? With an unconsciously common impulse, the writers of this generation have resorted to a rather desperate strategy. They have been forced to find, or try to find, certain grounds for living in *life itself*.

Pascal's wager no longer leaps to God; in desperation and blind faith we place our bet on life.

I have indicated some dissatisfaction with Lewis' individual chapters. In his discussion of "Alberto Moravia: Eros and Existence," Lewis all but invents a novelist who strips life and death to their innermost essence: "They are very simply existence and non-existence . . . the plus and minus of radical vitality, as affected by radical action." Thus

we have a recurring picture of Eros moving between being and nonbeing. It is this that distinguishes the fiction once and for all from pornography; for the incessant peepings and prying in Moravia's stories are . . . symptoms of an insatiable desire to catch a glimpse of the secret reality

of human beings—their primary existence, what is hidden or misrepresented by public morality, conventions and clothing.

Without bothering about the question of pornography—which within our society would prejudice the case in Moravia's favor—we may wonder whether, in his fiction, Moravia communicates his desire to view the primary existence of others and, if he does, whether that particular desire is well realized. In my judgment, Moravia does pry his way to existence from time to time, in the story of *Luca*, for example. In that novella, we have the superb scene in which Luca, a boy until now devoted to his parents, ventures into his parents' bedroom without knocking:

The lights were on. . . . The bed took up a large part of the wall opposite the door, so that the first thing Luca saw was the empty pillow and the sheets turned back on both sides of the bed. The empty bed did not hold his attention for a moment. To the right of the bed in the farthest corner of the room stood his father and mother in unusual attitudes. His father was wearing widestriped pyjamas which were crumpled over his fat body; his mother was standing close beside. . . . His father was clasp- ing to his chest with both arms a bundle which Luca immediately recognized as banknotes and industrial bonds.

What Lewis calls the sexualization of money—the theme that Moravia handles best—is brilliantly achieved here (though its irony depends to a great extent on our assumption that Moravia will be merely erotic). Yet, and this is the problem, even this little novel is hardly sustained by its action. The typical Moravia novel should have been a short story. Its length is the result less of growth than of addition. Lewis' admission that the effect is pathetic and not dramatic is an admission of Moravia's literary defeat, nothing more.

Nevertheless, Moravia makes a point for Lewis, for in choosing life Moravia chooses and so defines the minimum:

What is gradually revealed to us as Moravia's basic theme is nothing else than the sensation of existence. This is the end to which Moravia's fiction may be seen to be pressing; and it is to this that the sexual encounter regularly and treacherously seems to promise the clue.

Moravia is the starting point in a progression of representative choices of life. The next step will be compassion, as seen in an examination of Albert Camus' courageous ethical explorations.

Both *The Plague* and its discursive counterpart, *The Rebel*, reveal Camus' gradual conversion from the solitude, nihilism, and absurdity explored in all the works clustering around *The Stranger* toward a sense of participation, as the only salvageable value and the one trustworthy meaning. "Toward" is the right word; for Camus will not be hurried, and he will not betray his own awareness of treachery by coming nicely to rest on his spiritual journey.

The choice of life that distinguished *The Myth of Sisyphus* and *The Stranger* and the choice of compassion that mark *The Rebel* and *The Plague* are followed by a new rebellion in *The Fall*, "this time against an illusory generosity, an unsoundly based solidarity with the wretched."

The values of generosity and a concern for the helpless have, the book suggests, dangerously triumphed. We are all comfortably communal and jostle each other to assist the blind—this, too, must be exposed. And in the course of doing so, Camus, through his narrator, gropes toward a new basis for solidarity with his fellows: to what might be called the fellowship of those ashamed, the democracy of the guilty.

Lewis speaks of the distance that remains, always, between the characters

Camus has created. Perhaps it is this that the democracy of the guilty will eliminate. The notion brings Lewis to Silone, whose constant purpose, he feels, has been "to progress from compassion to companionship; to move forward from awareness to charity."

The study of Silone is the finest of Lewis' individual achievements. And his reasons for finding Silone the most sympathetic of authors are good. One has the sense that many of our critics place little value on friendship, companionship—at least, in literature. Leslie Fiedler, for example, has recently recast the relationship between Huck Finn and Nigger Jim into a homosexual mold. In the gathering together of men this, it would seem, is all that Fiedler can see. Lewis, in contrast, reiterates the etymological notion of companionship—the sharing of bread—and his skill at awakening our perception of this elemental theme in Silone does a service to the novelist and ourselves.

In Pietro Spina, the hero of *Bread and Wine*, Lewis discovers Silone's representative hero, the man who presses toward openness to the reality of others. The process is one of shedding the abstractions of doctrine for the concreteness of love.

The man who flees into the mountains at the close of *Bread and Wine* is the fullest embodiment we have yet met of the representative heroic figure of second generation fiction. If we accept Silone's hints and speak of Spina as a kind of contemporary saint we must add that he is a saint just *because* he is a martyr; he is a saint just *because* he is a man.

The sanctity is one of communion not with God but men. Silone opposes suffering—the stage at which Camus left us—and more. His hero shares, without resentment, the common miseries.

The method of Lewis' essay on Silone



is biographical. He says, with justice, of the novelist's communist and post-communist career that it has been a journey into and beyond history, a journey that enabled Silone to discover his proper theme: "the theme of charity in motion, the theme of the replacement of inhuman force by the human force of everything that friendship means to him." There is in this a sacrificial heroism, but joy as well. Lewis has rendered them admirably.

In the fiction of William Faulkner there is no question of choosing life: life is there just as surely as the earth of Yoknapatawpha County is there, and it is a man's awareness of it that counts. When Faulkner writes at his best the awareness is tragic, for in the face of a violent reality and a burdensome history, what remains is the hopeless joy of enduring. In *Light in August*, as Lewis points out, life is asserted by the bastard child in the womb of Lena Grove, or, in *As I Lay Dying*, with genuine comic insight, by a new set of false teeth.

Lewis' theme, which we can now describe as a tracing through fiction of a developing vision of life, demands that he consider chiefly Faulkner's preoccupations in and since "The Bear."

Thematically, "The Bear" is pivotal in Faulkner's work. Lewis describes it this way:

Beginning with "The Bear," and there more emphatically than anywhere else, what is positive in human nature and the moral world envelops and surrounds what is evil. The corrupting and the destructive and the desperate have their ageless being in human experience, but here they become known to us exactly in their opposition, even their subordination, to the creative and the nourishing.

And this process of knowing evil through the good is a crucial development in our vision of how 20th-century man

chooses life. The contrast with the early Camus—and we must remember that we have so far only seen the early Camus—is important. The plague, however apt within the context of Camus' novel, is an easy symbol: Rieux can choose the good without knowing it, since he chooses it in fighting the plague—an evil he cannot fail to recognize.

In "The Bear," we have innocence discovering virtue in the person of Ike MacCaslin engaged in the ritual hunt for Old Ben, the Bear. The hunters in "The Bear" possess the secrets of humility and pity and courage and manly pride. And it is these things that Ike learns by the time Old Ben is killed. Through learning them, Ike is reborn. But with Old Ben, the innocence of the woods is lost. His attainment of virtue shows Ike the nature of evil more clearly than any other Faulknerian character has seen it; he leaves his inheritance for the life of a huntsman and carpenter. He becomes a type of Christ.

It was perhaps Faulkner's most extraordinary poetic intuition to present the affinities between a human being and a divine—a Mississippi hunter and the figure of Christ—not as an actuality, but as a foggly seen prophetic possibility. . . .

Faulkner has attempted to create the man reborn, the man who learns good and then evil and his own complicity in it, and because of this, chooses to atone for evil and to bear witness to the good. That, later, the vision is debased in the rhetoric of *A Fable*, Lewis admits. That it is limited radically by Ike MacCaslin's rejecting in the end, not out of weakness but out of imputed strength, the community of men, we must remain painfully aware.

Despite forebodings concerning the mysticism of sin, the world of Graham Green is a world where life is a question of sanctity, for Greenland is "the

ravaged and disputed territory between two eternities," the battlefield on which Pinkie destroys his soul, the whisky priest saves his, and Scobie, the man of pity, dies with an objectless cry of love on his lips.

The foundation of Greene's vision is, Lewis points out, a primitive awareness of evil and its power. Reversing the pattern of Ike MacCaslin, "One began to believe in heaven because one believed in hell."

Christian doctrine, as it had done in the past, would come later and explain the pattern; but the pattern itself—so predoctrinal or subdoctrinal as to be not only not Catholic but not even Christian—was provided by the personal experience.

If we are to understand the Catholicism of Greene's novels, we must bear Lewis insight in mind. Faith may account for the vision, but the vision derives from intensely personal experience. The novels represent the vision, inquire into it by setting it in motion in different situations. Greene's world has been Manichean; we who live in it should not be surprised.

All the truth of things, for Greene, lies hidden in the darkness: whether of slum-ridden Brighton, of a squalid prison cell, or of a West African night of wonder and despair. Scarcely less mysterious is Greene's achievement of making visible in that darkness, and exactly by means of it, the unforgettable dramas of extraordinarily living human beings.

They meet their God in darkness, with hate or with furtive love. The choice of life is the choice or the rejection of Him.

I have avoided using Lewis' phrase, "the picaresque saint." The words are catchy, tempting to the writer, but are not applicable to even the majority of the protagonists discussed. As Lewis says at one point: "What is absent from Camus' image at this point is, of course,

any hint of the picaresque as an alloy of the saintly."

The subject of this book is not the picaresque saint. Rather, we have looked closely at an area of contemporary fiction in which we see men in action in a world where the sense of death is so great that it demands a response either of suicide or of radical moral engagement. The types of engagement, ranging from the erotic limply dramatized by Moravia to the supernatural realized with whatever limitations by Greene, define much of our art, and many of the available possibilities for sanctity in a secular and death-ridden world:

In his strength and his weakness, [he] is an eccentric and an outsider in more ways than one; but he has submitted himself to the experience of humanity. He has fallen headlong into the sufferings of mankind, and from that fall he has acquired a sense of life that he is willing to share. It is in the intensity of his approach to "the intimate reality of others," that [he] has an intuition of the sacred.

Lewis writes these words of a Malraux hero in an epilogue that may do much to reawaken American interest in a major novelist.<sup>4</sup> But the words apply to all the chief creations of what Lewis calls the second generation. Because Lewis submits us to their experiences we may be grateful to him. *The Picaresque Saint* is a fine achievement.

#### 4.

*Modern Literature and the Religious Frontier*, by Nathan A. Scott, Jr. (Harper & Brothers, 1958), 138 pp., \$2.50.

Because the committed Protestant intelligence has not, in the United States, been brought sufficiently to bear on contemporary literature, the burden on men like Nathan Scott is all the greater. Their take-off points are few, the demands made on them many. To Scott's

credit, this book, though clearly made up of separate essays (the matter of the second chapter appeared in *Cross Currents*, Spring 1957), lays a groundwork for a Protestant criticism useful to us all.

Scott quotes William F. Lynch, S.J., who has pointed out that the modern writer in general has "a very great fear of the finite and the human condition." Scott continues:

... the great question, it seems to me, with which the Christian critic must be concerned is the question as to how the modern poet is to be given the courage to glory in our human infirmities and to turn once again to the finite with a sense of wonder and expectancy and with love and a proper adoration.

In doing this

The Protestant critic will . . . seek to disclose to the poet of our time that in the very depth of his ontological confusion there is expressed a sense of the ultimate meaning of existence upon the basis of which he still lives; that in the very seriousness of his sense of separation from the Ground of Being there is expressed a profound intuition of its presence.

Later, Scott quotes the lines from Auden with which I began:

... art is a *fait accompli*.  
What they should do, or how or when  
Life-order comes to living men  
It cannot say, for it presents  
Already lived experience. . . .

In those words may be seen the question the theological critics must face: Can they, in fact, create a theology for artists? Or will they help artists by using work of our writers and our painters and our composers to create a theology from art? In our age we forget that the critic trades on what the artist makes, that the critic's role in the creative act is zero. I suspect the same would be true of any theology of the imagination that was not grounded in the specifics of actual, living works of art. The theologian-

critic will succeed to the extent that he grants the novel or poem its life and speaks to all of us of its content of being under God. Only then will we bring "the Christian faith into a genuinely dialogical relation with modern literature, so that art may speak to religion and religion to art. . . ." Under those circumstances, art will be increasingly relevant to life, the critic's function more important because he will be able better to suggest how "to what and how" art can "be applied."

WILLIAM BIRMINGHAM

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> The student of Faulkner, for example, can learn much about the workings of the novelist's mind from *The World of William Faulkner* by Ward L. Miner, which is now available in a paperback edition (Evergreen; \$1.45). Miner's handling of Faulkner's themes is not exceptional, but his scholarly comparison of the Lafayette actuality with the Yoknapatawpha legend gives the reader valuable insights into some aspects of the creative act.

<sup>2</sup> Leon Edel's *The Psychological Novel*, now reissued in a soft cover (Evergreen; \$1.45), ably advocates and describes the Joycean technique but is, I feel, dead wrong when it says that "in the modern psychological novel there is no 'story' in the old sense. . . ." Where there is "no" story—Dorothy Richardson, Virginia Woolf—there remains little life. Joyce and Faulkner are story tellers, though not in the familiar manner.

<sup>3</sup> Lewis' generations theory finds its most notable exception in D. H. Lawrence who, though contemporary with Joyce and Mann, reacted to the death he saw in industrial society with a compulsive celebration of life. Lewis preserves the clean lines of his history by the simple maneuver of ignoring Lawrence altogether in his discussion of the first generation. Any reader who rages less for order can locate Lawrence within the Lewis schema by consulting Graham Hough's *The Dark Sun* (available in Putnam's new Capricorn paperback series, \$1.25). The excellent chapter on the doctrine of Lawrence raises the novelist to a philosophic respectability that those repelled by the phallic cults of Taos might understandably miss. Lawrence's intuitions, like

his novels, are at their best neither cheap nor vulgar but raw. Above all, Lawrence's particular notion of polarities—the lion and unicorn are enemies but depend each on the other for existence—could be studied with profit by Jung and Sorokin as well as the rest of us.

<sup>4</sup> The statement should stand. But we might note, too, the words of French socialist Daniel Mayer, president of the League for the Rights of Man, concerning Malraux' silence (unless

he wept at cabinet meetings) after the suppression in June of *La Gangrène*, a book in which Algerian students detail the obscenities practiced upon them during questioning by the Paris police: "We ask M. Malraux . . . what he thinks of this new affair, and I do not hesitate to say that if he does not accept an investigation, I shall henceforth consider the André Malraux whom I knew a dead man." (Cf. *The Nation*, July 19, 1959.)

## THE POLITICAL-CULTURAL SCENE

### I.

Raymond Williams. *Culture and Society 1780-1950*. (Columbia University Press), 1958. \$5.00.

To a larger extent than perhaps most men are willing to recognize, our lives are intimately shaped by the age, the place, the work, and the "climate of opinion" in which they are spent. This important truth was first propagated on a wide scale by late nineteenth-century social prophets, most notably by Marx, and had a profoundly liberating effect in an age caught in a fearful deadlock between the massive opposing interests of rich and poor. In effect, Marx provided social reformers with an awareness regarding the social organism analogous to that which Freud provided later for the study and, as it was thought, emancipation of the individual. As Marx put it in his *Critique of Political Economy* (1859), "The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life." That man was able to deliberately shape his own total environment simply by controlling the material conditions of production was an idea that appealed by its very simplicity. The tragedy has been that the Western democracies have not been as successful in using the truth in this insight to set their own houses in order as they might have been, while in the

service of Marxist secularism it has produced a totally new, highly self-conscious, and elaborately planned culture that now threatens to achieve a dominant role in shaping the one great society of the future.

It is not the least of the many merits of Mr. Raymond Williams' remarkable new study, therefore, that it clarifies what might be called the great tradition of English social criticism out of which this insight arose. In tracing the development of this tradition from its beginnings in the early responses of Burke, Coleridge, and Cobbett to the emerging industrial, democratized society, down through the great Victorians, to the latter-day responses of George Orwell and T. S. Eliot, Mr. Williams makes clear both our debt to the tradition and the present need for some serious revaluations if it is to continue its indispensable service of sustaining and guiding Western culture.

The source of the tradition, in Williams' view, is to be found in Burke's concept of society as an "organic" complex, "where the emphasis is on the interrelation and continuity of human activities, rather than on separation into spheres of interest, each governed by its own laws" (p. 11). The "variations and new definitions" which the author would now apply to the tradition as we have inherited it from the Victorians are based on a criticism of the present-day

formula of thought and feeling "masses=mob," with its implicit "spheres of interest" assumption regarding the proper political and social organization of society. The stock response of the democracy—majority rule—mobism and vulgarity, to some extent inevitable for nineteenth-century social critics who were confronted by an unprecedented situation, must, Williams persuasively argues, be discarded. "Masses are other people. There are in fact no masses. . . . The fact is, surely, that a way of seeing other people which has become characteristic of our kind of society, has been capitalized for the purposes of political or cultural exploitation" (p. 300). For the outmoded, unjust, and dangerous attitudes concealed in such terms as "masses" and "service" Williams recommends the substitution of attitudes expressed by the terms "community" and "solidarity." Only then can an industrial democracy achieve the effective community of experience, the common culture indispensable to fruitful communication.

These provocative proposals in the book's lengthy Conclusion are in themselves of great interest, but what for many readers may prove to be the more enduring part of the study is the author's masterly survey of English social commentary over the past 170 years which leads up to these proposals. This historical survey is divided chronologically into three parts: *A Nineteenth-Century Tradition* (1780–1870); *Interregnum* (1870–1914); and *Twentieth-Century Opinions* (1914–1950). Starting from the central social facts of modern European history—the metamorphosis, through the impact of the Industrial and French Revolutions, of society's material means of production, of its structure and organization, and of the ideological terms by which it expressed its new self-consciousness—Williams concentrates on the

selected key terms "culture," "democracy," "class," "industry," and "art" to trace the evolving pattern of modern democracy. The paradigmatic term is "culture," which is shown as evolving from Coleridge's use of the term "cultivation" to T. S. Eliot's consideration of the "levels" of "culture." This evolution in turn supplies the evidence for William's simple but profoundly significant thesis: "Where culture [at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution] meant a state or habit of mind, or the body of intellectual and moral activities, it means now, also, a whole way of life" (p. xviii).

What is particularly impressive about Williams' study is his cogent demonstration of the close interaction of political, social, and aesthetic attitudes on one another in an increasingly industrialized England, and his reassessment along the way of important figures who were concerned with this interaction in their writings. As the author explains in his Introduction, he is "examining, not a series of statements by individuals" (p. xix), not "'thought' in the common opposition to 'feeling,'" but rather "a special immediacy of experience, which works itself out, in depth, to a particular embodiment of ideas that become, in themselves, the whole man" (p. 5). It is this ability to gauge the exact result of a "whole man" confronting a "whole society" that makes this book so different from and superior to most investigations of its kind. Cobbett, Southey, and Morris, for example, are given a new importance, and more familiar figures like Mill and Arnold are "placed" in such a way that the reader sees them with greater sureness and clarity than before. To see the fundamental similarity of intention behind Burke's Conservatism and Cobbett's Radicalism is to see both figures, as well as their society, in a fresh and instructive light. With



almost every figure that he discusses Williams manages incisive, always engaging, and often brilliant readings of the relevant texts. The impressive sanity of a passage from Plekhanov, the conservatism of I. A. Richards' underlying commitments, the place of sex in Lawrence's social gospel, Mill's reaction away from Coleridge after the great essay of 1840—these and many other insights emerge from Williams' sensitive explication of particular passages.

It would be too much, of course, to claim that the result is a new *Critique of Political Economy*. The book is too modest in intention and too temperate in argument for that. But that one can think in such terms at all is evidence of the stature of the book. Like Marx's *Critique*, it explores through a careful study of the past some of the fundamental aspects of our present technological, mass culture with a persuasiveness that will almost certainly reorient the thinking and language of those who read the book, whatever their personal persuasion and their reservations about the concluding proposals. If there is any reservation to be made about the book as a whole, it arises from the author's reluctance, perhaps he would in modesty say his inability, to consider the role of religion in shaping a "whole way of life." Of the three major criteria at work today in the struggle to decide the culture of the future, the Communist, the Humanist, and the Christian, Mr. Williams would seem to be concerned primarily with elucidating and affirming the second, and he may therefore be committed to reticence. Yet his criterion of "equality of being"—that no one will think himself better as a *human being* than his neighbor—is certainly a commitment of a high order, and while it is a noble and indeed a Christian one, one wonders if it is, in itself, viable as a vision by which masses of men are to set their

"standards of excellence." How in fact is equality of being to be won without a specific, comprehensive, eschatological vision to energize the aspirations of a mass society? Mr. Williams' tone and temper as well as his ultimate vagueness are reminiscent of Matthew Arnold, and the Arnoldian temper, for all its humanity and decency, seems finally to appeal to the sensitive, intellectual "remnant," not to the great, aggregated masses of men and women for whom Mr. Williams obviously has the deepest respect and to whom, at least tacitly, he addresses himself. But whatever its limitations, Americans as well as his English countrymen are greatly in Mr. Williams' debt for this illuminating and provocative book on a critically important subject. It is a book, one feels, that will become an essential part of the great tradition with which it is concerned.

WILLIAM A. MADDEN

2.

"*Racial and Moral Crisis.*" Ernest Q. Campbell and Thomas F. Pettigrew, in an article on the role played by Little Rock ministers in 1957 (*AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY*, March 1959), trace the power of prayer to quiet the storms of conscience. A week after the Columbus Day 1957 "prayers for peace" held in churches throughout Little Rock, the authors interviewed twenty-nine of the unhappy city's "influential" clergymen, two of them Jewish, none Roman Catholic. Of the twenty-nine, five were inactive segregationists, eight were active integrationists, and sixteen were inactive integrationists who believed they had done enough to acquaint their congregations with their sympathies. Since the last personally favored integration, and belonged to denominations whose national and regional voices had advocated it, their comparative silence may seem

at first odd, though less so when one recalls that, despite six "active integrationists," before the opening of Central High School in 1957 only two ministers had seen fit to devote their Sunday sermons to the forthcoming social trauma. The sociologists account for this by calling attention to the known segregationist sentiments of the Little Rock congregations and, equally important, to the inconsistencies that inflicted both personal conviction and the broad church positions. The national and regional churches, having made their statements, did little to back them up; as the authors put it, the hierarchy "does not wish [the minister] to damn his listeners to hell—unless somehow he gets them back in time to attend service next Sunday." Personal conviction—or, in sociological jargon, the Self-Reference System of the ministers—was complicated by their concept of their lifework. Should the minister not "maintain a fellowship in peace, harmony and Christian love"? Must he not be in a position to "do good"—that is, to do nothing so that he can remain in the office where it is possible to do something? Can he be sure he is doing God's work unless he can see results—that is, a growing congregation and an expanding plant? If the authors report accurately, the quiet clergy of Little Rock are no surprise. And yet, they did need some justification. And they apparently found it. The first dodge was found in the Protestant "doctrine" of vertical certitude and horizontal relativism. A putative minister could assure his people: "My stand is known . . . but, remember, we are every man a priest and each with equal access to God." The other two sops were rhetorical: a concentration in sermons on deeper issues, such as a brotherly love that had reached the eighth degree of abstraction; or a secret sins approach, in which the faithful were assured that

"God is watching" through some peephole in the clouds. But, the most important source of peace of soul in a society tossed by crisis was, of course, Christian prayer. On Columbus Day 1957, churches throughout Little Rock prayed for tranquility. Commented a segregationist minister, "You certainly can't go wrong by praying. Praying can't hurt you on anything." The ministers had talked to George. Now they could proceed with youth dances and church suppers. The rest was up to Him. Yet, the rabid segregationists were angry at the quiet conversations held with George. Their wrath served only to confirm the ministers in their self-conviction of courage and in their confidence in a God who does not work through men. And yet, do we dare cast stones?

(W. B.)

### 3.

*The Function of Poetry.* Two interesting articles, each of which marks out the critical antipodes in the continuing debate on the nature of the poetic utterance, have appeared in recent issues of *RENAISSANCE*. Writing in the Winter 1957 issue, John Julian Ryan says some rather harsh things about the New Criticism, leaving no doubt as to where he stands on the thorny question of the function and value of poetry:

Taken in its broadest sense, the most important art in the history of mankind has always been, and potentially still is, the art of poetry. With its aid, we can be disposed to lead lives that are heroic and sacramental; and without that aid, we tend to lead the lives of scientific and pietistic barbarians.

Such a frankly utilitarian approach to poetry runs counter to a theory of poetry which has dominated the American critical scene during the past several decades. Reacting violently against those who would misuse poetry, who would crudely exploit it as a propa-

gandistic weapon or as a mere means toward the attainment of some extraneous end, the American new critics, somewhat understandably, have attempted to wrench the poem out of its historical, human context in order to emphasize its unique separateness from other forms of human discourse. Yet in their passionate quest for ontological poetic purity they have undoubtedly overstated the case for the poem as an entity outside of time and space. To hurl epithets, however, as does Mr. Ryan in the aforementioned article—"precious," "amoralist," "esthete," "neop Epicurean"—accomplishes nothing.

A much more sober and consequently more devastating analysis of the inherent weakness of the New Criticism can be found in W. K. Wimsatt's statement in the January 1958 number of *NEW SCHOLASTICISM*. In an article entitled "Poetic Tension: A Summary" Professor Wimsatt makes the following telling observation:

Certain arts of visual design, abstract and arabesque, and perhaps certain kinds of music, strongly invite being described in a purely formal way. But poetry is an art of words. And words have meanings. And characteristically, in its greatest instances, poetry has dealt with all the most intense, the hottest, human experiences and problems: with love and hate, sex, war, murder, youth and age, sickness and death, skepticism and faith—with religion. There is a certain sense in which religion is the only theme of important poetry. To tell your audience in the classroom or critical journal that despite all this warmth and depth of content, the only thing that matters, the defining character, is something called 'form' or 'structure' or 'beauty of language'—this will be a fairly cold device, a kind of sellout, a maneuver almost cynical.

One need not be guilty of a crudely utilitarian view of poetry in order to subscribe to the truth of that statement.

For a somewhat different view of the

situation we have in the Spring 1959 issue of *RENAISSANCE* an article entitled "Poetry and Communication" by Father William J. Rooney of Catholic University's English Department. Basing his position on a comparative analysis of selected texts from Plato and Aristotle, in which, according to Father Rooney, "Aristotle's approach to poetry [is] sounder than that of Plato," the writer arrives at the following conclusions, conclusions which smack curiously of the quasi-esthetic formulated by Joyce's Stephen Dedalus. Utilizing a Shakespearean sonnet as his case study of what he considers the ideal literary encounter, Father Rooney makes the following observations:

We who overhear this speech [the sonnet] have no other urge except to rest in the contemplation of this perfect speech object, content to have it be just what it is. . . . With the sonnet I contemplate the form disinterestedly, in complete disengagement from it. . . . The ideal . . . is to make the response as pure as possible.

Readers of *CROSS CURRENTS* might be reminded here of Father Ong's "A Dialectic of Aural and Objective Correlatives," (Summer 1958), in which a propos of the nature of the literary experience there occur the following remarks:

... Once we recognize explicitly the fact that all poetry and all literature is, from one point of view, a moment in a dialogue, the role of the critic becomes both clearer and more complicated. If the art 'object' which is 'made' of words were really that—an 'object'—alone, one could talk about it without becoming involved in it in the way in which, despite everything, the critic is constantly becoming involved. However, since it is not simply an object, but also something that someone utters after . . . the lines of literature and of criticism are necessarily interwoven. They are interwoven as words are interwoven, each belonging to a certain moment in the totality of activity emanating from human life in history.

For further insights into the vulnerability of the critical position represented by Father Rooney, cf. Nathan F. Scott's incisive analysis in the Spring 1957 issue of *CROSS CURRENTS*.

*A Casebook on Ezra Pound* (Thomas Y. Crowell) reminds us that ten years ago this largely academic controversy erupted violently on the American politico-cultural scene. The editors, William Van O'Connor and Edward Stone, have skillfully drawn together the most important contributions to the furious controversy that broke out upon the awarding of the Bollingen Prize for poetry in 1948 to Pound's *Pisan Cantos*. The *Casebook* makes for fascinating reading, raising as it does some significant questions concerning anti-Semitism, politics and poetry, the relationship between the poet and society, and, what is probably the key question in the whole affair: "How far is it possible, in a lyric poem, for technical embellishments to transform vicious and ugly matter into beautiful poetry?" Here was the crucial test for that theory of poetry which we have come to call the New Criticism. For men like Eliot, Auden, Tate, Warren—men rightly or wrongly associated with the New Criticism—were among the judges who decided that the prize for the best poetry written in 1948 was to go to a body of poetry the political and moral content of which is repugnant to most civilized men everywhere. In thus throwing down the gauntlet, the Bollingen committee unleashed a storm which can be compared in its intensity, if not its scope, to the Dreyfus or Sacco and Vanzetti cases. The highlights of this fascinating affair are conveniently gathered into this little paperback volume for all who would ponder its significance.

(J. J. G.)

#### 4.

*Existence. A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology*. (Basic Books, Inc., 1958). The editors of this important volume, Rollo May, Ernest Angel and Henri F. Ellenberger, aim to bridge the gap between a comparatively new type of psychiatry prevalent in France, Switzerland and Germany, known as *Daseinsanalyse* (existential analysis), and American psychiatry and psychology. In Parts II and III, the first English translations are presented of seven fundamental articles, principally in the nature of illustrative cases histories, written by pioneers in the related movements of phenomenological psychiatry (E. Minkowski, E. W. Straus and V. E. von Gebattel) and existential analysis (L. Binswanger and R. Kuhn). Part I contains introductory essays by Rollo May (*The Origins and Significance of the Existential Movement in Psychiatry and Contributions of Existential Psychotherapy*) and Henri F. Ellenberger (*A Clinical Introduction to Psychiatric Phenomenology and Existential Analysis*). The essays of May locate the new movement in a broad historico-cultural context, relate it to and distinguish it from existential philosophy and contrast the existential and psychoanalytical approaches in psychiatry. The essay by Ellenberger is a model of clarity, and formulates the essential character of existential analysis:

"What Binswanger termed *Daseinsanalyse* (Existential Analysis) represents a synthesis of psychoanalysis, phenomenology and existentialist concepts modified by original new insights. It is a reconstruction of the inner world of experience of psychiatric patients with the help of a conceptual framework inspired by Heidegger's studies in the structure of human existence." In connection with the implications of existential analysis

for psychotherapy, he declares: "It should be understood that the activity of an existential analyst does not usually differ *seemingly* from what the ordinary psychiatrist does. He studies the patient's behavior, speech, writings, dreams, and free associations and reconstructs his biography. While doing this, however, he observes in a somewhat different way and clarifies his observations within the framework of existential concepts. This often makes possible a much deeper understanding and, consequently, may furnish new approaches for psychotherapy. In his interpersonal relationship to his patients, he will also be aware of the phenomenon of 'encounter' and distinguish it from transference and countertransference reactions (in the stricter original sense of these words)."

It is made very clear in the introductory essays that existential philosophy and existential analysis are distinct, that phenomenological psychiatry and existential analysis are also distinct, and that existentialist psychotherapy is something else again, not to be identified with any of the preceding. It is also made clear to what extent philosophy enters into existential analysis without compromising the latter's autonomy, and to what extent the phenomenological and existential approaches are anti-psycho-analytic. Essentially, they are not **opposed to psychoanalysis**. They are opposed only to a self-sufficient psychoanalysis, one that functions in independence of a broader "anthropological" context of an existential character and reduces the human being to an object or to a subject in contact with objects, instead of viewing him as a "being-in-the-world," a way of looking at him that undercuts the subject-object dichotomy.

The general reader might rest satisfied with a reading of Part I and the article in Part III by L. Binswanger en-

titled *The Existential Analysis School of Thought*. The professional will be interested in the case histories, and the general reader would be well advised to read them also. Only the case histories provide a basis for some evaluation of this unfamiliar psychiatric approach. It is only fair to point out, however, that both types of reader will probably find the material in Parts II and III extremely difficult. In general, there is a heaviness, an awkwardness and an elusiveness about the style and an exasperating incompleteness about much of the content in these sections. There are reasons for this that are not always the fault of the editors and translators. The descriptions of actual existential analyses are adequate, but detailed accounts of therapeutic procedure are lacking. Nowhere does one learn how the therapist, in empathic "encounters" with his patients, gradually helps them to change their "world-design," their mode of "being-in-the-world," from a blocked and distorted one to one that is appropriate and would signify an alleviation or remedy of their disturbed condition. Yet this is the ultimate aim of existential analysis.

In spite of everything, however, the book must be recommended with enthusiasm to all who are interested in the science of man, to psychiatrists and psychologists first of all, and to theologians, philosophers, sociologists, literary men, and the rest, because of its informative character and the importance of the basic orientation to man in general and to the mentally and emotionally disturbed person in particular that it stresses in contrast to the fragmented, objectivated and alienated approach so prevalent in the life and science of modern man.

It would prove interesting and helpful for purposes of critical evaluation for the reader to consult the eight fun-



damental questions posed to the existential analysts from the psychoanalytic viewpoint in the periodical *Psychoanalysis and the Psychoanalytic Review* (Winter 1958-59, pp. 77-8). A short essay on existential analysis and psychotherapy by L. Binswanger follows in the same issue, pp. 79-83.

## 5.

*Psychology and Religion*. The February 1959 issue of PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY, a monthly under Protestant auspices, testifies to the generosity and good-will of its editors. The entire number is devoted to "Catholic Viewpoints in Pastoral Psychology," with Dr. Alexander A. Schneiders, Professor of Psychology, Fordham University, as guest editor. All of the contributors are noted Catholic theologians, psychologists or psychiatrists.

The editorial deals with the basic attitude of the Catholic Church toward new scientific developments in general and toward modern psychology and psychotherapy in particular. It stresses the unquestionably positive, but at the same time essentially conservative approach characteristic of the Catholic Church in such matters.

The articles included are good examples of this attitude in practice. Father William C. Bier, S. J., distinguishes clearly between guidance, as an off-shoot of education, counseling, as based on psychology, and psychotherapy, as deriving from psychiatry. He then tries to locate the precise task of pastoral counseling, distinguishing in it a proximate (psychological), and an ultimate (religious) goal, a distinction of great practical importance.

Francis J. Braceland, M.D., Psychiatrist-in-Chief of the Institute of Living, presents a forthright examination of good and bad relationships between psychiatry and the Catholic clergy. Father

Charles A. Curran insists that "to understand at the deepest level of another's feelings and reactions is an immeasurably more profound, complex, and delicate kind of understanding than simply knowing the meaning of the words the person uses." Father Gustave Weigel, S.J., contributes an article in which he discusses the role of the clergyman in the new era of peace now prevailing between psychiatry and religion.

"Sanctity and the Problem of Neurosis" by Rev. Noel Mailloux, O.P., Director of the Center for Research in Human Relations (Montreal), is perhaps the most stimulating of all the articles, from both the psychological and the religious points of view. It concerns itself with the fact that even "the most holy man will always have to struggle strenuously to preserve an inner integration, whose precarious condition never ceases to be threatened by the hazardous vicissitudes of life." The final essay is an interesting report on research procedures used in the Loyola University NIMH Project on Religion and Mental Health.

There are also "Notes and News" on persons, projects and organizations; the issue concludes with a series of excellent reviews of current books relating to the topic of religion and psychology and with a fairly extensive bibliography in Pastoral Psychology.

Naturally enough, most of the articles are rather general and sketchy. They give ample evidence, however, of the professional competence of the contributors and attest the encouragement the Catholic Church is presently giving those of her members who manifest an intelligent, vital and positive interest in the science of pastoral psychology.

## 6.

*Psychology and the Cross* (Bruce 1959). Canon G. Emmet Carter's book gives

modest but convincing indications for a synthesis of modern psychology and Catholic theology and mysticism. The author is not content simply to make the obvious point that psychology and religion are independently legitimate fields. He also has sufficient understanding of psychological problems and too much respect for psychoanalysis to suggest that unconscious conflicts and deep-rooted anxieties can be treated by simple recourse to religious faith and practice. He does not concern himself at all with the problems of mental disease. Instead, he undertakes to demonstrate that where the unconscious and the conscious meet in human psychology, "true psychology without metaphysical bias or theological prejudice walks hand in hand with ascetical wisdom and the religious guidance of souls." What modern psychology has to say about the development of a true self is shown to be very relevant for the correct understanding of the tasks of religious and moral education. On the other hand, the virtues of Christian charity and humility are seen paradoxically as constituting the highest development of the kind of true self-assertion and adjustment emphasized in modern psychology. Satisfied that most of the important distinctions have by now been made in those areas where religious and psychological factors often tend to become confused, readers should welcome this short book as an introduction to the positive synthesis that has yet to be constructed with the materials of the psychologist and the theologian as they relate to a proper conception of the whole man.

(B. G.)

*Art and Architecture in Italy, 1600-1750* (Pelican History of Art, Penguin Books, \$12.50). It is a widespread point of view, recently voiced anew by Benson, that the essence of Baroque architecture is

twisted columns, broken pediments, overpowering proportions, cornices too projecting, relief too bulging, everything beyond human expectation or demand yet with no suggestion of the superhuman let alone the supernatural.

A similar response to all Baroque art is expressed by Croce, who certainly could never be suspected of hedonism:

It is an art of the unexpected and of the marvelous, which excites, stuns, stimulates the curiosity through its particular form of shock.

And considering the spirit of contemporary religious expression, which is bound to affect critics working from a Christian point of view, there are few capable of sharing E. I. Watkin's admiration for the style (cf. *Christian Art and Culture*).

Diametrically opposed points of view, then, apparently converge in a common hostility towards or mistrust of the Baroque. The reasons are obviously complex, and bewilderingly so. Quite possibly the Baroque, unlike the Gothic, may never outgrow its original pejorative meaning.

In a rather circumscribed way the art criticism of Wölfflin and Riegl has to some extent exposed the arbitrariness of some anti-Baroque bias, and subsequent studies down to the present day, principally by German and Italian scholars, have placed the meaningfulness of the Baroque beyond question. But such studies have not filtered down to become general convictions and have until recently had disappointingly little impact on English and American studies of the period.

It is particularly fortunate, then, that the task of evaluating Italian art and architecture from 1600 to 1750 should have fallen to a member of the Warburg Institute, the author of the finest works in English on Bernini and on the drawings of the Carracci, Prof. Rudolf Wittkower.

Working within obvious limitations of space, Prof. Wittkower has chosen to put the stress in such a rich period on Roman High Baroque, 1623-1675, and on its three greatest representatives, Bernini, Borromini and da Cortona. As for the areas left uncovered, such as the fascinating Venetian painting of the eighteenth century, Prof. Wittkower refers the reader to works of modern Italian scholars.

Aside from a brief discussion and rejection of Weisbach's notion of the Baroque as the art of the Counter Reformation, there is no discussion in these pages on the general concept of the Baroque. The concentration is all on the individual works of art. There are excellent analyses of space and color and point of view in sculpture, of good and bad works of art. Whether or not there is such a thing as the Baroque soul, and if so where, is not the author's concern, and his references to religion, mysticism, morals and politics are consequently kept to a minimum. Baroque music and literature are left to other specialists. The author is intent on studying artists, pictures, sculptures and buildings. In detail.

As might be expected, Bernini dominates the book. And well he might, considering the incredible variety of his accomplishments: the development of a revolutionary type of funeral monument, the placement for the first time of a monumentalized rustic fountain in the center of a square, the radical revision of the classic concept of beauty, a new solution for the old problem of the truncated chest in busts, a new type of equestrian monument, and most decisive of all, the unification of all the arts to one overwhelming effect while discovering at the same time the potentialities of concealed and directed light.

But if Bernini dominates the period,

he does not monopolize it. The careful analysis of Sant'Ivo, San Carlo alle Quattro Fontane, the Oratory of San Filippo Neri, makes clear that their creator, Borromini, was motivated by a completely different spirit from Bernini—the spirit of Gothic Mannerism. And certainly da Cortona's elegant Mannerism, his magnificent fresco painting and his notion of a dynamic centerless architecture has little in common with Bernini or Borromini.

If the High Baroque was anything at all, it was richly diversified: severity and exuberance, sensuality and mysticism, bad and good art. If a common denominator is to be found among its three leading artists it is in the unexpected increasingly restrained classical tone of their later works.

If the variety of Roman High Baroque is so little known, it is to be expected that the Late Piedmontese Baroque is virtually the property of the *cognoscenti*. Yet there are a multitude of reasons why this type of less monumental, more mysterious and elusive architecture should have a wide appeal; it did in fact have a strong influence in France and Germany. This section of the book will consequently be the most delightful surprise to most readers, who will have the advantage of approaching the great architect Guarini not as a theological-mathematical obscurantist but as a revolutionary artist and priest much concerned with the relationship of architecture and infinity. The other members of the great Piedmontese triumvirate, Juvarra and Vittone, will be found equally worthy of the detailed study Prof. Wittkower gives them.

Though the stress of this work falls on architecture in the widest sense of the word, there is a complete survey of sculpture and painting. The chapters on Caravaggio and the Carracci, in particular, deserve to be read, if only

as a corrective to the dominant heavy-handed sociological approach so well popularized by Hauser. There is also a thorough coverage of the principal Italian cities before, during and after the High Baroque, of Bologna, Naples, Venice, and the unknown gloriously Baroque Genova. For those who will persist in considering theatrical and Baroque as synonymous, the author makes one concession: there is a theatrical Baroque, and that is the Vene-

tian Baroque of Santa Maria della Salute. If this be theatrical, let us make the most of it.

Though the plates are occasionally disappointing, they are more than made up for by a superb bibliography on cities, artists and works of art which adds to the indispensability of what gives all signs of being accepted as a "basic" work.

(S. H.)

## PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

### 1.

*Eglise Vivante*. We hope that many of our readers will discover the value of this extraordinary Catholic missionary magazine, which is published six times each year under the direction of the S.A.M. (*Société des Auxiliaires des Missions*) at the following addresses: 44 rue des Bernardins, Paris, V, France, and 61 Boulevard Schreurs, Louvain, Belgium. Residents of the United States may procure *Eglise Vivante* through Moore-Cottrell Subscription Agencies, Inc., North Cohocton, New York.

First of all, a word about the *Société des Auxiliaires des Missions* is in order. It is a society of missionary priests whose members serve in mission lands under Ordinaries native to the countries in question. In the nature of things, such a life requires a high sense of dedication and a willingness on the part of those who embrace it to make an all-out effort to adapt themselves—both physically and psychologically—to conditions in a mission land.

S.A.M.'s founder was Father Vincent Lebbe, a Belgian missionary, who aroused considerable controversy in Church circles some years ago by urging the rapid creation of a native priesthood and hierarchy in Asia. Despite consider-

able opposition, the Holy See proceeded to consecrate Chinese and Indian bishops—an undertaking which has had far-reaching results. Father Lebbe himself became a Chinese citizen and devoted his life to the spiritual and material welfare of his adopted people. He died during World War II as a result of mistreatment at the hands of Chinese Communists.

*Eglise Vivante* is a magazine of high intellectual content embracing not only missionary actions of the Church in the strict sense of the term but also the many and varied manifestations of human culture that bear on the apostolate. For the purposes of this analysis, we shall limit ourselves to a brief consideration of the magazine's contents during the year 1958.

As a general rule, most issues are divided into three sections: (1) articles dealing with missionary problems or experiences; cultural problems in mission lands; relations to non-Catholic groups; non-Christian religions; social and political movements.

(2) The section entitled *Des Quatres Vents*, which comments briefly on current developments in mission lands; and

(3) The section entitled *Les Livres*, which contains brief but remarkably

keen reviews of current books in the field of mission literature, history, politics and sociology.

During the year 1958, the following articles of unusual interest appeared in the magazine. A major part of the January-February issue was devoted to Father Jules Monchanin (1895-1957), a member of the S.A.M. who had founded, along with a French Benedictine priest, a Christian *ashram* or hermitage in South India. Through the tributes of Father Monchanin's friends and associates we receive a moving account of this holy man's attempt to present Christian mysticism to the people of India in terms that reflect India's own mystical tradition.

The March-April issue contains an analysis by Jean Frisque on the possible development of a single, world-wide civilization and the effects such a development would have on the Church. Another article deals with the Church in Africa; and a third with religious festivals and legends of South Africa.

The May-August issue reviews the "Missionary World during 1957"—a comprehensive survey of developments affecting Catholic missions all over the world, area by area. Included here is also an account of major happenings affecting non-Catholic groups and missionaries as well.

In the September-October issue two articles are particularly noteworthy: *Scandale ou nouvel espoir?* by Father H. Haas of the S.A.M. reviews the urgent problem of Asian and African students in foreign lands, pointing out that half of the 120,000 foreign students from those areas have received scholarships for the U.S.S.R. and other Communist-dominated countries; he asks what we in the West are doing for foreign students in our own lands. Next, Father Henry Van Straelen, S.V.D., a professor at the Catholic University in Nagoya,

Japan, takes up some of the main obstacles to the Church's missionary appeal in the Far East and pleads for a better understanding of non-Christian cultures by missionaries and all other Catholics.

Finally, the November-December issue contains excellent summaries by J. Bruls and A. Sohler of the Church's world-wide missionary expansion during Pius XII's reign. Also included in this issue is an interesting discussion by Father W. A. Kaschmitter of Maryknoll on international social justice and the need for the Church to offer Christian solutions to the grave social problems that threaten world peace and the maintenance of the moral order.

(R. J. C.)

## 2.

"*Liturgy and Contemplation.*" This important article (in *SPIRITUAL LIFE*, June 1959) by Jacques and Raissa Maritain focuses attention upon the exaggerated claims made by certain liturgists out of what is perhaps an excessive enthusiasm for public liturgical prayer. These enthusiasts would set up a hostile dichotomy between liturgy and contemplation, and, as the Maritains demonstrate with authority and conviction, they succeed only in distorting the true meaning of both. After a survey of the writers and texts which go to make up the great tradition of Christian spirituality and contemplation, the authors make clear the distinction between and the compatibility of liturgy and contemplation. To those who would hold for the mutual exclusiveness of the two, or those who would, in the name of liturgy, dismiss contemplation as irrelevant to the needs of our times, the article addresses this strongly worded warning:

Those who turn souls aside from contemplation in the name of the liturgy



are, contrary to what they think, great enemies of the liturgy itself. Such a disregard for mental prayer and contemplation certainly does not depend on a true view of the liturgy, but on what it is fitting to call a 'pseudo-liturgical systematization.' . . . One of the great needs of our age is to understand better the mystery of the Mystical Body. It is this need that is being met by the efforts of all those, priests and laymen, who dedicate themselves with an admirable zeal to the liturgical renewal, thereby restoring so many parishes to an authentic life and to a common fervor in worship worthily rendered, and helping the faithful to realize better, through their union with the public prayer of the Church, their belonging to the Mystical Body.

• • •

It is true also that our historical age has other needs than that of St. Teresa and St. John of the Cross. But it is certainly not in the aspiration to submit everything to the primacy of the social and the communal that these true needs of our age are to be sought. As concerns the spiritual life in particular, we must today meditate on the true and authentic mystery of the Mystical Body (which transcends to the infinite the natural social, and the human communal); on the other hand it is very important that we understand—without losing or neglecting anything of the teaching of the masters on contemplation—that today contemplation asks, not to leave the cloisters and the convents, but to go out of doors and spread its wings, and to have done with the illusion, too frequent among people, that it would be reserved for specialists. 'As soon as a man is fully disposed to be alone with God, he is alone with God no matter where he may be—in the country, the monastery, the woods or the city.' . . . The great need of our age, in what concerns the spiritual life, is to put contemplation on the roads of the world.

(J. J. G.)

### 3.

*Le Père Jacques* (321 pp. Paris. Edi-

tions du Seuil, 1958), Michel Carrouges, already known for an important study of Charles de Foucauld, here gives us the moving biography of a French Carmelite priest and educator who gave extraordinary witness to Christ in Nazi Germany's Satanic concentration camps.

The book is well researched and organized. As a result of the author's extensive contacts with those who knew Père Jacques best—relatives and friends of his youthful years, teachers and colleagues in religion, his pupils, and, above all, his fellow sufferers in the concentration camps—Père Jacques emerges as a vital personality, a man of our own era faced with the problems and temptations with which we too are confronted.

He was born Lucien Bunel in Normandy in 1900, and grew up among the dark mills and factories of the Rouen-Le Havre area. His family was numerous, devout and poor. When Lucien wanted to enter the minor seminary at the age of twelve, there were no funds to finance his studies for the priesthood. Without generous support from his father's employer, young Lucien might never have become a priest. Despite his early piety, Lucien had a strong will of his own and was by temperament inclined to be critical of those in authority. Someone predicted of him: "Bunel will become either a monk or a jailbird."

Ordained to the diocesan clergy (1925) and installed as an instructor in a Catholic school for boys at Le Havre, he was not happy with his lot in life, despite his success in molding young people. One day a visit to a Carmelite nuns' convent opened up for him the vision of a more complete service for God. He read the works of St. Teresa of Avila, St. John of the Cross and the Little Flower. Full of enthusiasm, he asked his archbishop's permission to enter the Carmelite novitiate. But permission was

denied him for several long years. Finally, in 1931, he entered the Carmel of Lille, taking as his name in religion Jacques de Jésus.

Assigned as headmaster to the Carmelite school for young men at Avon, near Fontainebleau, Père Jacques distinguished himself as an educator. He had an uncanny ability to draw the best out of the students under his exacting, yet paternal care.

During the German occupation Père Jacques offered refuge to three Jewish boys and a seminarian seeking to escape the forced labor battalions. Arrested by the Gestapo in January, 1944, he was sent off with a group of French political prisoners to Germany. In his terrible odyssey through the concentration camps Père Jacques—because he was a monk—was particularly exposed to the hatred and ridicule of the anti-Christian Nazis. But neither tortures nor privations made him lose his dignity. Even in Mauthausen he exercised his priestly functions, impressing Frenchmen, Poles, Communists and even some Germans with his manly courage. Worn out by suffering, he died in Linz a few weeks after the liberation.

This book is a disturbing experience, for it carries us back to the recent past with its bitter memories, ugly fears and the gloomy spectacle of man's cruelty to man. Yet it is also a book of hope. The example of men like Père Jacques will help others find the courage to take up their crosses in the spirit of Christian faith.

(R. J. C.)

### 3.

The long-heralded text of Thérèse of Lisieux's autobiographic writings has appeared in English, translated by Ronald Knox (P. J. Kennedy & Sons, 1958). In this last work he completed before his death, Msgr. Knox has taken the

pains to rework the original French into lively, colloquial English. The text is close to the saint's original, and is the only one in English based on the unedited original manuscript. It offers many new anecdotes and personal details which will make the book of interest both to new and old friends of the young Carmelite nun.

A sense of Thérèse's humanity and humor pervades this book, as it does the original, and the interesting photographs will be a surprise to anyone who has seen the usual retouched photographs. The book also gives a greater sense of Thérèse's development from section to section. It is just this sense of progress and change which the earlier highly-edited versions of her *Story of a Soul* erased.

It might be mentioned, however, that the very efforts Msgr. Knox expended to recast Thérèse's language into a comparable English version set up a slight barrier for an American. Colloquial school-girl English is different from American, but an effort of the will can surmount the annoyance.

In the March 1959 issue of *Spiritual Life*, Noel Dermot, O.C.D., presents a detailed critique of the Knox translation, entitled "The Real St. Thérèse." This is the second section of his article which opens with a tribute to the publication of the French manuscript. He is indebted to it for uncovering Thérèse's originality, her sense of irony, and even the words she chose, since these had been obscured or misunderstood in the earlier edited versions. Above all, however, it reveals the Saint's doctrine, particularly in regard to the relation between true human and true divine love. A forcible example is Thérèse's reference to "a grace received this year" in the last manuscript she wrote, shortly before her death, which in the *Story of A Soul* was lumped together with tales of charity towards disagreeable sisters in the convent, thus losing the force and

distinction it represented as a further step in her spiritual development. Father Dermot is particularly impressed with the clarity the French manuscript gives to the break between Thérèse's old and new understanding of the second commandment, since it is this deeper understanding which is the heart of her spiritual heritage.

Despite the brilliance of Msgr. Knox's translation, Father Dermot believes that in the process of de-Frenchifying and desentimentalizing the manuscript, he has toned down Thérèse's excitement to a pleasant, easy ripple. "*Doux*" is translated "delightful"; "*tendresse*" becomes "kindness." Sometimes the sense is changed, as when "*un torrent de larmes*" becomes "the tears came to my eyes," and a "*glorieuse épreuve*" becomes "a strange affliction." Where Thérèse says "Jesus," Knox always says "Our Lord." Father Dermot presents several longer passages in which Knox has rather substantially changed the thought as well as the style. He himself would like to see a more pedestrian, literal translation of the original.

These comments, however, should not make us less grateful for the possession of an English version into which Ronald Knox poured so much art and love, and which should become a modern spiritual classic.

Since so much publicity has been given to the publication of Thérèse's original photographs and manuscripts, there may well be some readers who would like a sane biographical guide to this surprisingly mysterious saint. Pantheon has brought out an English translation of the eighth revised German edition of *The Hidden Face* by Ida Friederike Goerres, first written in 1944, before any fragments of the unrevised autobiography had appeared in print. It is a tribute to her knowledge of history, of sanctity and human nature, as well as her patient exploration

of available sources that she has had to revise so little of her material in the light of the publication of Thérèse's original writings. The book does contain Frau Goerres's comments on this recently published material, and it reveals her digestion of many of the critical commentaries their appearance has stimulated. There is a dramatic quality in this biography since the author herself is searching for a key to the *why* of Thérèse's canonization. Her informed, sophisticated mind was quite aware of what appeared to be a similarity between Thérèse's form of spirituality and the nineteenth century bourgeois ideal. Frau Goerres was confused and puzzled by the meaning of the Church's action in declaring this girl a model for us today. It was the sight of an unretouched photograph that determined her "to pursue the riddle of her look and her smile—so different from the honeyed insipidity of the usual representations of her. Who was Thérèse of the Child Jesus in reality?"

*The Hidden Face* is the dramatic answer to this question as it develops through the people, places and the books which influenced Thérèse consciously or otherwise. With great restraint in her use of factual details, the author goes on to examine the meaning and importance of these influences as they affected Thérèse. The proportion is just right for those who are not interested in small gossip, but would like to know enough about the Martin family life, for instance, to see in what way it was a help and in what way a hindrance to a genuine spiritual life.

Thérèse's sister Céline said during the process of canonization that "...the chief virtues I saw practised at home were the observance of the holiness of Sunday, and contempt for the world." Frau Goerres uses the statement as a springboard for her analysis of the reaction of the Church in nineteenth cen-

tury Europe to the secularization of the Western world. She presents the state of mind which made Catholics feel it not only right but heroic to sever all links with contemporary life and society. It was surely a major influence on Thérèse, since both her parents thought of the lay state as a substitute for—and, ideally an imitation of—life in the monastery.

The author is not tempted, however, despite a critical awareness of the limitations of such a religious outlook, to minimise the gifts given to Thérèse by her parents. She was encouraged to think seriously about religion from her earliest years. Pauline, her second "mother," taught her to trust her own reason and inspiration for answers to doctrinal difficulties at the same time that she was given an ardent love for the sacraments and a thorough training in obedience to ecclesiastical authority. It is interesting to note that it was under the influence of her sisters and the Carmelites that she pressed her case to the Pope for early entry into the order. The Martins believed obedience was not merely passive.

They were also capable of great love, and Frau Goerres gives a convincing case for the origin of Thérèse's mature spirituality in this love which she knew was always ready to forgive and to support her. The author's sensitive understanding of a growing Thérèse and her humiliations in a school for whose social life she was ill-fitted are as penetrating as her discussion of the saint's life within the family.

The author's grasp of the spiritual life within the Carmel and elsewhere is equally praiseworthy. Of particular interest is her discussion of the doctrinal implications of "the Holy Face," which Thérèse added to her name in religion, as well as of the meaning of "the child Jesus" which she chose at first. It is the incredible humiliation of divine majesty which was involved in

the veneration of the Child Jesus, not an appeal to maternal instincts. The analysis of the relation of the emotions to worship in her discussion of Thérèse's aridity is equally illuminating. And perhaps most memorable of all is the last chapter in which she rejects "the hagiographer's temptation" to glorify her subject beyond the fallible humanity she reveals, and gently suggests that Thérèse is a "type" of all the small, usually invisible saints within the church who are neither old-nor new-fashioned, but timeless, representing constant renewal within the Mystical Body of Christ by the Holy Spirit.

If Frau Goerres reveals a weakness, it is her emphasis on the likeness between Thérèse and her sisters. She is able to say that the seven thousand changes made in Thérèse's "Story of a Soul" are "ultimately without significance." One would be more inclined to accept this point of view if the author did not, for example, repeat Pauline's idealized description of Thérèse's deathbed scene as fact. Or if she did not treat everything that appeared in *Novissima Verba* as uncritically as if Thérèse herself had written it. It is this lack of discrimination which leads one to believe that perhaps the summation of the reasons for Thérèse's canonization also leave out an element of difference. The author reveals a totally non-critical attitude to all the miracles reported as well. This in no way diminishes the value of the biography since the author's careful research, her essential sanity and pervasive charity make the book one worth reading and re-reading. (S. C.)

#### 4.

*The Paradise Tree, The Living Symbols of the Church*, Sheed & Ward, \$3.50. Father Gerald Vann has put us once more in his debt. Throughout *The Paradise Tree* he shows an insight into the meaning of poetry, myth and sym-

bol which, one hopes, will have some effect on such diverse things as the reading of the Bible, the organisation of our too "rational" school curricula, the understanding of psychology, the teaching of catechism, and the appreciation of the Mass. If having such a wide effect seems to be a rather unlikely expectation, it is simply because, despite Jung and Freud, and Dante and Eliot and Read, and a host of modern critics, we have not yet come to accept the part that an immediate and deep response to imagery and symbols must play in our living. Father Vann realises the need for all we call, roughly, "the unconscious," "myth," "fiction," "poetry"; and his forte is in facing up to the discoveries of people such as Jung, and in working out the relationship between these discoveries and the life of the Church. He is particularly interesting on the "shadow."

On page 59 he has the following to say:

As a desiccated and jargon-ridden treatment of dogma can make the whole *corpus* of Christian doctrine seem remote and unreal, so too with the ten commandments. . . .

We need then to revivify our understanding of the commandments, to get back again to their real meaning; and the first step is to see them in their context, and their context is poetry, is the poem we call the Old and New Testaments. The trouble with so much catechetical work, so many sermons and instructions, seems to be that they attempt to 'paraphrase' the poem. . . .

One has to thank him for constantly making this kind of point. But the difficulty is that since poetry and myth and art, in any essential sense, are constantly undervalued by our schools and society, we can hardly be expected to know how to read the scriptures as poetry, as we perhaps might not yet have learned to read any kind of poetry whatsoever.

Father Vann's book is divided into two parts; the first is called "The Mystery"; the second, "The Mystery in the Mass." The second part is somewhat disappointing; it seems not to come together as a whole. But it raises, by implication at least, two points about the Mass: one, *when* are we going to have the needed changes in the details and structure of the Mass?

For instance, Father Vann says, in a footnote to page 165: "It is absurd to print the *Per omnia saecula saeculorum, Amen*, which concludes the doxology, and therefore the whole Canon, as though it were the beginning of the *Our Father*." It is hard to see how one can disagree with him, but who would like to say that this printing, and the chanting which it engenders at High Mass, will not continue for another 50 years?

The second point is this: can a language which in English-speaking countries is bound to be strange to at least 90% of any given congregation, carry across to that congregation symbolic meanings: Can we really maintain that a passage such as "Wisdom have I loved, and have sought her from my youth, and have desired to take her for my spouse, and I became a lover of her beauty" can really go home to an urban American or English congregation when read in Latin? Or maybe it should not go home to the congregation?

Father Vann is also helpful in stressing that the Mass is both remembrance and sacrifice. As he says, "remembrance of the facts of the redemption is essential and fundamental for christianity."

This book contains many deep insights; it helps to point out relationships which previously we have been missing. It is a pity that the second half did not come together into a more satisfying whole. The author tends also to overburden his text with quotations.

(J. J. F.)



## 5.

*Science, Religion and Christianity.* (Newman Press, \$3.50). There are several attitudes which a Christian might assume when approaching modern and contemporary thought. An extreme and, happily, an increasingly rare attitude might view this thought as the work of the devil which must be denigrated and refuted. At the other extreme would be the Christian who sees modern thought as "all sweetness and light," presenting no problems and no dangers. A more moderate view would recognize that modern thought is both good and bad and would lead to a kind of eclectic juxtaposing with Christianity of those aspects which seem compatible with it and a rejecting of what seems opposed to it. This is the attitude which most Christians, for one reason or another, must assume, but there is another attitude which is as rare as it is creative and which can arise only from one who is deeply immersed in both the modern and Christian experience. This attitude recognizes that the relation between the two experiences is neither simple opposition nor superficial harmony, but rather is dialectical. It will see the need which each has for the other and the necessity of contributing to the development of both. It is this last attitude which is so masterfully represented in this new work of the distinguished Swiss Catholic theologian, Hans Urs von Balthazar.

The book's physical slightness is no indication of its importance; it cannot be consulted for light reading or easily assimilable, clear-cut definitions and delineations of science, religion, and Christianity. There is much overlapping and interpenetration but for purposes of clarification we can understand by "science" that natural knowledge in virtue of which man has more and more come to master the world. Science and

Christianity are related by an "intermediate sphere" which is variously viewed as *Weltanschauung*, "religion," and philosophy.

Balthazar's work has two broad divisions, the first of which, "Science and Religion," is primarily a historical description of man's movement from the magical to the cosmological to the anthropological age. The second part, "Religion and Christianity," is a phenomenological-theological consideration of the contemporary confrontation (or need for confrontation) between philosophy (natural religion) and Christianity.

Balthazar adopts the Comtean description of the development of mankind in such a way that the "phases are made to occur within the comprehensive idea of perennial humanity." While sharing the modern awareness of the importance of change and process, Balthazar avoids the error which so often accompanies this awareness, namely, that of disregarding and discarding earlier human experience and insight. It is hard to see how anyone today can avoid holding some form of the development hypothesis; at the same time it must be stressed that the organic development of human experience does not necessarily oppose or reject earlier experience but assimilates, refines and brings it to fuller realization. Balthazar also succeeds admirably in escaping the opposite error insofar as he is able to retain the authentic experience and insight of the past without giving us a stagnant and static picture of the human situation.

Balthazar's prime concern is with the anthropological attitude that emerges with modern science and philosophy. In his movement from the cosmological to the anthropological stage man has lost something which was right and something which was wrong. "The right element in his history, now past, was that his whole intellectual life was embedded

in the course of nature." "The wrong element was the deification of this embracing reality, the pantheistic 'God or nature'." Nevertheless Balthazar insists that "the loss of both aspects of the past is a gain for the present. Because man is no longer—at least not wholly—sheltered in nature, he now becomes truly the master of creation, as the Genesis account makes him." Thus, as Balthazar points out, it is true that there is much that "is questionable in modern civilization, yet it is hardly an exaggeration to say that we are witnessing the advent of a new, serious, ethos of the scientific and technical age."

Balthazar refuses to see the "modern world-interpretation and philosophy" as outside the boundaries of "the great tradition; rather, they are a variation of the perennial theme." On the other hand, Balthazar is also aware that the Christian cannot be outside the modern experience without jeopardizing his Christianity. "The time of isolationism is past, both for the spirit and for religion, for, through the body, we are bound to the cosmos as a whole. Only in union with it is the human spirit meant to be perfected and to find its shelter in the eternal sphere of the Divine."

This book would be significant if for no other reason than the fact that it deals with the nature-supernature question in such a way as to place it definitively beyond any 'either/or' oppositional resolution. Not that Balthazar gives any 'solution' to this continuing question nor any simple reconciliation between nature and supernature; rather his meditation deals with both as realities having their own peculiar mysteries. It is well worth noting, as Balthazar does, that "the Fathers do not distinguish between 'nature' and 'supernature' in our modern technical sense." This enabled them and the medievals in general to view Christianity as a "univer-

sal religious phenomenon" as well as to "regard the religious beliefs of the pagan nations as particles of a universal revelation that had always been both natural and supernatural." Balthazar contends that this universal religious consciousness dissolved "at exactly the historical moment when humanity was becoming conscious of its unity."

The modern and contemporary encounter of man with himself has led, according to Balthazar, to the "crisis of natural religion." While conceding that "today, as never before in the history of mankind, the sanctuary appears defiled," Balthazar maintains that "behind this crisis of natural religion there is something that must at least be regarded as a preliminary for a definitive relation of mankind to God, if not even as one of its inner components."

Balthazar's view that the Christian must positively assimilate the modern experience is expressed in the following:

Thus the contemporary concept of God, too, has a style, which the Christian ought to recognize and in which he ought to express himself. And he should do this not only from without, diplomatically and apologetically, but from within: as a child of the age who shares its situation, its needs and abundance, and who yet knows to draw (sic) from the treasure of God's revelation entrusted to him "new things and old" (Matt. 13.52). By interpreting them rightly he will help both himself and his time.

In his comparison between "the hiddenness of God in our time" and "the Christian idea of the transcendent God," Balthazar is attempting that interior assimilation which he recommends to all Christians. It is not surprising that a Christian theologian would call attention to the fact that "modern man has had the frightful misfortune that God in nature has died for him." But what is surprising and much more important is Balthazar's insistence that "the Chris-

tian is not allowed to avoid this experience. He shares it as a human being; it may even apply to those presentations of his own religion that were themselves an impoverished cosmological form of the truth of Jesus Christ."

Modern man is characterized by solitude, by being alone with and a stranger to himself; nevertheless Balthazar contends that he seeks the absolute as passionately as every other generation. "But he will not let himself be caught either by absolute denominational claims or by idealistic and cosmological enthusiasms." And in words reminiscent of those which Gabriel Marcel used in referring to Camus, Balthazar adds, "he will not go one step beyond what he can justify with his existence, to what he can pledge himself entirely."

Balthazar's aim is never polemical, and his work can do much to stimulate reflection and dialogue. Christian presuppositions are neither veiled nor apologetized for, yet there is at the same time an openness to and respect for the profound experiences and insights of the modern and contemporary non-Christian thinker.

(E. F.)

# 6.

*More on Tillich.* The Spring 1959 issue of REVUE DE L'UNIVERSITÉ D'OTTAWA contains an article by George McLean, O.M.I., entitled "Symbol and Analogy: Tillich and Thomas." The article contains sections on "The Symbol in the Philosophy of Paul Tillich," "The Religious Symbol in the Philosophy of Paul Tillich," and corresponding sections giving "Thomistic evaluations." Fr. McLean analyzes Tillich's assertion that he means by "symbolic knowledge . . . exactly what St. Thomas means with *analogia entis*." The conclusion reached is that the differences are more significant than the similarities. While it is true that Tillich's "philosophy of sym-

bol" is a "defense of a transcendent God" which "represents an awareness of the philosophical bankruptcy which must follow on an exclusive positivism," still it involves a "subjectivism" and "relativism" which seriously limits it.

Fr. McLean finds St. Thomas' doctrine much more satisfactory in that through a kind of "mixed analogy" involving proportionality and attribution we are enabled to escape both anthropomorphism and agnosticism. "Without proportionality we could but virtually predicate things of God. Without attribution we could not avoid agnosticism. . . . Thus the Thomistic system uses its realistic conception of a radical analogy of being in all its amplitude in order to make success possible in man's highest task, knowledge of God."

Though Fr. McLean succeeds in maintaining a "reasonable objectivity" throughout, the article nevertheless manifests a "one-sidedness" which is perhaps almost inevitable in any short treatment of two such complex thinkers as Tillich and Thomas. Fr. McLean quite understandably criticizes Tillich against the background of St. Thomas' thought and in many respects this criticism seems well founded and most convincing. Still, several questions naturally come to mind. Is St. Thomas as fully adequate to the mystery of the finite-infinite relation as this article seems to imply? Is the only contribution of Tillich's "philosophy of symbol" to be found in the fact that "it is a significant step toward the notion of analogy which was developed in the peripatetic and scholastic schools of philosophy?" Or has Tillich perhaps achieved a 'creative insight' which does not simply repeat or recapture what a previous age or thinker has grasped, but which makes a unique and indispensable addition to man's awareness of his relation to the infinite?

(E. F.)

## 7.

*La doctrine morale des prophètes d'Israel* (Éditions du Seuil). The central notion in the moral doctrine of the prophets of Israel, as seen in this provocative essay by Claude Tresmontant, is the social dimension of sin.

The analysis of sin which the prophets make bears upon groups, upon collectivities: sins of nations, sins of the people of God, and, within this people, sins of dominant castes, sins of rulers, sins of the possessing classes, sins of priests, sins of false prophets, in fine, sins of the whole people implicated in those of the rulers and the priests. The sin of individuals is only rarely in view and this to the degree that these individuals—the rulers, for example—play a role in the destiny of the entire people and thus make the people sin. (p. 110)

The classical moral doctrine of the Christian occident suffers from the deficiency of being centered on the individual, on individual salvation, individual sin, and individual perfection. The perspective of the prophets (and indeed that of the general biblical tradition) is needed to correct "the filtering of individual imperfections while allowing to pass into a kind of unconsciousness the enormities of collective crime—crimes of class such as oppression, pauperism, exploitation, and economic crimes which in the end add up to genocide, and crimes of nations such as the massacres of 'colonized' or 'conquered' peoples." (p. 147)

If sin is collective and gregarious, a giving way to the tendencies inherited in the institutional structure of the milieu, holiness is personal. It consists in separating one's self from the collective norm. Holiness, however, beyond the separation it involves and the persecution it provokes, is destined to find a new community, which is no longer one of tribe, race, or blood but

the spiritual community of those who have chosen the justice and the life of God. The career of the prophet, the *nabi*, the man in whom there resides the Spirit of God, parallels that of the Chosen People itself. The same pattern is to be found in the passion of the *Mashiah* and indeed in the life of every man who suffers persecution for justice's sake.

Partly supporting and partly suggested by the prophets' insistence on the social dimension of sin, an interpretation of *adam* as signifying the human species rather than a proper name is offered by Tresmontant. (This interpretation depends also on his acceptance of the critical view that *Genesis* can be distributed into Yahvistic and Elohist texts.) This leads to a conception of original sin similar to that advanced by A. and J. Bouyssonie in their article, "Polygénisme," in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* (col. 2536 ff.) and by A. M. Dubarle in *Les sages d'Israel* (Paris: 1946, pp. 21-22). Original sin is not in this view the inheritance by the whole human race from the sin committed by one individual—this was the interpretation of St. Augustine and later Judaism—; it consists rather in each individual's inheriting the sin of humanity, of Man. In order to enter into the true life of God he is required to choose the new life in a personal and revolutionary fashion.

These concerns are developed in about one third of the book. The first half of the work is devoted to a reprise of the author's two earlier studies (*Essai sur la pensée hébraïque*, and *Etudes de métaphysique biblique*) on "the metaphysics of the Bible." The point of departure for an analysis of the biblical metaphysics is the notion of creation by a unique God. This excludes all pantheism and "demythologizes the Universe" with respect to conceptions

of the world, sensible reality, multiplicity, time, and man.

The last quarter of the work projects the development of the moral doctrine of the prophets as "subsumed dialectically" into the New Testament. The Church is presented as having become the People of God, the Israel of God, the fulfillment of the hope of Israel. The transposition of the prophetic function is presented, with a delicacy that a summary can scarcely hope to duplicate, in terms of occupation and resistance. The disciples are portrayed as *maquis*. "Iscaiot," it is suggested, is a semitic transcription of *sicarius* or "dagger-bearer." "Simon *baryona*" is derived from *biryonom*, "rebels" or "brigands" from the standpoint of the occupying powers but "members of the resistance" to their

fellow-countrymen. Between the collaborators and resisters, Jesus maintained the prophetic transcendence of His universal mission although He doubtless shared the legitimate aspiration of His people for independence. " . . . There is the recapitulation and the real presence of all the sufferings of each innocent person who has ever been massacred, downtrodden, humiliated or tortured, in the Mass of that prophet of Israel, Jeschoua of Nazareth, who was tortured unto death by an occupation police force." (p. 171)

(G. D.)

(Initialed notes for this issue have been contributed by Bernard Gilligan, William Birmingham, Sally S. Cunneen, John J. Figueroa, Eugene Fontineil, Robert J. Cunningham, Serge Hughes, George Drury, and James J. Greene.)



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